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ORCID14th ACM-EC 2013: Philadelphia, PA, USA
- Michael J. Kearns, R. Preston McAfee, Éva Tardos:
Proceedings of the fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2013, Philadelphia, PA, USA, June 16-20, 2013. ACM 2013, ISBN 978-1-4503-1962-1
Keynote talks
- Jon M. Kleinberg:
Cascading behavior in social and economic networks. 1-4 - Alvin E. Roth:
Kidney exchange: where we've been and where we can go from here. 5-6
Technical presentations
- Ittai Abraham, Susan Athey, Moshe Babaioff, Michael Grubb:
Peaches, lemons, and cookies: designing auction markets with dispersed information. 7-8 - Noga Alon, Yishay Mansour, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Differential pricing with inequity aversion in social networks. 9-24 - Itai Ashlagi, Patrick Jaillet, Vahideh H. Manshadi:
Kidney exchange in dynamic sparse heterogenous pools. 25-26 - Itai Ashlagi, Yashodhan Kanoria, Jacob D. Leshno:
Unbalanced random matching markets. 27-28 - Pablo Daniel Azar, Silvio Micali:
Super-efficient rational proofs. 29-30 - Eduardo M. Azevedo, John William Hatfield:
Existence of stable matchings in large markets with complementarities. 31-32 - Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan
:
Bertrand networks. 33-34 - Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
Multi-parameter mechanisms with implicit payment computation. 35-52 - Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes, Gabriel Y. Weintraub:
Auctions for online display advertising exchanges: approximations and design. 53-54 - Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Federico Echenique, Adam Wierman:
The empirical implications of rank in Bimatrix games. 55-72 - Anand Bhalgat, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kamesh Munagala:
Optimal auctions via the multiplicative weight method. 73-90 - Sayan Bhattacharya, Elias Koutsoupias, Janardhan Kulkarni, Stefano Leonardi, Tim Roughgarden, Xiaoming Xu:
Near-optimal multi-unit auctions with ordered bidders. 91-102 - Jose H. Blanchet, Guillermo Gallego, Vineet Goyal:
A markov chain approximation to choice modeling. 103-104 - Jeremiah Blocki, Saranga Komanduri, Ariel D. Procaccia, Or Sheffet:
Optimizing password composition policies. 105-122 - Avrim Blum, Anupam Gupta, Ariel D. Procaccia, Ankit Sharma:
Harnessing the power of two crossmatches. 123-140 - Aditya Bhave, Eric Budish:
Primary-market auctions for event tickets: eliminating the rents of "Bob the broker". 141-142 - Ioannis Caragiannis, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah:
When do noisy votes reveal the truth? 143-160 - Gabriel D. Carroll:
Robust incentives for information acquisition. 161-162 - Denis Xavier Charles, Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Max Chickering, Nikhil R. Devanur, Lei Wang:
Budget smoothing for internet ad auctions: a game theoretic approach. 163-180 - Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline:
Auctions with unique equilibria. 181-196 - Wei Chen, Yajun Wang, Dongxiao Yu, Li Zhang:
Sybil-proof mechanisms in query incentive networks. 197-214 - Yiling Chen, Stephen Chong, Ian A. Kash, Tal Moran, Salil P. Vadhan:
Truthful mechanisms for agents that value privacy. 215-232 - Flavio Chierichetti, Jon M. Kleinberg, Sigal Oren:
On discrete preferences and coordination. 233-250 - Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Gagan Goel:
Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without payments. 251-268 - Constantinos Daskalakis, Alan Deckelbaum, Christos Tzamos:
Mechanism design via optimal transport. 269-286 - Nikhil R. Devanur, Bach Q. Ha, Jason D. Hartline:
Prior-free auctions for budgeted agents. 287-304 - Nikhil R. Devanur, Zhiyi Huang, Nitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Qiqi Yan:
Whole-page optimization and submodular welfare maximization with online bidders. 305-322 - John P. Dickerson, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm:
Failure-aware kidney exchange. 323-340 - Miroslav Dudík, Sébastien Lahaie, David M. Pennock, David M. Rothschild:
A combinatorial prediction market for the U.S. elections. 341-358 - David A. Easley, Arpita Ghosh:
Incentives, gamification, and game theory: an economic approach to badge design. 359-376 - Matthew Elliott, Benjamin Golub:
A network approach to public goods. 377-378 - Roee Engelberg, Alex Fabrikant, Michael Schapira, David Wajc:
Best-response dynamics out of sync: complexity and characterization. 379-396 - John Fearnley, Martin Gairing, Paul Goldberg, Rahul Savani:
Learning equilibria of games via payoff queries. 397-414 - Uriel Feige, Ron Lavi, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Competition among asymmetric sellers with fixed supply. 415-416 - Michal Feldman, David Kempe, Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme:
Pricing public goods for private sale. 417-434 - Dimitris Fotakis, Christos Tzamos:
Strategyproof facility location for concave cost functions. 435-452 - Hu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Cost-recovering bayesian algorithmic mechanism design. 453-470 - Hu Fu, Jason D. Hartline, Darrell Hoy:
Prior-independent auctions for risk-averse agents. 471-488 - Xi Alice Gao, Jie Zhang, Yiling Chen:
What you jointly know determines how you act: strategic interactions in prediction markets. 489-506 - Golnaz Ghasemiesfeh, Roozbeh Ebrahimi, Jie Gao:
Complex contagion and the weakness of long ties in social networks: revisited. 507-524 - Arpita Ghosh, Jon M. Kleinberg:
Incentivizing participation in online forums for education. 525-542 - Arpita Ghosh, Katrina Ligett:
Privacy and coordination: computing on databases with endogenous participation. 543-560 - Negin Golrezaei, Hamid Nazerzadeh, Paat Rusmevichientong:
Real-time optimization of personalized assortments. 561-562 - Ragavendran Gopalakrishnan, Jason R. Marden, Adam Wierman:
Potential games are necessary to ensure pure nash equilibria in cost sharing games. 563-564 - Sergiu Hart, Noam Nisan:
The menu-size complexity of auctions. 565-566 - Martin Hoefer, Thomas Kesselheim, Berthold Vöcking:
Truthfulness and stochastic dominance with monetary transfers. 567-582 - Darrell Hoy, Kamal Jain, Christopher A. Wilkens:
A dynamic axiomatic approach to first-price auctions. 583-584 - David Kempe, Jon M. Kleinberg, Sigal Oren, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
Selection and influence in cultural dynamics. 585-586 - Sang Won Kim, Marcelo Olivares, Gabriel Y. Weintraub:
Measuring the performance of large-scale combinatorial auctions: a structural estimation approach. 587-588 - Robert Kleinberg, Yang Yuan:
On the ratio of revenue to welfare in single-parameter mechanism design. 589-602 - Scott Duke Kominers, Tayfun Sönmez:
Designing for diversity in matching: extended abstract. 603-604 - Ilan Kremer, Yishay Mansour, Motty Perry:
Implementing the "Wisdom of the Crowd". 605-606 - Euiwoong Lee, Katrina Ligett:
Improved bounds on the price of stability in network cost sharing games. 607-620 - Nektarios Leontiadis, Tyler Moore, Nicolas Christin:
Pick your poison: pricing and inventories at unlicensed online pharmacies. 621-638 - Randall A. Lewis, David H. Reiley:
Down-to-the-minute effects of super bowl advertising on online search behavior. 639-656 - Xiaolong Li, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan:
An axiomatic characterization of adaptive-liquidity market makers. 657-674 - Yunan Li:
Approximation in mechanism design with interdependent values. 675-676 - Ilan Lobel, Evan Sadler:
Social learning and aggregate network uncertainty. 677-678 - Brandon A. Mayer, Eric Sodomka, Amy Greenwald, Michael P. Wellman:
Accounting for price dependencies in simultaneous sealed-bid auctions. 679-696 - Hervé Moulin, Jay Sethuraman:
Loss calibrated methods for bipartite rationing: bipartite rationing. 697-714 - Georgios Piliouras, Evdokia Nikolova, Jeff S. Shamma:
Risk sensitivity of price of anarchy under uncertainty. 715-732 - Baharak Rastegari, Anne Condon, Nicole Immorlica, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Two-sided matching with partial information. 733-750 - Ben Roberts, Dinan Gunawardena, Ian A. Kash, Peter B. Key:
Ranking and tradeoffs in sponsored search auctions. 751-766 - Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Optimal and near-optimal mechanism design with interdependent values. 767-784 - Yiling Chen, Mike Ruberry, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan:
Cost function market makers for measurable spaces. 785-802 - Daniela Sabán, Jay Sethuraman:
House allocation with indifferences: a generalization and a unified view. 803-820 - Sean J. Taylor, Eytan Bakshy, Sinan Aral:
Selection effects in online sharing: consequences for peer adoption. 821-836 - David R. M. Thompson, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Revenue optimization in the generalized second-price auction. 837-852 - Rodrigo A. Velez:
Sincere and sophisticated players in the envy-free allocation problem. 853-854 - Elaine Wah, Michael P. Wellman:
Latency arbitrage, market fragmentation, and efficiency: a two-market model. 855-872 - Michal Feldman, Yoav Wilf:
Strategyproof facility location and the least squares objective. 873-890 - Michael Wunder, Siddharth Suri, Duncan J. Watts:
Empirical agent based models of cooperation in public goods games. 891-908
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