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ORCIDTuomas Sandholm
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- affiliation: Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA
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2020 – today
- 2025
[j56]Maria-Florina Balcan
, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Generalization Guarantees for Multi-Item Profit Maximization: Pricing, Auctions, and Randomized Mechanisms. Oper. Res. 73(2): 648-663 (2025)- [c332]Maria-Florina Balcan, Siddharth Prasad, Tuomas Sandholm:
Increasing Revenue in Efficient Combinatorial Auctions by Learning to Generate Artificial Competition. AAAI 2025: 13572-13580 - [c331]Ratip Emin Berker, Emanuel Tewolde, Ioannis Anagnostides, Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer:
The Value of Recall in Extensive-Form Games. AAAI 2025: 13631-13640 - [c330]Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld, Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer:
Computing Game Symmetries and Equilibria That Respect Them. AAAI 2025: 14148-14157 - [c329]Redha Taguelmimt, Samir Aknine, Djamila Boukredera, Narayan Changder, Tuomas Sandholm:
A Multiagent Path Search Algorithm for Large-Scale Coalition Structure Generation. AAAI 2025: 23313-23322 - [i132]Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld, Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer:
Computing Game Symmetries and Equilibria That Respect Them. CoRR abs/2501.08905 (2025) - [i131]Carlos Martin, Tuomas Sandholm:
Solving Infinite-Player Games with Player-to-Strategy Networks. CoRR abs/2501.09330 (2025) - [i130]Wataru Masaka, Mitsuki Sakamoto, Kenshi Abe, Kaito Ariu, Tuomas Sandholm, Atsushi Iwasaki:
The Power of Perturbation under Sampling in Solving Extensive-Form Games. CoRR abs/2501.16600 (2025) - [i129]Ioannis Anagnostides, Ioannis Panageas, Tuomas Sandholm, Jingming Yan:
The Complexity of Symmetric Equilibria in Min-Max Optimization and Team Zero-Sum Games. CoRR abs/2502.08519 (2025) - [i128]Redha Taguelmimt, Samir Aknine, Djamila Boukredera, Narayan Changder, Tuomas Sandholm:
A Multiagent Path Search Algorithm for Large-Scale Coalition Structure Generation. CoRR abs/2502.10226 (2025) - [i127]Brian Hu Zhang, Ioannis Anagnostides, Emanuel Tewolde, Ratip Emin Berker, Gabriele Farina, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Learning and Computation of Φ-Equilibria at the Frontier of Tractability. CoRR abs/2502.18582 (2025) - [i126]Brian Hu Zhang, Ioannis Anagnostides, Emanuel Tewolde, Ratip Emin Berker, Gabriele Farina, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Expected Variational Inequalities. CoRR abs/2502.18605 (2025) - [i125]Brian Hu Zhang, Tao Lin, Yiling Chen, Tuomas Sandholm:
Learning a Game by Paying the Agents. CoRR abs/2503.01976 (2025) - 2024
- [j55]Maria-Florina Balcan, Travis Dick, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Learning to Branch: Generalization Guarantees and Limits of Data-Independent Discretization. J. ACM 71(2): 13:1-13:73 (2024) - [j54]Maria-Florina Balcan, Dan F. DeBlasio, Travis Dick, Carl Kingsford, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
How Much Data Is Sufficient to Learn High-Performing Algorithms? J. ACM 71(5): 32:1-32:58 (2024) - [c328]Ioannis Anagnostides, Ioannis Panageas, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Optimistic Policy Gradient in Multi-Player Markov Games with a Single Controller: Convergence beyond the Minty Property. AAAI 2024: 9451-9459 - [c327]Michael J. Curry, Vinzenz Thoma, Darshan Chakrabarti, Stephen McAleer, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm, Niao He, Sven Seuken:
Automated Design of Affine Maximizer Mechanisms in Dynamic Settings. AAAI 2024: 9626-9635 - [c326]Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm:
On the Outcome Equivalence of Extensive-Form and Behavioral Correlated Equilibria. AAAI 2024: 9969-9976 - [c325]Redha Taguelmimt, Samir Aknine, Djamila Boukredera, Narayan Changder, Tuomas Sandholm:
A Multiagent Path Search Algorithm for Large-Scale Coalition Structure Generation. AAMAS 2024: 2489-2491 - [c324]Redha Taguelmimt, Samir Aknine, Djamila Boukredera, Narayan Changder, Tuomas Sandholm:
Efficient Size-based Hybrid Algorithm for Optimal Coalition Structure Generation. AAMAS 2024: 2492-2494 - [c323]Yongyuan Liang, Yanchao Sun, Ruijie Zheng, Xiangyu Liu, Benjamin Eysenbach, Tuomas Sandholm, Furong Huang, Stephen Marcus McAleer:
Game-Theoretic Robust Reinforcement Learning Handles Temporally-Coupled Perturbations. ICLR 2024 - [c322]Stephen Marcus McAleer, JB Lanier, Kevin A. Wang, Pierre Baldi, Tuomas Sandholm, Roy Fox:
Toward Optimal Policy Population Growth in Two-Player Zero-Sum Games. ICLR 2024 - [c321]Ted Moskovitz, Aaditya K. Singh, DJ Strouse, Tuomas Sandholm, Ruslan Salakhutdinov, Anca D. Dragan, Stephen Marcus McAleer:
Confronting Reward Model Overoptimization with Constrained RLHF. ICLR 2024 - [c320]Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Mediator Interpretation and Faster Learning Algorithms for Linear Correlated Equilibria in General Sequential Games. ICLR 2024 - [c319]Paul Friedrich, Yulun Zhang, Michael J. Curry, Ludwig Dierks, Stephen McAleer, Jiaoyang Li, Tuomas Sandholm, Sven Seuken:
Scalable Mechanism Design for Multi-Agent Path Finding. IJCAI 2024: 58-66 - [c318]Redha Taguelmimt, Samir Aknine, Djamila Boukredera, Narayan Changder, Tuomas Sandholm:
Faster Optimal Coalition Structure Generation via Offline Coalition Selection and Graph-Based Search. IJCAI 2024: 238-248 - [c317]Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld, Manolis Zampetakis, Tuomas Sandholm, Paul Goldberg, Vincent Conitzer:
Imperfect-Recall Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Their Complexity. IJCAI 2024: 2994-3004 - [c316]Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Exponential Lower Bounds on the Double Oracle Algorithm in Zero-Sum Games. IJCAI 2024: 3032-3039 - [c315]Carlos Martin, Craig Boutilier, Ofer Meshi, Tuomas Sandholm:
Model-Free Preference Elicitation. IJCAI 2024: 3493-3503 - [c314]Ioannis Anagnostides, Alkis Kalavasis, Tuomas Sandholm, Manolis Zampetakis:
On the Complexity of Computing Sparse Equilibria and Lower Bounds for No-Regret Learning in Games. ITCS 2024: 5:1-5:24 - [c313]Ioannis Anagnostides, Tuomas Sandholm:
Convergence of $\text{log}(1/\epsilon)$ for Gradient-Based Algorithms in Zero-Sum Games without the Condition Number: A Smoothed Analysis. NeurIPS 2024 - [c312]Brian Hu Zhang, Ioannis Anagnostides, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Efficient $\Phi$-Regret Minimization with Low-Degree Swap Deviations in Extensive-Form Games. NeurIPS 2024 - [c311]Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides, Federico Cacciamani, Stephen McAleer, Andreas A. Haupt, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Steering No-Regret Learners to a Desired Equilibrium. EC 2024: 73-74 - [c310]Luca Carminati, Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Nicola Gatti, Tuomas Sandholm:
Hidden-Role Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Computation. EC 2024: 106-107 - [i124]Siddharth Prasad, Ellen Vitercik, Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm:
New Sequence-Independent Lifting Techniques for Cutting Planes and When They Induce Facets. CoRR abs/2401.13773 (2024) - [i123]Paul Friedrich, Yulun Zhang, Michael J. Curry, Ludwig Dierks, Stephen McAleer, Jiaoyang Li, Tuomas Sandholm, Sven Seuken:
Scalable Mechanism Design for Multi-Agent Path Finding. CoRR abs/2401.17044 (2024) - [i122]Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm:
On the Outcome Equivalence of Extensive-Form and Behavioral Correlated Equilibria. CoRR abs/2402.05245 (2024) - [i121]Michael J. Curry, Vinzenz Thoma, Darshan Chakrabarti, Stephen McAleer, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm, Niao He, Sven Seuken:
Automated Design of Affine Maximizer Mechanisms in Dynamic Settings. CoRR abs/2402.08129 (2024) - [i120]Brian Hu Zhang, Ioannis Anagnostides, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Efficient Φ-Regret Minimization with Low-Degree Swap Deviations in Extensive-Form Games. CoRR abs/2402.09670 (2024) - [i119]Naifeng Zhang, Stephen McAleer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Faster Game Solving via Hyperparameter Schedules. CoRR abs/2404.09097 (2024) - [i118]Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Exponential Lower Bounds on the Double Oracle Algorithm in Zero-Sum Games. CoRR abs/2405.06797 (2024) - [i117]Carlos Martin, Tuomas Sandholm:
Simultaneous incremental support adjustment and metagame solving: An equilibrium-finding framework for continuous-action games. CoRR abs/2406.08683 (2024) - [i116]Carlos Martin, Tuomas Sandholm:
AlphaZeroES: Direct score maximization outperforms planning loss minimization. CoRR abs/2406.08687 (2024) - [i115]Constantinos Daskalakis, Gabriele Farina, Noah Golowich, Tuomas Sandholm, Brian Hu Zhang:
A Lower Bound on Swap Regret in Extensive-Form Games. CoRR abs/2406.13116 (2024) - [i114]Emanuel Tewolde, Brian Hu Zhang, Caspar Oesterheld, Manolis Zampetakis, Tuomas Sandholm, Paul W. Goldberg, Vincent Conitzer:
Imperfect-Recall Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Their Complexity. CoRR abs/2406.15970 (2024) - [i113]Redha Taguelmimt, Samir Aknine, Djamila Boukredera, Narayan Changder, Tuomas Sandholm:
Faster Optimal Coalition Structure Generation via Offline Coalition Selection and Graph-Based Search. CoRR abs/2407.16092 (2024) - [i112]Carlos Martin, Tuomas Sandholm:
Joint-perturbation simultaneous pseudo-gradient. CoRR abs/2408.09306 (2024) - [i111]Fabian R. Pieroth, Tuomas Sandholm:
Verifying Approximate Equilibrium in Auctions. CoRR abs/2408.11445 (2024) - [i110]Ioannis Anagnostides, Tuomas Sandholm:
Convergence of log(1/ε) for Gradient-Based Algorithms in Zero-Sum Games without the Condition Number: A Smoothed Analysis. CoRR abs/2410.21636 (2024) - [i109]Ioannis Anagnostides, Alkis Kalavasis, Tuomas Sandholm:
Barriers to Welfare Maximization with No-Regret Learning. CoRR abs/2411.01720 (2024) - [i108]Ioannis Anagnostides, Alkis Kalavasis, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computational Lower Bounds for Regret Minimization in Normal-Form Games. CoRR abs/2411.01721 (2024) - [i107]Ratip Emin Berker, Emanuel Tewolde, Ioannis Anagnostides, Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer:
The Value of Recall in Extensive-Form Games. CoRR abs/2412.19659 (2024) - 2023
- [c309]Keegan Harris, Ioannis Anagnostides, Gabriele Farina, Mikhail Khodak, Steven Wu, Tuomas Sandholm:
Meta-Learning in Games. ICLR 2023 - [c308]Stephen Marcus McAleer, Gabriele Farina, Marc Lanctot, Tuomas Sandholm:
ESCHER: Eschewing Importance Sampling in Games by Computing a History Value Function to Estimate Regret. ICLR 2023 - [c307]Ioannis Anagnostides, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Near-Optimal Φ-Regret Learning in Extensive-Form Games. ICML 2023: 814-839 - [c306]Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Team Belief DAG: Generalizing the Sequence Form to Team Games for Fast Computation of Correlated Team Max-Min Equilibria via Regret Minimization. ICML 2023: 40996-41018 - [c305]Redha Taguelmimt, Samir Aknine, Djamila Boukredera, Narayan Changder, Tuomas Sandholm:
Optimal Anytime Coalition Structure Generation Utilizing Compact Solution Space Representation. IJCAI 2023: 309-316 - [c304]Michael J. Curry, Tuomas Sandholm, John P. Dickerson:
Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions. IJCAI 2023: 2633-2641 - [c303]Carlos Martin, Tuomas Sandholm:
Finding Mixed-Strategy Equilibria of Continuous-Action Games without Gradients Using Randomized Policy Networks. IJCAI 2023: 2844-2852 - [c302]Ioannis Anagnostides, Ioannis Panageas, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
On the Convergence of No-Regret Learning Dynamics in Time-Varying Games. NeurIPS 2023 - [c301]Ioannis Anagnostides, Tuomas Sandholm:
On the Interplay between Social Welfare and Tractability of Equilibria. NeurIPS 2023 - [c300]Stephen McAleer, Gabriele Farina, Gaoyue Zhou, Mingzhi Wang, Yaodong Yang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Team-PSRO for Learning Approximate TMECor in Large Team Games via Cooperative Reinforcement Learning. NeurIPS 2023 - [c299]Siddharth Prasad, Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm:
Bicriteria Multidimensional Mechanism Design with Side Information. NeurIPS 2023 - [c298]Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides, Federico Cacciamani, Stephen McAleer, Andreas A. Haupt, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing Optimal Equilibria and Mechanisms via Learning in Zero-Sum Extensive-Form Games. NeurIPS 2023 - [i106]Carlos Martin, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing equilibria by minimizing exploitability with best-response ensembles. CoRR abs/2301.08830 (2023) - [i105]Ioannis Anagnostides, Ioannis Panageas, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
On the Convergence of No-Regret Learning Dynamics in Time-Varying Games. CoRR abs/2301.11241 (2023) - [i104]Maria-Florina Balcan, Siddharth Prasad, Tuomas Sandholm:
Bicriteria Multidimensional Mechanism Design with Side Information. CoRR abs/2302.14234 (2023) - [i103]Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides, Federico Cacciamani, Stephen Marcus McAleer, Andreas Alexander Haupt, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing Optimal Equilibria and Mechanisms via Learning in Zero-Sum Extensive-Form Games. CoRR abs/2306.05216 (2023) - [i102]Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides, Federico Cacciamani, Stephen Marcus McAleer, Andreas Alexander Haupt, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Steering No-Regret Learners to Optimal Equilibria. CoRR abs/2306.05221 (2023) - [i101]Yongyuan Liang, Yanchao Sun, Ruijie Zheng, Xiangyu Liu, Tuomas Sandholm, Furong Huang, Stephen McAleer:
Game-Theoretic Robust Reinforcement Learning Handles Temporally-Coupled Perturbations. CoRR abs/2307.12062 (2023) - [i100]Carlos Martin, Tuomas Sandholm:
Planning in the imagination: High-level planning on learned abstract search spaces. CoRR abs/2308.08693 (2023) - [i99]Luca Carminati, Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Nicola Gatti, Tuomas Sandholm:
Hidden-Role Games: Equilibrium Concepts and Computation. CoRR abs/2308.16017 (2023) - [i98]Ted Moskovitz, Aaditya K. Singh, DJ Strouse, Tuomas Sandholm, Ruslan Salakhutdinov, Anca D. Dragan, Stephen McAleer:
Confronting Reward Model Overoptimization with Constrained RLHF. CoRR abs/2310.04373 (2023) - [i97]Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Mediator Interpretation and Faster Learning Algorithms for Linear Correlated Equilibria in General Extensive-Form Games. CoRR abs/2310.15935 (2023) - [i96]Ioannis Anagnostides, Tuomas Sandholm:
On the Interplay between Social Welfare and Tractability of Equilibria. CoRR abs/2310.16976 (2023) - [i95]Ioannis Anagnostides, Alkis Kalavasis, Tuomas Sandholm, Manolis Zampetakis:
On the Complexity of Computing Sparse Equilibria and Lower Bounds for No-Regret Learning in Games. CoRR abs/2311.14869 (2023) - [i94]Ioannis Anagnostides, Ioannis Panageas, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Optimistic Policy Gradient in Multi-Player Markov Games with a Single Controller: Convergence Beyond the Minty Property. CoRR abs/2312.12067 (2023) - 2022
- [c297]Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Fast Payoff Matrix Sparsification Techniques for Structured Extensive-Form Games. AAAI 2022: 4999-5007 - [c296]Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Team Correlated Equilibria in Zero-Sum Extensive-Form Games via Tree Decompositions. AAAI 2022: 5252-5259 - [c295]Maria-Florina Balcan, Siddharth Prasad, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Improved Sample Complexity Bounds for Branch-And-Cut. CP 2022: 3:1-3:19 - [c294]Ioannis Anagnostides, Ioannis Panageas, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
On Last-Iterate Convergence Beyond Zero-Sum Games. ICML 2022: 536-581 - [c293]Ioannis Anagnostides, Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Chung-Wei Lee, Haipeng Luo, Tuomas Sandholm:
Uncoupled Learning Dynamics with O(log T) Swap Regret in Multiplayer Games. NeurIPS 2022 - [c292]Ioannis Anagnostides, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Panageas, Tuomas Sandholm:
Optimistic Mirror Descent Either Converges to Nash or to Strong Coarse Correlated Equilibria in Bimatrix Games. NeurIPS 2022 - [c291]Maria-Florina Balcan, Siddharth Prasad, Tuomas Sandholm:
Maximizing Revenue under Market Shrinkage and Market Uncertainty. NeurIPS 2022 - [c290]Maria-Florina Balcan, Siddharth Prasad, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Structural Analysis of Branch-and-Cut and the Learnability of Gomory Mixed Integer Cuts. NeurIPS 2022 - [c289]Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides, Haipeng Luo, Chung-Wei Lee, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Near-Optimal No-Regret Learning Dynamics for General Convex Games. NeurIPS 2022 - [c288]Brian Hu Zhang, Luca Carminati, Federico Cacciamani, Gabriele Farina, Pierriccardo Olivieri, Nicola Gatti, Tuomas Sandholm:
Subgame Solving in Adversarial Team Games. NeurIPS 2022 - [c287]Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Polynomial-Time Optimal Equilibria with a Mediator in Extensive-Form Games. NeurIPS 2022 - [c286]Ioannis Anagnostides, Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Andrea Celli, Tuomas Sandholm:
Faster No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated and Coarse Correlated Equilibria. EC 2022: 915-916 - [c285]Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Andrea Celli, Tuomas Sandholm:
Optimal Correlated Equilibria in General-Sum Extensive-Form Games: Fixed-Parameter Algorithms, Hardness, and Two-Sided Column-Generation. EC 2022: 1119-1120 - [c284]Ioannis Anagnostides, Constantinos Daskalakis, Gabriele Farina, Maxwell Fishelson, Noah Golowich, Tuomas Sandholm:
Near-optimal no-regret learning for correlated equilibria in multi-player general-sum games. STOC 2022: 736-749 - [i93]Stephen McAleer, Kevin Wang, John B. Lanier, Marc Lanctot, Pierre Baldi, Tuomas Sandholm, Roy Fox:
Anytime PSRO for Two-Player Zero-Sum Games. CoRR abs/2201.07700 (2022) - [i92]Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Team Belief DAG Form: A Concise Representation for Team-Correlated Game-Theoretic Decision Making. CoRR abs/2202.00789 (2022) - [i91]Michael J. Curry, Tuomas Sandholm, John P. Dickerson:
Differentiable Economics for Randomized Affine Maximizer Auctions. CoRR abs/2202.02872 (2022) - [i90]Ioannis Anagnostides, Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Andrea Celli, Tuomas Sandholm:
Faster No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated and Coarse Correlated Equilibria. CoRR abs/2202.05446 (2022) - [i89]Brian Hu Zhang, Gabriele Farina, Andrea Celli, Tuomas Sandholm:
Optimal Correlated Equilibria in General-Sum Extensive-Form Games: Fixed-Parameter Algorithms, Hardness, and Two-Sided Column-Generation. CoRR abs/2203.07181 (2022) - [i88]Ioannis Anagnostides, Ioannis Panageas, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
On Last-Iterate Convergence Beyond Zero-Sum Games. CoRR abs/2203.12056 (2022) - [i87]Ioannis Anagnostides, Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Panageas, Tuomas Sandholm:
Optimistic Mirror Descent Either Converges to Nash or to Strong Coarse Correlated Equilibria in Bimatrix Games. CoRR abs/2203.12074 (2022) - [i86]Maria-Florina Balcan, Siddharth Prasad, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Structural Analysis of Branch-and-Cut and the Learnability of Gomory Mixed Integer Cuts. CoRR abs/2204.07312 (2022) - [i85]Ioannis Anagnostides, Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Chung-Wei Lee, Haipeng Luo, Tuomas Sandholm:
Uncoupled Learning Dynamics with O(log T) Swap Regret in Multiplayer Games. CoRR abs/2204.11417 (2022) - [i84]Stephen McAleer, Gabriele Farina, Marc Lanctot, Tuomas Sandholm:
ESCHER: Eschewing Importance Sampling in Games by Computing a History Value Function to Estimate Regret. CoRR abs/2206.04122 (2022) - [i83]Gabriele Farina, Ioannis Anagnostides, Haipeng Luo, Chung-Wei Lee, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Near-Optimal No-Regret Learning for General Convex Games. CoRR abs/2206.08742 (2022) - [i82]Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Polynomial-Time Optimal Equilibria with a Mediator in Extensive-Form Games. CoRR abs/2206.15395 (2022) - [i81]Stephen McAleer, John B. Lanier, Kevin A. Wang, Pierre Baldi, Roy Fox, Tuomas Sandholm:
Self-Play PSRO: Toward Optimal Populations in Two-Player Zero-Sum Games. CoRR abs/2207.06541 (2022) - [i80]Ioannis Anagnostides, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Near-Optimal $Φ$-Regret Learning in Extensive-Form Games. CoRR abs/2208.09747 (2022) - [i79]Keegan Harris, Ioannis Anagnostides, Gabriele Farina, Mikhail Khodak, Zhiwei Steven Wu, Tuomas Sandholm:
Meta-Learning in Games. CoRR abs/2209.14110 (2022) - [i78]Carlos Martin, Tuomas Sandholm:
Finding mixed-strategy equilibria of continuous-action games without gradients using randomized policy networks. CoRR abs/2211.15936 (2022) - 2021
- [j53]Robin Schmucker, Gabriele Farina, James R. Faeder, Fabian Fröhlich, Ali Sinan Saglam, Tuomas Sandholm:
Combination treatment optimization using a pan-cancer pathway model. PLoS Comput. Biol. 17(12) (2021) - [c283]Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Faster Game Solving via Predictive Blackwell Approachability: Connecting Regret Matching and Mirror Descent. AAAI 2021: 5363-5371 - [c282]Gabriele Farina, Robin Schmucker, Tuomas Sandholm:
Bandit Linear Optimization for Sequential Decision Making and Extensive-Form Games. AAAI 2021: 5372-5380 - [c281]Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Model-Free Online Learning in Unknown Sequential Decision Making Problems and Games. AAAI 2021: 5381-5390 - [c280]Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Finding and Certifying (Near-)Optimal Strategies in Black-Box Extensive-Form Games. AAAI 2021: 5779-5788 - [c279]Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Generalization in Portfolio-Based Algorithm Selection. AAAI 2021: 12225-12232 - [c278]Gabriele Farina, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti, Tuomas Sandholm:
Connecting Optimal Ex-Ante Collusion in Teams to Extensive-Form Correlation: Faster Algorithms and Positive Complexity Results. ICML 2021: 3164-3173 - [c277]Maria-Florina Balcan, Siddharth Prasad, Tuomas Sandholm:
Learning Within an Instance for Designing High-Revenue Combinatorial Auctions. IJCAI 2021: 31-37 - [c276]Maria-Florina Balcan, Siddharth Prasad, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Sample Complexity of Tree Search Configuration: Cutting Planes and Beyond. NeurIPS 2021: 4015-4027 - [c275]Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Equilibrium Refinement for the Age of Machines: The One-Sided Quasi-Perfect Equilibrium. NeurIPS 2021: 8845-8856 - [c274]Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Subgame solving without common knowledge. NeurIPS 2021: 23993-24004 - [c273]Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Better Regularization for Sequential Decision Spaces: Fast Convergence Rates for Nash, Correlated, and Team Equilibria. EC 2021: 432 - [c272]Maria-Florina Balcan, Dan F. DeBlasio, Travis Dick, Carl Kingsford, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
How much data is sufficient to learn high-performing algorithms? generalization guarantees for data-driven algorithm design. STOC 2021: 919-932 - [i77]Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Model-Free Online Learning in Unknown Sequential Decision Making Problems and Games. CoRR abs/2103.04539 (2021) - [i76]Gabriele Farina, Robin Schmucker, Tuomas Sandholm:
Bandit Linear Optimization for Sequential Decision Making and Extensive-Form Games. CoRR abs/2103.04546 (2021) - [i75]Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Better Regularization for Sequential Decision Spaces: Fast Convergence Rates for Nash, Correlated, and Team Equilibria. CoRR abs/2105.12954 (2021) - [i74]Maria-Florina Balcan, Siddharth Prasad, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Sample Complexity of Tree Search Configuration: Cutting Planes and Beyond. CoRR abs/2106.04033 (2021) - [i73]Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Subgame solving without common knowledge. CoRR abs/2106.06068 (2021) - [i72]Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Team Correlated Equilibria in Zero-Sum Extensive-Form Games via Tree Decompositions. CoRR abs/2109.05284 (2021) - [i71]Gabriele Farina, Andrea Celli, Tuomas Sandholm:
Efficient Decentralized Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Coarse Correlated Equilibrium: No Expensive Computation of Stationary Distributions Required. CoRR abs/2109.08138 (2021) - [i70]Ioannis Anagnostides, Constantinos Daskalakis, Gabriele Farina, Maxwell Fishelson, Noah Golowich, Tuomas Sandholm:
Near-Optimal No-Regret Learning for Correlated Equilibria in Multi-Player General-Sum Games. CoRR abs/2111.06008 (2021) - [i69]Maria-Florina Balcan, Siddharth Prasad, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Improved Learning Bounds for Branch-and-Cut. CoRR abs/2111.11207 (2021) - [i68]Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Fast Payoff Matrix Sparsification Techniques for Structured Extensive-Form Games. CoRR abs/2112.03804 (2021) - 2020
- [j52]Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Limited lookahead in imperfect-information games. Artif. Intell. 283: 103218 (2020) - [j51]Eleonora Braggion, Nicola Gatti, Roberto Lucchetti, Tuomas Sandholm, Bernhard von Stengel:
Strong Nash equilibria and mixed strategies. Int. J. Game Theory 49(3): 699-710 (2020) - [j50]Avrim Blum, John P. Dickerson, Nika Haghtalab, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm, Ankit Sharma:
Ignorance Is Almost Bliss: Near-Optimal Stochastic Matching with Few Queries. Oper. Res. 68(1): 16-34 (2020) - [j49]Christian Kroer, Kevin Waugh, Fatma Kilinç-Karzan, Tuomas Sandholm:
Faster algorithms for extensive-form game solving via improved smoothing functions. Math. Program. 179(1): 385-417 (2020) - [c271]Gabriele Farina, Tommaso Bianchi, Tuomas Sandholm:
Coarse Correlation in Extensive-Form Games. AAAI 2020: 1934-1941 - [c270]Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Learning to Optimize Computational Resources: Frugal Training with Generalization Guarantees. AAAI 2020: 3227-3234 - [c269]Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Refined bounds for algorithm configuration: The knife-edge of dual class approximability. ICML 2020: 580-590 - [c268]Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Stochastic Regret Minimization in Extensive-Form Games. ICML 2020: 3018-3028 - [c267]Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Sparsified Linear Programming for Zero-Sum Equilibrium Finding. ICML 2020: 11256-11267 - [c266]Maria-Florina Balcan, Siddharth Prasad, Tuomas Sandholm:
Efficient Algorithms for Learning Revenue-Maximizing Two-Part Tariffs. IJCAI 2020: 332-338 - [c265]Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Polynomial-Time Computation of Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Two-Player Extensive-Form Games with Public Chance Moves and Beyond. NeurIPS 2020 - [c264]Duncan C. McElfresh, Michael J. Curry, Tuomas Sandholm, John Dickerson:
Improving Policy-Constrained Kidney Exchange via Pre-Screening. NeurIPS 2020 - [c263]Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Small Nash Equilibrium Certificates in Very Large Games. NeurIPS 2020 - [i67]Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Stochastic Regret Minimization in Extensive-Form Games. CoRR abs/2002.08493 (2020) - [i66]Carlos Martin, Tuomas Sandholm:
Efficient exploration of zero-sum stochastic games. CoRR abs/2002.10524 (2020) - [i65]Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Sparsified Linear Programming for Zero-Sum Equilibrium Finding. CoRR abs/2006.03451 (2020) - [i64]Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Refined bounds for algorithm configuration: The knife-edge of dual class approximability. CoRR abs/2006.11827 (2020) - [i63]Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Small Nash Equilibrium Certificates in Very Large Games. CoRR abs/2006.16387 (2020) - [i62]Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Faster Game Solving via Predictive Blackwell Approachability: Connecting Regret Matching and Mirror Descent. CoRR abs/2007.14358 (2020) - [i61]Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Polynomial-Time Computation of Optimal Correlated Equilibria in Two-Player Extensive-Form Games with Public Chance Moves and Beyond. CoRR abs/2009.04336 (2020) - [i60]Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Finding and Certifying (Near-)Optimal Strategies in Black-Box Extensive-Form Games. CoRR abs/2009.07384 (2020) - [i59]Gabriele Farina, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti, Tuomas Sandholm:
Faster Algorithms for Optimal Ex-Ante Coordinated Collusive Strategies in Extensive-Form Zero-Sum Games. CoRR abs/2009.10061 (2020) - [i58]Duncan C. McElfresh, Michael J. Curry, Tuomas Sandholm, John P. Dickerson:
Improving Policy-Constrained Kidney Exchange via Pre-Screening. CoRR abs/2010.12069 (2020) - [i57]Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Generalization in portfolio-based algorithm selection. CoRR abs/2012.13315 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j48]Swaprava Nath, Tuomas Sandholm:
Efficiency and budget balance in general quasi-linear domains. Games Econ. Behav. 113: 673-693 (2019) - [j47]John P. Dickerson, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm:
Failure-Aware Kidney Exchange. Manag. Sci. 65(4): 1768-1791 (2019) - [c262]Noam Brown, Tuomas Sandholm:
Solving Imperfect-Information Games via Discounted Regret Minimization. AAAI 2019: 1829-1836 - [c261]Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Online Convex Optimization for Sequential Decision Processes and Extensive-Form Games. AAAI 2019: 1917-1925 - [c260]Alberto Marchesi, Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Nicola Gatti, Tuomas Sandholm:
Quasi-Perfect Stackelberg Equilibrium. AAAI 2019: 2117-2124 - [c259]Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Estimating Approximate Incentive Compatibility. EC 2019: 867 - [c258]Noam Brown, Adam Lerer, Sam Gross, Tuomas Sandholm:
Deep Counterfactual Regret Minimization. ICML 2019: 793-802 - [c257]Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Noam Brown, Tuomas Sandholm:
Stable-Predictive Optimistic Counterfactual Regret Minimization. ICML 2019: 1853-1862 - [c256]Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Regret Circuits: Composability of Regret Minimizers. ICML 2019: 1863-1872 - [c255]Gabriele Farina, Chun Kai Ling, Fei Fang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Efficient Regret Minimization Algorithm for Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium. NeurIPS 2019: 5187-5197 - [c254]Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Optimistic Regret Minimization for Extensive-Form Games via Dilated Distance-Generating Functions. NeurIPS 2019: 5222-5232 - [c253]Gabriele Farina, Chun Kai Ling, Fei Fang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Correlation in Extensive-Form Games: Saddle-Point Formulation and Benchmarks. NeurIPS 2019: 9229-9239 - [i56]Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Noam Brown, Tuomas Sandholm:
Stable-Predictive Optimistic Counterfactual Regret Minimization. CoRR abs/1902.04982 (2019) - [i55]Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Limited Lookahead in Imperfect-Information Games. CoRR abs/1902.06335 (2019) - [i54]Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Estimating Approximate Incentive Compatibility. CoRR abs/1902.09413 (2019) - [i53]Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Learning to Optimize Computational Resources: Frugal Training with Generalization Guarantees. CoRR abs/1905.10819 (2019) - [i52]Gabriele Farina, Chun Kai Ling, Fei Fang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Correlation in Extensive-Form Games: Saddle-Point Formulation and Benchmarks. CoRR abs/1905.12564 (2019) - [i51]Maria-Florina Balcan, Dan F. DeBlasio, Travis Dick, Carl Kingsford, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
How much data is sufficient to learn high-performing algorithms? CoRR abs/1908.02894 (2019) - [i50]Gabriele Farina, Tommaso Bianchi, Tuomas Sandholm:
Coarse Correlation in Extensive-Form Games. CoRR abs/1908.09893 (2019) - [i49]Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Optimistic Regret Minimization for Extensive-Form Games via Dilated Distance-Generating Functions. CoRR abs/1910.10906 (2019) - [i48]Gabriele Farina, Chun Kai Ling, Fei Fang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Efficient Regret Minimization Algorithm for Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium. CoRR abs/1910.12450 (2019) - 2018
- [c252]Christian Kroer, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Robust Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games and Extension to Limited Lookahead. AAAI Workshops 2018: 294-301 - [c251]Christian Kroer, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Robust Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games and Extension to Limited Lookahead. AAAI 2018: 1130-1137 - [c250]Maria-Florina Balcan, Travis Dick, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Learning to Branch. ICML 2018: 353-362 - [c249]Gabriele Farina, Alberto Marchesi, Christian Kroer, Nicola Gatti, Tuomas Sandholm:
Trembling-Hand Perfection in Extensive-Form Games with Commitment. IJCAI 2018: 233-239 - [c248]Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
A Unified Framework for Extensive-Form Game Abstraction with Bounds. NeurIPS 2018: 613-624 - [c247]Christian Kroer, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Solving Large Sequential Games with the Excessive Gap Technique. NeurIPS 2018: 872-882 - [c246]Gabriele Farina, Nicola Gatti, Tuomas Sandholm:
Practical exact algorithm for trembling-hand equilibrium refinements in games. NeurIPS 2018: 5044-5054 - [c245]Noam Brown, Tuomas Sandholm, Brandon Amos:
Depth-Limited Solving for Imperfect-Information Games. NeurIPS 2018: 7674-7685 - [c244]Gabriele Farina, Andrea Celli, Nicola Gatti, Tuomas Sandholm:
Ex ante coordination and collusion in zero-sum multi-player extensive-form games. NeurIPS 2018: 9661-9671 - [c243]Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
A General Theory of Sample Complexity for Multi-Item Profit Maximization. EC 2018: 173-174 - [i47]Maria-Florina Balcan, Travis Dick, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Learning to Branch. CoRR abs/1803.10150 (2018) - [i46]Noam Brown, Tuomas Sandholm, Brandon Amos:
Depth-Limited Solving for Imperfect-Information Games. CoRR abs/1805.08195 (2018) - [i45]Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Online Convex Optimization for Sequential Decision Processes and Extensive-Form Games. CoRR abs/1809.03075 (2018) - [i44]Noam Brown, Tuomas Sandholm:
Solving Imperfect-Information Games via Discounted Regret Minimization. CoRR abs/1809.04040 (2018) - [i43]Christian Kroer, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Solving Large Sequential Games with the Excessive Gap Technique. CoRR abs/1810.03063 (2018) - [i42]Noam Brown, Adam Lerer, Sam Gross, Tuomas Sandholm:
Deep Counterfactual Regret Minimization. CoRR abs/1811.00164 (2018) - [i41]Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Composability of Regret Minimizers. CoRR abs/1811.02540 (2018) - [i40]Alberto Marchesi, Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Nicola Gatti, Tuomas Sandholm:
Quasi-Perfect Stackelberg Equilibrium. CoRR abs/1811.03871 (2018) - 2017
- [j46]John P. Dickerson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Multi-Organ Exchange. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 60: 639-679 (2017) - [c242]Kimmo Berg, Tuomas Sandholm:
Exclusion Method for Finding Nash Equilibrium in Multiplayer Games. AAAI 2017: 383-389 - [c241]Noam Brown, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Dynamic Thresholding and Pruning for Regret Minimization. AAAI 2017: 421-429 - [c240]Noam Brown, Tuomas Sandholm:
Reduced Space and Faster Convergence in Imperfect-Information Games via Regret-Based Pruning. AAAI Workshops 2017 - [c239]Noam Brown, Tuomas Sandholm:
Safe and Nested Endgame Solving for Imperfect-Information Games. AAAI Workshops 2017 - [c238]John P. Dickerson, Aleksandr M. Kazachkov, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm:
Small Representations of Big Kidney Exchange Graphs. AAAI 2017: 487-493 - [c237]John P. Dickerson, Aleksandr M. Kazachkov, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm:
Small Representations of Big Kidney Exchange Graphs. AAAI Workshops 2017 - [c236]Gabriele Farina, John P. Dickerson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Inter-Club Kidney Exchange. AAAI Workshops 2017 - [c235]Noam Brown, Tuomas Sandholm:
Reduced Space and Faster Convergence in Imperfect-Information Games via Pruning. ICML 2017: 596-604 - [c234]Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Regret Minimization in Behaviorally-Constrained Zero-Sum Games. ICML 2017: 1107-1116 - [c233]Tuomas Sandholm:
Super-Human AI for Strategic Reasoning: Beating Top Pros in Heads-Up No-Limit Texas Hold'em. IJCAI 2017: 24-25 - [c232]Gabriele Farina, John P. Dickerson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Operation Frames and Clubs in Kidney Exchange. IJCAI 2017: 199-205 - [c231]Christian Kroer, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Smoothing Method for Approximate Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium. IJCAI 2017: 295-301 - [c230]Noam Brown, Tuomas Sandholm:
Libratus: The Superhuman AI for No-Limit Poker. IJCAI 2017: 5226-5228 - [c229]Noam Brown, Tuomas Sandholm:
Safe and Nested Subgame Solving for Imperfect-Information Games. NIPS 2017: 689-699 - [c228]Christian Kroer, Kevin Waugh, Fatma Kilinç-Karzan, Tuomas Sandholm:
Theoretical and Practical Advances on Smoothing for Extensive-Form Games. EC 2017: 693 - [i39]Christian Kroer, Kevin Waugh, Fatma Kilinç-Karzan, Tuomas Sandholm:
Theoretical and Practical Advances on Smoothing for Extensive-Form Games. CoRR abs/1702.04849 (2017) - [i38]Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Sample Complexity of Multi-Item Profit Maximization. CoRR abs/1705.00243 (2017) - [i37]Noam Brown, Tuomas Sandholm:
Safe and Nested Subgame Solving for Imperfect-Information Games. CoRR abs/1705.02955 (2017) - [i36]Christian Kroer, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Smoothing Method for Approximate Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium. CoRR abs/1705.09326 (2017) - [i35]Gabriele Farina, John P. Dickerson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Operation Frames and Clubs in Kidney Exchange. CoRR abs/1705.09328 (2017) - [i34]Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Regret Minimization in Behaviorally-Constrained Zero-Sum Games. CoRR abs/1711.03441 (2017) - [i33]Nicola Gatti, Marco Rocco, Tuomas Sandholm:
On the Verification and Computation of Strong Nash Equilibrium. CoRR abs/1711.06318 (2017) - [i32]Christian Kroer, Gabriele Farina, Tuomas Sandholm:
Robust Stackelberg Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games and Extension to Limited Lookahead. CoRR abs/1711.08080 (2017) - 2016
- [c227]Noam Brown, Tuomas Sandholm:
Strategy-Based Warm Starting for Regret Minimization in Games. AAAI 2016: 432-438 - [c226]Benjamin Plaut, John P. Dickerson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Fast Optimal Clearing of Capped-Chain Barter Exchanges. AAAI 2016: 601-607 - [c225]Kimmo Berg, Tuomas Sandholm:
Exclusion Method for Finding Nash Equilibrium in Multi-Player Games: (Extended Abstract). AAMAS 2016: 1417-1418 - [c224]Tri-Dung Nguyen, Tuomas Sandholm:
Multi-Option Descending Clock Auction: (Extended Abstract). AAMAS 2016: 1461-1462 - [c223]Fei Peng, Tuomas Sandholm:
Scalable Segment Abstraction Method for Advertising Campaign Admission and Inventory Allocation Optimization. IJCAI 2016: 655-661 - [c222]Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Sequential Planning for Steering Immune System Adaptation. IJCAI 2016: 3177-3184 - [c221]Noam Brown, Tuomas Sandholm:
Baby Tartanian8: Winning Agent from the 2016 Annual Computer Poker Competition. IJCAI 2016: 4238-4239 - [c220]Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Sample Complexity of Automated Mechanism Design. NIPS 2016: 2083-2091 - [c219]John P. Dickerson, David F. Manlove, Benjamin Plaut, Tuomas Sandholm, James Trimble:
Position-Indexed Formulations for Kidney Exchange. EC 2016: 25-42 - [c218]Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Imperfect-Recall Abstractions with Bounds in Games. EC 2016: 459-476 - [c217]Swaprava Nath, Tuomas Sandholm:
Efficiency and Budget Balance. WINE 2016: 369-383 - [i31]John P. Dickerson, Aleksandr M. Kazachkov, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm:
Small Representations of Big Kidney Exchange Graphs. CoRR abs/1605.07728 (2016) - [i30]Benjamin Plaut, John P. Dickerson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Hardness of the Pricing Problem for Chains in Barter Exchanges. CoRR abs/1606.00117 (2016) - [i29]John P. Dickerson, David F. Manlove, Benjamin Plaut, Tuomas Sandholm, James Trimble:
Position-Indexed Formulations for Kidney Exchange. CoRR abs/1606.01623 (2016) - [i28]Maria-Florina Balcan, Tuomas Sandholm, Ellen Vitercik:
Sample Complexity of Automated Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/1606.04145 (2016) - [i27]Noam Brown, Tuomas Sandholm:
Reduced Space and Faster Convergence in Imperfect-Information Games via Regret-Based Pruning. CoRR abs/1609.03234 (2016) - [i26]Swaprava Nath, Tuomas Sandholm:
Efficiency and Budget Balance in General Quasi-linear Domains. CoRR abs/1610.01443 (2016) - 2015
- [j45]Tuomas Sandholm, Anton Likhodedov:
Automated Design of Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions. Oper. Res. 63(5): 1000-1025 (2015) - [j44]Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm:
Safe Opponent Exploitation. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 3(2): 8:1-8:28 (2015) - [c216]Noam Brown, Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm:
Hierarchical Abstraction, Distributed Equilibrium Computation, and Post-Processing, with Application to a Champion No-Limit Texas Hold'em Agent. AAAI Workshop: Computer Poker and Imperfect Information 2015 - [c215]John P. Dickerson, Tuomas Sandholm:
FutureMatch: Combining Human Value Judgments and Machine Learning to Match in Dynamic Environments. AAAI 2015: 622-628 - [c214]Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm:
Endgame Solving in Large Imperfect-Information Games. AAAI Workshop: Computer Poker and Imperfect Information 2015 - [c213]Chen Hajaj, John P. Dickerson, Avinatan Hassidim, Tuomas Sandholm, David Sarne:
Strategy-Proof and Efficient Kidney Exchange Using a Credit Mechanism. AAAI 2015: 921-928 - [c212]Tuomas Sandholm:
Steering Evolution Strategically: Computational Game Theory and Opponent Exploitation for Treatment Planning, Drug Design, and Synthetic Biology. AAAI 2015: 4057-4061 - [c211]Tuomas Sandholm:
Abstraction for Solving Large Incomplete-Information Games. AAAI 2015: 4127-4131 - [c210]Noam Brown, Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm:
Tartanian7: A Champion Two-Player No-Limit Texas Hold'em Poker-Playing Program. AAAI 2015: 4270-4271 - [c209]Noam Brown, Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm:
Hierarchical Abstraction, Distributed Equilibrium Computation, and Post-Processing, with Application to a Champion No-Limit Texas Hold'em Agent. AAMAS 2015: 7-15 - [c208]Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm:
Endgame Solving in Large Imperfect-Information Games. AAMAS 2015: 37-45 - [c207]Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Discretization of Continuous Action Spaces in Extensive-Form Games. AAMAS 2015: 47-56 - [c206]Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computational Bundling for Auctions. AAMAS 2015: 317-326 - [c205]Noam Brown, Tuomas Sandholm:
Simultaneous Abstraction and Equilibrium Finding in Games. IJCAI 2015: 489-496 - [c204]Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Limited Lookahead in Imperfect-Information Games. IJCAI 2015: 575-581 - [c203]Noam Brown, Tuomas Sandholm:
Regret-Based Pruning in Extensive-Form Games. NIPS 2015: 1972-1980 - [c202]Avrim Blum, John P. Dickerson, Nika Haghtalab, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm, Ankit Sharma:
Ignorance is Almost Bliss: Near-Optimal Stochastic Matching With Few Queries. EC 2015: 325-342 - [c201]Christian Kroer, Kevin Waugh, Fatma Kilinç-Karzan, Tuomas Sandholm:
Faster First-Order Methods for Extensive-Form Game Solving. EC 2015: 817-834 - 2014
- [c200]Noam Brown, Tuomas Sandholm:
Regret Transfer and Parameter Optimization. AAAI 2014: 594-601 - [c199]John Paul Dickerson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Balancing Efficiency and Fairness in Dynamic Kidney Exchange. AAAI Workshop: Modern Artificial Intelligence for Health Analytics 2014 - [c198]Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm:
Potential-Aware Imperfect-Recall Abstraction with Earth Mover's Distance in Imperfect-Information Games. AAAI 2014: 682-690 - [c197]John P. Dickerson, Jonathan R. Goldman, Jeremy Karp, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm:
The Computational Rise and Fall of Fairness. AAAI 2014: 1405-1411 - [c196]John P. Dickerson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Multi-Organ Exchange: The Whole Is Greater than the Sum of its Parts. AAAI 2014: 1412-1418 - [c195]John P. Dickerson, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm:
Price of fairness in kidney exchange. AAMAS 2014: 1013-1020 - [c194]Nicola Gatti, Tuomas Sandholm:
Finding the pareto curve in bimatrix games is easy. AAMAS 2014: 1217-1224 - [c193]Albert Xin Jiang, Leandro Soriano Marcolino, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm, Nisarg Shah, Milind Tambe:
Diverse Randomized Agents Vote to Win. NIPS 2014: 2573-2581 - [c192]Tri-Dung Nguyen, Tuomas Sandholm:
Optimizing prices in descending clock auctions. EC 2014: 93-110 - [c191]Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Extensive-form game abstraction with bounds. EC 2014: 621-638 - [c190]Bruce DeBruhl, Christian Kroer, Anupam Datta, Tuomas Sandholm, Patrick Tague:
Power napping with loud neighbors: optimal energy-constrained jamming and anti-jamming. WISEC 2014: 117-128 - [i25]Michael Benisch, George B. Davis, Tuomas Sandholm:
Algorithms for Closed Under Rational Behavior (CURB) Sets. CoRR abs/1401.3855 (2014) - [i24]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/1408.1486 (2014) - [i23]Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Extensive-Form Game Imperfect-Recall Abstractions With Bounds. CoRR abs/1409.3302 (2014) - 2013
- [j43]Abraham Othman, David M. Pennock, Daniel M. Reeves, Tuomas Sandholm:
A Practical Liquidity-Sensitive Automated Market Maker. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 1(3): 14:1-14:25 (2013) - [c189]John Paul Dickerson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Throwing Darts: Random Sampling Helps Tree Search when the Number of Short Certificates is Moderate. AAAI (Late-Breaking Developments) 2013 - [c188]Nicola Gatti, Marco Rocco, Tuomas Sandholm:
Algorithms for Strong Nash Equilibrium with More than Two Agents. AAAI 2013: 342-349 - [c187]Nicola Gatti, Marco Rocco, Tuomas Sandholm:
Strong Nash Equilibrium Is in Smoothed P. AAAI (Late-Breaking Developments) 2013 - [c186]Nicola Gatti, Marco Rocco, Tuomas Sandholm:
On the verification and computation of strong nash equilibrium. AAMAS 2013: 723-730 - [c185]Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm:
Action Translation in Extensive-Form Games with Large Action Spaces: Axioms, Paradoxes, and the Pseudo-Harmonic Mapping. IJCAI 2013: 120-128 - [c184]Xin Sui, Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm:
Analysis and Optimization of Multi-Dimensional Percentile Mechanisms. IJCAI 2013: 367-374 - [c183]John P. Dickerson, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm:
Failure-aware kidney exchange. EC 2013: 323-340 - [c182]John Paul Dickerson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Throwing Darts: Random Sampling Helps Tree Search when the Number of Short Certificates Is Moderate. SOCS 2013: 55-62 - [i22]Nicola Gatti, Marco Rocco, Tuomas Sandholm:
On the complexity of strong Nash equilibrium: Hard-to-solve instances and smoothed complexity. CoRR abs/1304.1351 (2013) - 2012
- [j42]Zhengyu Yin, Albert Xin Jiang, Milind Tambe, Christopher Kiekintveld, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Tuomas Sandholm, John P. Sullivan:
TRUSTS: Scheduling Randomized Patrols for Fare Inspection in Transit Systems Using Game Theory. AI Mag. 33(4): 59-72 (2012) - [j41]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 78(1): 2-14 (2012) - [j40]Andrew Gilpin, Javier Peña, Tuomas Sandholm:
First-order algorithm with 𝒪(ln(1/ε)) convergence for ε-equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games. Math. Program. 133(1-2): 279-298 (2012) - [c181]John P. Dickerson, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm:
Dynamic Matching via Weighted Myopia with Application to Kidney Exchange. AAAI 2012: 1340-1346 - [c180]Pingzhong Tang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Optimal Auctions for Spiteful Bidders. AAAI 2012: 1457-1463 - [c179]Albert Xin Jiang, Zhengyu Yin, Matthew P. Johnson, Milind Tambe, Christopher Kiekintveld, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Tuomas Sandholm:
Towards Optimal Patrol Strategies for Fare Inspection in Transit Systems. AAAI Spring Symposium: Game Theory for Security, Sustainability, and Health 2012 - [c178]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm:
Rational market making with probabilistic knowledge. AAMAS 2012: 645-652 - [c177]John P. Dickerson, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm:
Optimizing kidney exchange with transplant chains: theory and reality. AAMAS 2012: 711-718 - [c176]Pingzhong Tang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Mixed-bundling auctions with reserve prices. AAMAS 2012: 729-736 - [c175]Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm, Kevin Waugh:
Strategy purification and thresholding: effective non-equilibrium approaches for playing large games. AAMAS 2012: 871-878 - [c174]Zhengyu Yin, Albert Xin Jiang, Matthew Paul Johnson, Christopher Kiekintveld, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Tuomas Sandholm, Milind Tambe, John P. Sullivan:
TRUSTS: Scheduling Randomized Patrols for Fare Inspection in Transit Systems. IAAI 2012: 2348-2355 - [c173]Samuel Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm:
Safe opponent exploitation. EC 2012: 587-604 - [c172]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm:
Profit-charging market makers with bounded loss, vanishing bid/ask spreads, and unlimited market depth. EC 2012: 790-807 - [c171]Tuomas Sandholm, Satinder Singh:
Lossy stochastic game abstraction with bounds. EC 2012: 880-897 - [c170]Nicola Gatti, Giorgio Patrini, Marco Rocco, Tuomas Sandholm:
Combining local search techniques and path following for bimatrix games. UAI 2012: 286-295 - [i21]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators. CoRR abs/1207.1368 (2012) - [i20]Nicola Gatti, Giorgio Patrini, Marco Rocco, Tuomas Sandholm:
Combining local search techniques and path following for bimatrix games. CoRR abs/1210.4858 (2012) - 2011
- [j39]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm:
Inventory-based versus Prior-based Options Trading Agents. Algorithmic Finance 1(2): 95-121 (2011) - [j38]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Expressive markets for donating to charities. Artif. Intell. 175(7-8): 1251-1271 (2011) - [j37]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm:
Information-theoretic approaches to branching in search. Discret. Optim. 8(2): 147-159 (2011) - [c169]Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm, Kevin Waugh:
Strategy Purification. Applied Adversarial Reasoning and Risk Modeling 2011 - [c168]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated Market Makers That Enable New Settings: Extending Constant-Utility Cost Functions. AMMA 2011: 19-30 - [c167]Michael Benisch, Tuomas Sandholm:
A Framework for Automated Bundling and Pricing Using Purchase Data. AMMA 2011: 40-52 - [c166]Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm:
Game theory-based opponent modeling in large imperfect-information games. AAMAS 2011: 533-540 - [c165]Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm, Kevin Waugh:
Strategy purification. AAMAS 2011: 1111-1112 - [c164]Pingzhong Tang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Approximating Optimal Combinatorial Auctions for Complements Using Restricted Welfare Maximization. IJCAI 2011: 379-385 - [c163]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm:
Liquidity-Sensitive Automated Market Makers via Homogeneous Risk Measures. WINE 2011: 314-325 - 2010
- [j36]Tuomas Sandholm:
The State of Solving Large Incomplete-Information Games, and Application to Poker. AI Mag. 31(4): 13-32 (2010) - [j35]Michael Benisch, George B. Davis, Tuomas Sandholm:
Algorithms for Closed Under Rational Behavior (CURB) Sets. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 38: 513-534 (2010) - [j34]Samid Hoda, Andrew Gilpin, Javier Peña, Tuomas Sandholm:
Smoothing Techniques for Computing Nash Equilibria of Sequential Games. Math. Oper. Res. 35(2): 494-512 (2010) - [c162]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm:
Envy Quotes and the Iterated Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auction. AAAI 2010: 829-835 - [c161]Ankit Sharma, Tuomas Sandholm:
Asymmetric Spite in Auctions. AAAI 2010: 867-873 - [c160]William E. Walsh, Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields, George L. Nemhauser, David C. Parkes:
Automated Channel Abstraction for Advertising Auctions. AAAI 2010: 887-894 - [c159]Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing equilibria by incorporating qualitative models? AAMAS 2010: 183-190 - [c158]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm:
Decision rules and decision markets. AAMAS 2010: 625-632 - [c157]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm:
When do markets with simple agents fail? AAMAS 2010: 865-872 - [c156]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm, Eric Budish:
Finding approximate competitive equilibria: efficient and fair course allocation. AAMAS 2010: 873-880 - [c155]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm:
Speeding up gradient-based algorithms for sequential games. AAMAS 2010: 1463-1464 - [c154]Piotr Krysta, Tomasz P. Michalak, Tuomas Sandholm, Michael J. Wooldridge:
Combinatorial auctions with externalities. AAMAS 2010: 1471-1472 - [c153]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated market-making in the large: the gates hillman prediction market. EC 2010: 367-376 - [c152]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm, David M. Pennock, Daniel M. Reeves:
A practical liquidity-sensitive automated market maker. EC 2010: 377-386
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [c151]Michael Benisch, Norman M. Sadeh, Tuomas Sandholm:
Methodology for Designing Reasonably Expressive Mechanisms with Application to Ad Auctions. IJCAI 2009: 46-52 - [c150]Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing Equilibria in Multiplayer Stochastic Games of Imperfect Information. IJCAI 2009: 140-146 - [c149]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm:
How Pervasive Is the Myerson-Satterthwaite Impossibility? IJCAI 2009: 233-238 - [c148]Pranjal Awasthi, Tuomas Sandholm:
Online Stochastic Optimization in the Large: Application to Kidney Exchange. IJCAI 2009: 405-411 - [c147]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm:
Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms. SAGT 2009: 60-71 - [c146]Michael Benisch, Patrick Gage Kelley, Norman M. Sadeh, Tuomas Sandholm, Janice Y. Tsai, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Paul Hankes Drielsma:
The impact of expressiveness on the effectiveness of privacy mechanisms for location-sharing. SOUPS 2009 - 2008
- [j33]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
New complexity results about Nash equilibria. Games Econ. Behav. 63(2): 621-641 (2008) - [j32]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm:
On the Existence of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auction Protocols. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 11(2): 6:1-6:21 (2008) - [c145]Michael Benisch, Norman M. Sadeh, Tuomas Sandholm:
A Theory of Expressiveness in Mechanisms. AAAI 2008: 17-23 - [c144]Craig Boutilier, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm, William E. Walsh:
Expressive Banner Ad Auctions and Model-Based Online Optimization for Clearing. AAAI 2008: 30-37 - [c143]Andrew Gilpin, Javier Peña, Tuomas Sandholm:
First-Order Algorithm with O(ln(1/e)) Convergence for e-Equilibrium in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games. AAAI 2008: 75-82 - [c142]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm:
Expectation-Based Versus Potential-Aware Automated Abstraction in Imperfect Information Games: An Experimental Comparison Using Poker. AAAI 2008: 1454-1457 - [c141]William E. Walsh, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm, Craig Boutilier:
Computing Reserve Prices and Identifying the Value Distribution in Real-world Auctions with Market Disruptions. AAAI 2008: 1499-1502 - [c140]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm:
Solving two-person zero-sum repeated games of incomplete information. AAMAS (2) 2008: 903-910 - [c139]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm, Troels Bjerre Sørensen:
A heads-up no-limit Texas Hold'em poker player: discretized betting models and automatically generated equilibrium-finding programs. AAMAS (2) 2008: 911-918 - [c138]Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing an approximate jam/fold equilibrium for 3-player no-limit Texas Hold'em tournaments. AAMAS (2) 2008: 919-925 - [c137]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm, Troels Bjerre Sørensen:
GS3 and Tartanian: game theory-based heads-up limit and no-limit Texas Hold'em poker-playing programs. AAMAS (Demos) 2008: 1647-1648 - [e3]Lance Fortnow, John Riedl, Tuomas Sandholm:
Proceedings 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2008), Chicago, IL, USA, June 8-12, 2008. ACM 2008, ISBN 978-1-60558-169-9 [contents] - 2007
- [j31]Tuomas Sandholm:
Perspectives on multiagent learning. Artif. Intell. 171(7): 382-391 (2007) - [j30]Tuomas Sandholm:
Expressive Commerce and Its Application to Sourcing: How We Conducted $35 Billion of Generalized Combinatorial Auctions. AI Mag. 28(3): 45-58 (2007) - [j29]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Jérôme Lang:
When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?. J. ACM 54(3): 14 (2007) - [j28]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm:
Lossless abstraction of imperfect information games. J. ACM 54(5): 25 (2007) - [j27]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents. Mach. Learn. 67(1-2): 23-43 (2007) - [c136]Tuomas Sandholm:
Expressive commerce and its application to sourcing: how we conducted $35 billion of generalized combinatorial auctions. ICEC 2007: 349-350 - [c135]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm, Troels Bjerre Sørensen:
Potential-Aware Automated Abstraction of Sequential Games, and Holistic Equilibrium Analysis of Texas Hold'em Poker. AAAI 2007: 50-57 - [c134]Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated Online Mechanism Design and Prophet Inequalities. AAAI 2007: 58-65 - [c133]Tuomas Sandholm:
Expressive Commerce and Its Application to Sourcing: How We Conducted $25 Billion of Generalized Combinatorial Auctions. AAIM 2007: 426 - [c132]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm:
Better automated abstraction techniques for imperfect information games, with application to Texas Hold'em poker. AAMAS 2007: 192 - [c131]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham:
Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions. IJCAI 2007: 1207-1214 - [c130]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Incremental Mechanism Design. IJCAI 2007: 1251-1256 - [c129]Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, Craig Boutilier:
Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms. IJCAI 2007: 1500-1506 - [c128]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm:
Information-Theoretic Approaches to Branching in Search. IJCAI 2007: 2286-2292 - [c127]David J. Abraham, Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm:
Clearing algorithms for barter exchange markets: enabling nationwide kidney exchanges. EC 2007: 295-304 - [c126]Andrew Gilpin, Samid Hoda, Javier Peña, Tuomas Sandholm:
Gradient-Based Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games. WINE 2007: 57-69 - [e2]Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Francesca Rossi, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computational Issues in Social Choice, 21.10. - 26.10.2007. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 07431, Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum fuer Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany 2007 [contents] - [i19]Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Francesca Rossi, Tuomas Sandholm:
07431 Executive Summary - Computational Issues in Social Choice. Computational Issues in Social Choice 2007 - [i18]Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Francesca Rossi, Tuomas Sandholm:
07431 Abstracts Collection - Computational Issues in Social Choice. Computational Issues in Social Choice 2007 - 2006
- [j26]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions. Artif. Intell. 170(6-7): 607-619 (2006) - [j25]Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri:
Side constraints and non-price attributes in markets. Games Econ. Behav. 55(2): 321-330 (2006) - [j24]Tuomas Sandholm, David Levine, Michael Concordia, Paul Martyn, Rick Hughes, Jim Jacobs, Dennis Begg:
Changing the Game in Strategic Sourcing at Procter & Gamble: Expressive Competition Enabled by Optimization. Interfaces 36(1): 55-68 (2006) - [j23]Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich:
Online algorithms for market clearing. J. ACM 53(5): 845-879 (2006) - [c125]Michael Benisch, George B. Davis, Tuomas Sandholm:
Algorithms for Rationalizability and CURB Sets. AAAI 2006: 598-604 - [c124]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate. AAAI 2006: 627-634 - [c123]Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kohki Maruono, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. AAAI 2006: 697-702 - [c122]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm:
A Competitive Texas Hold'em Poker Player via Automated Abstraction and Real-Time Equilibrium Computation. AAAI 2006: 1007-1013 - [c121]Tuomas Sandholm:
Expressive Commerce and Its Application to Sourcing. AAAI 2006: 1736-1744 - [c120]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges. AAMAS 2006: 521-528 - [c119]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a Nash equilibrium. AAMAS 2006: 537-544 - [c118]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm:
Information-theoretic approaches to branching in search. AAMAS 2006: 545-547 - [c117]Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin:
Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation. AAMAS 2006: 1127-1134 - [c116]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm:
A Texas Hold'em poker player based on automated abstraction and real-time equilibrium computation. AAMAS 2006: 1453-1454 - [c115]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing the optimal strategy to commit to. EC 2006: 82-90 - [c114]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm:
Finding equilibria in large sequential games of imperfect information. EC 2006: 160-169 - 2005
- [j22]Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, David Levine:
CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions. Manag. Sci. 51(3): 374-390 (2005) - [c113]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Paolo Santi:
Combinatorial Auctions with k-wise Dependent Valuations. AAAI 2005: 248-254 - [c112]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Expressive Negotiation in Settings with Externalities. AAAI 2005: 255-260 - [c111]Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm:
Approximating Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions. AAAI 2005: 267-274 - [c110]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It. AAAI 2005: 483-488 - [c109]Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin, Vincent Conitzer:
Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria. AAAI 2005: 495-501 - [c108]Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki:
Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. AAAI 2005: 509-515 - [c107]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm:
Optimal Rhode Island Hold'em Poker. AAAI 2005: 1684-1685 - [c106]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm:
Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy. AAMAS 2005: 357-364 - [c105]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Mechanism design and deliberative agents. AAMAS 2005: 650-656 - [c104]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm:
Efficient Privacy-Preserving Protocols for Multi-unit Auctions. Financial Cryptography 2005: 298-312 - [c103]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm:
On Correctness and Privacy in Distributed Mechanisms. AMEC@AAMAS/TADA@IJCAI 2005: 212-225 - [c102]Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki:
Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. IJCAI 2005: 1668-1669 - [c101]Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki:
A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. JSAI Workshops 2005: 53-64 - [c100]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Communication complexity of common voting rules. EC 2005: 78-87 - [c99]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of (iterated) dominance. EC 2005: 88-97 - [c98]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm:
Unconditional privacy in social choice. TARK 2005: 207-218 - [c97]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators. UAI 2005: 145-152 - [e1]Daniel Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing and Markets, 3.-7. January 2005. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 05011, IBFI, Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany 2005 [contents] - [i17]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham:
Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions. Computing and Markets 2005 - [i16]Daniel Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm:
05011 Executive Summary - Computing and Markets. Computing and Markets 2005 - [i15]Daniel Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm:
05011 Abstracts Collection - Computing and Markets. Computing and Markets 2005 - [i14]Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated Mechanism Design. Computing and Markets 2005 - [i13]Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin:
Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation. Computing and Markets 2005 - 2004
- [j21]Avrim Blum, Jeffrey C. Jackson, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich:
Preference Elicitation and Query Learning. J. Mach. Learn. Res. 5: 649-667 (2004) - [c96]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Using Performance Profile Trees to Improve Deliberation Control. AAAI 2004: 73-79 - [c95]Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields:
Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences in (Combinatorial) Auctions. AAAI 2004: 204-211 - [c94]Vincent Conitzer, Jonathan Derryberry, Tuomas Sandholm:
Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs. AAAI 2004: 212-218 - [c93]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains. AAAI 2004: 219-225 - [c92]Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm:
Methods for Boosting Revenue in Combinatorial Auctions. AAAI 2004: 232-237 - [c91]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments. AMEC 2004: 1-14 - [c90]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Designing Auctions for Deliberative Agents. AMEC 2004: 87-100 - [c89]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments. AAMAS 2004: 128-135 - [c88]Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm:
Anonymous Pricing of Efficient Allocations in Combinatorial Economies. AAMAS 2004: 254-260 - [c87]Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Effectiveness of Query Types and Policies for Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions. AAMAS 2004: 386-393 - [c86]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Experiments on Deliberation Equilibria in Auctions. AAMAS 2004: 394-401 - [c85]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm:
Im)Possibility of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auctions. AAMAS 2004: 810-817 - [c84]Anshul Kothari, Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri:
Solving Combinatorial Exchanges: Optimality via a Few Partial Bids. AAMAS 2004: 1418-1419 - [c83]Paolo Santi, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract). COLT 2004: 1-16 - [c82]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games. ICML 2004 - [c81]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Expressive negotiation over donations to charities. EC 2004: 51-60 - [c80]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions. EC 2004: 132-141 - [c79]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Computational criticisms of the revelation principle. EC 2004: 262-263 - [c78]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Strategic deliberation and truthful revelation: an impossibility result. EC 2004: 264-265 - [c77]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments. EC 2004: 266-267 - [c76]Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm:
Mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency in multi-unit auctions. EC 2004: 268-269 - 2003
- [j20]Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri:
BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations. Artif. Intell. 145(1-2): 33-58 (2003) - [j19]Subhash Suri, Tuomas Sandholm, Priyank Ramesh Warkhede:
Compressing Two-Dimensional Routing Tables. Algorithmica 35(4): 287-300 (2003) - [c75]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting. ICEC 2003: 17-24 - [c74]Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin:
Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation. AMEC 2003: 73-91 - [c73]Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm:
Mechanism for Optimally Trading Off Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-unit Auctions. AMEC 2003: 92-108 - [c72]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Miscomputing ratio: social cost of selfish computing. AAMAS 2003: 273-280 - [c71]Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Generalizing preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. AAMAS 2003: 1014-1015 - [c70]Avrim Blum, Jeffrey C. Jackson, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich:
Preference Elicitation and Query Learning. COLT 2003: 13-25 - [c69]Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated Mechanism Design: A New Application Area for Search Algorithms. CP 2003: 19-36 - [c68]Tuomas Sandholm:
Terminating Decision Algorithms Optimally. CP 2003: 950-955 - [c67]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents. ICML 2003: 83-90 - [c66]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games. ICML 2003: 91-98 - [c65]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core. IJCAI 2003: 613-618 - [c64]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria. IJCAI 2003: 765-771 - [c63]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. IJCAI 2003: 781-788 - [c62]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems. IJCAI 2003: 1099-1106 - [c61]Tuomas Sandholm:
Making Markets and Democracy Work: A Story of Incentives and Computing. IJCAI 2003: 1649- - [c60]Xiao Feng Wang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Learning Near-Pareto-Optimal Conventions in Polynomial Time. NIPS 2003: 863-870 - [c59]Martin Zinkevich, Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm:
On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries. EC 2003: 176-185 - [c58]Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm:
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. EC 2003: 196-197 - [c57]Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm:
Auction mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency. EC 2003: 212-213 - [c56]Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Using value queries in combinatorial auctions. EC 2003: 226-227 - [c55]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core. EC 2003: 230-231 - [c54]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer. EC 2003: 232-233 - [c53]Anshul Kothari, Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri:
Solving combinatorial exchanges: optimality via a few partial bids. EC 2003: 236-237 - [c52]Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm:
How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? TARK 2003: 201-214 - [c51]Sviatoslav B. Braynov, Tuomas Sandholm:
Auctions with Untrustworthy Bidders. CEC 2003: 363- - [i12]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems. CoRR cs.AI/0307017 (2003) - [i11]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents. CoRR cs.GT/0307002 (2003) - [i10]Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm:
How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? CoRR cs.GT/0307003 (2003) - [i9]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games. CoRR cs.GT/0307006 (2003) - [i8]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core. CoRR cs.GT/0307016 (2003) - [i7]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. CoRR cs.GT/0307018 (2003) - 2002
- [j18]Tuomas Sandholm:
Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Artif. Intell. 135(1-2): 1-54 (2002) - [j17]Tuomas Sandholm, Yunhong Zhou:
Surplus equivalence of leveled commitment contracts. Artif. Intell. 142(2): 239-264 (2002) - [j16]Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser:
Leveled-Commitment Contracting: A Backtracking Instrument for Multiagent Systems. AI Mag. 23(3): 89-100 (2002) - [j15]Sviatoslav B. Braynov, Tuomas Sandholm:
Contracting With Uncertain Level Of Trust. Comput. Intell. 18(4): 501-514 (2002) - [j14]Tuomas Sandholm:
eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server. Comput. Intell. 18(4): 656-676 (2002) - [c50]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 314-319 - [c49]Tuomas Sandholm, Xiao Feng Wang:
(Im)possibility of Safe Exchange Mechanism Design. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 338-344 - [c48]Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm:
Partial-Revelation VCG Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 367-372 - [c47]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 392-397 - [c46]Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm:
Differential -Revelation VCG Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions. AMEC 2002: 34-51 - [c45]Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions. AMEC 2002: 69-86 - [c44]Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, David Levine:
Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations. AAMAS 2002: 69-76 - [c43]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm:
An alternating offers bargaining model for computationally limited agents. AAMAS 2002: 135-142 - [c42]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Bidders with hard valuation problems. AAMAS 2002: 160-161 - [c41]Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm:
Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. AAMAS 2002: 168-169 - [c40]Sviatoslav B. Braynov, Tuomas Sandholm:
Incentive compatible mechanism for trust revelation. AAMAS 2002: 310-311 - [c39]Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri:
Market Clearing with Supply and Demand Curves. ISAAC 2002: 600-611 - [c38]Xiaofeng Wang, Tuomas Sandholm:
Reinforcement Learning to Play an Optimal Nash Equilibrium in Team Markov Games. NIPS 2002: 1571-1578 - [c37]Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich:
Online algorithms for market clearing. SODA 2002: 971-980 - [c36]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Mechanism Design. UAI 2002: 103-110 - [i6]Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR cs.GT/0205066 (2002) - [i5]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness. CoRR cs.GT/0205073 (2002) - [i4]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria. CoRR cs.GT/0205074 (2002) - [i3]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Mechanism Design. CoRR cs.GT/0205075 (2002) - [i2]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates. CoRR cs.GT/0205076 (2002) - 2001
- [j13]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. Artif. Intell. 132(2): 183-217 (2001) - [j12]Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser:
Leveled Commitment Contracts and Strategic Breach. Games Econ. Behav. 35(1-2): 212-270 (2001) - [c35]Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, David Levine:
CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions. IJCAI 2001: 1102-1108 - [c34]Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri:
Market Clearability. IJCAI 2001: 1145-1151 - [c33]Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm:
Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. EC 2001: 256-259 - 2000
- [j11]Tuomas Sandholm:
Agents in Electronic Commerce: Component Technologies for Automated Negation and Coalition Formation. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 3(1): 73-96 (2000) - [j10]Tuomas Sandholm:
Approaches to winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Decis. Support Syst. 28(1-2): 165-176 (2000) - [j9]Tuomas Sandholm:
Issues in Computational Vickrey Auctions. Int. J. Electron. Commer. 4(3): 107-129 (2000) - [j8]Tuomas Sandholm, Qianbo Huai:
Nomad: Mobile Agent System for an Internet-Based Auction House. IEEE Internet Comput. 4(2): 80-86 (2000) - [j7]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Anytime coalition structure generation: an average case study. J. Exp. Theor. Artif. Intell. 12(1): 23-42 (2000) - [j6]Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated contracting in distributed manufacturing among independent companies. J. Intell. Manuf. 11(3): 271-283 (2000) - [c32]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Deliberation in Equilibrium: Bargaining in Computationally Complex Problems. AAAI/IAAI 2000: 48-55 - [c31]Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri:
Improved Algorithms for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions and Generalizations. AAAI/IAAI 2000: 90-97 - [c30]Tuomas Sandholm:
eMediator: a next generation electronic commerce server. Agents 2000: 341-348 - [c29]Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Contract Type Sequencing for Reallocative Negotiation. ICDCS 2000: 154-160 - [c28]Sviatoslav B. Brainov, Tuomas Sandholm:
Reasoning About Others: Representing and Processing Infinite Belief Hierarchies. ICMAS 2000: 71-78 - [c27]Tuomas Sandholm, Yunhong Zhou:
Surplus Equivalence of Leveled Commitment Contracts. ICMAS 2000: 247-254 - [c26]Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Ferrandon:
Safe Exchange Planner. ICMAS 2000: 255-262 - [c25]Subhash Suri, Tuomas Sandholm, Priyank Ramesh Warkhede:
Optimal Flow Aggregation. SWAT 2000: 462-475
1990 – 1999
- 1999
- [j5]Tuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory, Fernando Tohmé:
Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees. Artif. Intell. 111(1-2): 209-238 (1999) - [j4]Tuomas Sandholm:
Automated Negotiation. Commun. ACM 42(3): 84-85 (1999) - [j3]Fernando Tohmé, Tuomas Sandholm:
Coalition Formation Processes with Belief Revision among Bounded-rational Self-interested Agents. J. Log. Comput. 9(6): 793-815 (1999) - [c24]Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Time-Quality Tradeoffs in Reallocative Negotiation with Combinatorial Contract Types. AAAI/IAAI 1999: 3-10 - [c23]Sviatoslav B. Brainov, Tuomas Sandholm:
Power, Dependence and Stability in Multiagent Plans. AAAI/IAAI 1999: 11-16 - [c22]Tuomas Sandholm, Nir Vulkan:
Bargaining with Deadlines. AAAI/IAAI 1999: 44-51 - [c21]Tuomas Sandholm:
eMediator: a Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server. AAAI/IAAI 1999: 923-924 - [c20]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Anytime Coalition Structure Generation: An Average Case Study. Agents 1999: 40-47 - [c19]Tuomas Sandholm, Sandeep Sikka, Samphel Norden:
Algorithms for Optimizing Leveled Commitment Contracts. IJCAI 1999: 535-541 - [c18]Tuomas Sandholm:
An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions. IJCAI 1999: 542-547 - [c17]Sviatoslav B. Brainov, Tuomas Sandholm:
Contracting with uncertain level of trust. EC 1999: 15-21 - 1998
- [c16]Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Leveled Commitment Contracts with Myopic and Strategic Agents. AAAI/IAAI 1998: 38-45 - [c15]Tuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory, Fernando Tohmé:
Anytime Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees. AAAI/IAAI 1998: 46-53 - [c14]Hyacinth S. Nwana, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Tuomas Sandholm, Carles Sierra, Pattie Maes, Robert H. Guttman:
Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: Issues, Challenges and Some Viewpoints. Agents 1998: 189-196 - [c13]Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Sequencing of Contract Types for Anytime Task Reallocation. AMET 1998: 54-69 - [c12]Tuomas Sandholm:
Agents in Electronic Commerce: Component Technologies for Automated Negation and Coalition Formation. CIA 1998: 113-134 - [c11]Tuomas Sandholm:
Agents in Electronic Commerce: Component Technologies for Automated Negotiation and Coalition Formation. ICMAS 1998: 10-11 - [c10]Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm:
Leveled Commitment Contracting among Myopic Individually Rational Agents. ICMAS 1998: 26-33 - [i1]Tuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory, Fernando Tohmé:
Anytime Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees. CoRR cs.MA/9810005 (1998) - 1997
- [j2]Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser:
Coalitions Among Computationally Bounded Agents. Artif. Intell. 94(1-2): 99-137 (1997) - [j1]Tuomas Sandholm:
Unenforced E-Commerce Transactions. IEEE Internet Comput. 1(6): 47-54 (1997) - [c9]Tuomas Sandholm, Fredrik Ygge:
On the Gains and Losses of Speculation in Equilibrium Markets. IJCAI (1) 1997: 632-639 - 1996
- [c8]Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser:
Advantages of a Leveled Commitment Contracting Protocol. AAAI/IAAI, Vol. 1 1996: 126-133 - [c7]Tuomas Sandholm:
A Second Order Parameter for 3SAT. AAAI/IAAI, Vol. 1 1996: 259-265 - 1995
- [c6]Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser:
Issues in Automated Negotiation and Electronic Commerce: Extending the Contract Net Framework. ICMAS 1995: 328-335 - [c5]Tuomas Sandholm, Robert H. Crites:
On Multiagent Q-Learning in a Semi-Competitive Domain. Adaption and Learning in Multi-Agent Systems 1995: 191-205 - [c4]Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser:
Coalition Formation among Bounded Rational Agents. IJCAI (1) 1995: 662-671 - [c3]Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser:
Equilibrium Analysis of the Possibilities of Unenforced Exchange in Multiagent Systems. IJCAI (1) 1995: 694-703 - 1994
- [c2]Daniel E. Neiman, David W. Hildum, Victor R. Lesser, Tuomas Sandholm:
Exploiting Meta-Level information in a Distributed Scheduling System. AAAI 1994: 394-400 - 1993
- [c1]Tuomas Sandholm:
An Implementation of the Contract Net Protocol Based on Marginal Cost Calculations. AAAI 1993: 256-262
Coauthor Index
[c331] [c330] [i132] [i127] [i126] [c317] [c311] [i114] [i107] [c298] [i103] [i102] [i24] [j41] [i21] [j38] [j33] [j29] [j27] [c130] [c129] [j26] [c124] [c123] [c120] [c119] [c115] [c113] [c112] [c110] [c109] [c108] [c102] [c101] [c100] [c99] [c97] [c94] [c93] [c91] [c89] [c83] [c82] [c81] [c80] [c79] [c77] [c75] [c67] [c66] [c65] [c64] [c63] [c62] [c55] [c54] [c52] [i12] [i11] [i10] [i9] [i8] [i7] [c50] [c47] [c36] [i5] [i4] [i3] [i2]
[i127] [i126] [c328] [c320] [c312] [c311] [c310] [i120] [i115] [c309] [c308] [c307] [c306] [c302] [c300] [c298] [i105] [i103] [i102] [i99] [i97] [i94] [c297] [c294] [c293] [c292] [c289] [c288] [c286] [c285] [c284] [i92] [i90] [i89] [i88] [i87] [i85] [i84] [i83] [i80] [i79] [j53] [c283] [c282] [c281] [c278] [c275] [c273] [i77] [i76] [i75] [i71] [i70] [i68] [c271] [c268] [c265] [i67] [i62] [i61] [i59] [c261] [c260] [c257] [c256] [c255] [c254] [c253] [i56] [i52] [i50] [i49] [i48] [c252] [c251] [c249] [c247] [c246] [c244] [i45] [i43] [i41] [i40] [c236] [c234] [c232] [c231] [i36] [i35] [i34] [i32]
Sam Ganzfried
aka: Samuel Ganzfried
aka: Samuel Ganzfried
[c327] [i121] [c293] [c289] [c286] [i90] [i85] [i83] [c283] [c273] [i75] [j52] [j49] [c268] [i67] [i62] [c261] [c260] [c257] [c256] [c254] [i56] [i55] [i49] [c252] [c251] [c249] [c248] [c247] [i45] [i43] [i41] [i40] [c241] [c234] [c231] [c228] [i39] [i36] [i34] [i32] [c222] [c218] [c207] [c206] [c204] [c201] [c191] [c190] [i23]
Stephen McAleer
aka: Stephen Marcus McAleer
aka: Stephen Marcus McAleer
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