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ORCID26th ACM-EC 2025: Stanford, CA, USA
- Itai Ashlagi, Aaron Roth:
Proceedings of the 26th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2025, Stanford University, Stanford, CA, USA, July 7-10, 2025. ACM 2025, ISBN 979-8-4007-1943-1 - Rajan Udwani:
Optimality of Non-Adaptive Algorithms in Online Submodular Welfare Maximization with Stochastic Outcomes. 1 - Philip Solimine, Paul Schrimpf:
Investment and misallocation in infrastructure networks: The case of U.S. natural gas pipelines. 2 - Harry Pei:
Reputation Effects with Endogenous Records. 3 - Keisuke Bando, Kenzo Imamura, Yasushi Kawase:
Properties of Path-Independent Choice Correspondences and Their Applications to Efficient and Stable Matchings. 4 - Jerry Anunrojwong, Santiago R. Balseiro, Omar Besbes, Bolun Xu:
Battery Operations in Electricity Markets: Strategic Behavior and Distortions. 5 - Wade Hann-Caruthers, Minghao Pan, Omer Tamuz:
Network and Timing Effects in Social Learning. 6 - Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Yiannis Giannakopoulos, Alexandros Hollender, Charalampos Kokkalis:
Equilibrium Computation in First-Price Auctions with Correlated Priors. 7-33 - Simon Jantschgi, Thành Nguyen, Alex Teytelboym:
Competitive Combinatorial Exchange. 34 - Alexander Haberman, Ravi Jagadeesan:
Auctions with Withdrawal Rights: A Foundation for Uniform Price. 35 - Alexander Haberman, Ravi Jagadeesan, Frank Yang:
Multidimensional Screening with Returns. 36 - Thanh Nguyen, Rakesh Vohra:
Information Design for Many Parameters. 37 - Gali Noti, Kate Donahue, Jon M. Kleinberg, Sigal Oren:
AI-Assisted Decision Making with Human Learning. 38-39 - Hanrui Zhang:
Clock Auctions: Allocation-Based Characterization, Computational Complexity, and Economic Efficiency. 40-65 - Klim Efremenko, Hendrik Molter, Meirav Zehavi:
Tournament Robustness via Redundancy. 66-85 - Peng Shi:
Welfare-Optimal Policies for Sponsored Advertising in a Two-Sided Marketplace. 86 - Yiding Feng, Vahideh H. Manshadi, Rad Niazadeh, Saba Neyshabouri:
Robust Dynamic Staffing with Predictions. 87 - Jingying Ding, Yifan Feng, Ying Rong:
A Behavioral Model for Exploration vs. Exploitation: Theoretical Framework and Experimental Evidence. 88 - Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Linda Cai, Yiding Feng, Yingkai Li, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Competition Complexity in Multi-item Auctions: Beyond VCG and Regularity. 89 - Ayoub Foussoul, Vineet Goyal:
Distributionally Robust Newsvendor on a Metric. 90 - Mete Seref Ahunbay, Martin Bichler:
Semicoarse Correlated Equilibria and LP-Based Guarantees for Gradient Dynamics in Normal-Form Games. 91 - Giannis Fikioris, Siddhartha Banerjee, Éva Tardos:
Beyond Worst-Case Online Allocation via Dynamic Max-min Fairness. 92 - Peiran Xiao:
Allocating Positional Goods: A Mechanism Design Approach. 93 - Kei Ikegami, Atsushi Iwasaki, Akira Matsushita, Kyohei Okumura:
Evaluating the Efficiency of Regulation in Matching Markets with Distributional Disparities. 94 - John R. Birge, Emin Ozyoruk:
Pricing and Capacity Decisions in Platform Competition with Network Externalities. 95 - Dana Pizarro, José Correa, Sebastian Perez-Salazar, Bruno Ziliotto:
Residual Prophet Inequalities. 96 - Itai Arieli, Leonie Baumann, Wade Hann-Caruthers:
Anonymous Network Formation. 97 - Kai-Hao Yang, Nathan Yoder, Alexander Zentefis:
Explaining Models. 98 - Piotr Dworczak, Marco Reuter, Scott Duke Kominers, Changhwa Lee:
Optimal Membership Design. 99-100 - Vishwa Prakash HV, Pratik Ghosal, Prajakta Nimbhorkar, Nithin Varma:
EFX Exists for Three Types of Agents. 101-128 - Christian Kroer, Dominik Peters:
Computing Lindahl Equilibrium for Public Goods with and without Funding Caps. 129 - Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Natalie Collina, Yishay Mansour, Mehryar Mohri, Jon Schneider, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Swap Regret and Correlated Equilibria Beyond Normal-Form Games. 130-157 - Giannis Fikioris, Robert Kleinberg, Yoav Kolumbus, Raunak Kumar, Yishay Mansour, Éva Tardos:
Learning in Budgeted Auctions with Spacing Objectives. 158 - Mika Sumida:
Dynamic Resource Allocation with Recovering Rewards under Non-Stationary Arrivals. 159 - Uriel Feige, Vadim Grinberg:
Fair allocations with subadditive and XOS valuations. 160-185 - Martino Banchio, Andrzej Skrzypacz, Frank Yang:
Dynamic Threats to Credible Auctions. 186 - Niccolò Lomys, Lorenzo Magnolfi:
Estimation of Games under No Regret: Structural Econometrics for AI. 187 - Daniel Halpern, Alexandros Psomas, Paritosh Verma, Daniel Xie:
Online Envy Minimization and Multicolor Discrepancy: Equivalences and Separations. 188 - Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Divyarthi Mohan, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser:
Online Combinatorial Allocation with Interdependent Values. 189-205 - Yuan Deng, Jieming Mao, Balasubramanian Sivan, Kangning Wang, Jinzhao Wu:
Approximately Efficient Bilateral Trade with Samples. 206-223 - Ruslan Momot, Marat Salikhov, Oleh Stupak, George Charlson:
Managing Cybersecurity: Data Access & Protection. 224-225 - Tomer Ezra, Tamar Garbuz:
The Competition Complexity of Prophet Inequalities with Correlations. 226-249 - Simon Finster:
Selling Multiple Complements with Packaging Costs. 250 - Kaito Fujii:
The Power of Mediators: Price of Anarchy and Stability in Bayesian Games with Submodular Social Welfare. 251 - Krishna Dasaratha, Juan Ortner, Chengyang Zhu:
Markets for Models. 252 - Anton Kolotilin, Hongyi Li, Andy Zapechelnyuk:
On Monotone Persuasion. 253 - Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Georgios Kalantzis, Alexandros A. Voudouris:
Utilitarian Distortion with Predictions. 254-271 - Daniel Freund, David Hausman, Wentao Weng:
Regulating Wait-Driven Requests in Queues. 272 - Mikael Mäkimattila, Yucheng Shang, Ryo Shirakawa:
The Design and Price of Certification. 273 - Patrick Lahr, Axel Niemeyer:
Extreme Points in Multi-Dimensional Screening. 274 - Kiarash Banihashem, Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Piotr Krysta, Suho Shin:
Delegated Choice with Combinatorial Constraints. 275-303 - Simon Finster, Patrick Loiseau, Simon Mauras, Mathieu Molina, Bary S. R. Pradelski:
Equitable Auctions. 304 - Ilan Morgenstern, Daniela Sabán, Divya Singhvi, Somya Singhvi:
Design of Resale Platforms. 305 - Sophie Greenwood, Karen Levy, Solon Barocas, Hoda Heidari, Jon M. Kleinberg:
Designing Algorithmic Delegates: the Role of Indistinguishability in Human-AI Handoff. 306-336 - Andrew Koh, Ricky Li, Kei Uzui:
Inertial Coordination Games. 337 - Ran Canetti, Amos Fiat, Yannai A. Gonczarowski:
Zero-Knowledge Mechanisms. 338-339 - Brett Hollenbeck, Poet Larsen, Davide Proserpio:
The Financial Consequences of Legalized Sports Gambling. 340 - Enoch Hyunwook Kang, Hema Yoganarasimhan, Lalit Jain:
An Empirical Risk Minimization Approach for Offline Inverse Reinforcement Learning and Dynamic Discrete Choice Models. 341 - Audrey Bazerghi, Sébastien Martin, Garrett J. van Ryzin:
Relative Monte Carlo for Reinforcement Learning. 342 - Zi Yang Kang, Mitchell Watt:
Optimal In-Kind Redistribution. 343 - Théo Durandard, Udayan Vaidya, Boli Xu:
Robust Contracting for Sequential Search. 344 - Orestis Vravosinos:
Multidimensional screening of strategic candidates. 345-346 - Fedor Sandomirskiy, Po Hyun Sung, Omer Tamuz, Ben Wincelberg:
Independence of Irrelevant Decisions in Stochastic Choice. 347 - Sara Fish, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Sergiu Hart:
Stable Menus of Public Goods: A Matching Problem. 348 - Haris Aziz, Patrick Lederer, Xinhang Lu, Mashbat Suzuki, Jeremy Vollen:
Approximately Fair and Population Consistent Budget Division via Simple Payment Schemes. 349 - Martino Banchio, Aranyak Mehta, Andrés Perlroth:
Ads in Conversations. 350 - Dongjin Hwang, Ilwoo Hwang:
Competitive Information Disclosure with Heterogeneous Consumer Search. 351 - Omar Besbes, Yash Kanoria, Akshit Kumar:
Impact of Rankings and Personalized Recommendations in Marketplaces. 352 - Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka, Maya Schlesinger:
Budget-Feasible Contracts. 353 - Alexandre Belloni, Xuanjie Li, Ali Makhdoumi:
Approximately Optimal Online Mechanism for Multiunit Demand Buyers with Post-Allocation Inspection. 354 - Yifeng Teng, Yifan Wang:
Learning Optimal Posted Prices for a Unit-Demand Buyer. 355 - Peter Caradonna, Christopher Turansick:
Identifying Restrictions on the Random Utility Model. 356 - Adam N. Elmachtoub, Jiaqi Shi:
The Power of Static Pricing for Reusable Resources. 357 - Uriel Feige:
Low communication protocols for fair allocation of indivisible goods. 358-382 - Kailin Chen:
Experiments in the Linear Convex Order. 383 - Richard Faltings:
Pricing the Right to Renege in Search Markets: Evidence from Trucking. 384 - Andrea Galeotti, Benjamin Golub, Sanjeev Goyal, Omer Tamuz, Eduard Talamàs:
Robust Market Interventions. 385 - S. Nageeb Ali, Andreas Kleiner, Kun Zhang:
From Design to Disclosure. 386 - Annie Liang:
Artificial Intelligence Clones. 387-388 - Yun Kuen Cheung, Richard Cole, Yixin Tao:
Proportional Response Dynamics in Gross Substitutes Markets. 389 - Stefan Kiefer, Richard Mayr, Mahsa Shirmohammadi, Patrick Totzke:
Strategy Complexity of Büchi and Transience Objectives in Concurrent Stochastic Games. 390-409 - Andrei Iakovlev, Annie Liang:
The Value of Context: Human versus Black Box Evaluators. 410-411 - Xiaolin Bu, Zihao Li, Shengxin Liu, Jiaxin Song, Biaoshuai Tao:
Approximability Landscape of Welfare Maximization within Fair Allocations. 412-440 - Kurt R. Sweat:
Endogenous Priority in Centralized Matching Markets: The Design of the Heart Transplant Waitlist. 441 - Bary S. R. Pradelski, Bassel Tarbush:
Satisficing Equilibrium. 442 - James Brand, Adam N. Smith:
A Quasi-Bayes Approach to Nonparametric Demand Estimation with Economic Constraints. 443 - Hannaneh Akrami, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Aniket Murhekar:
On the Theoretical Foundations of Data Exchange Economies. 444 - Debasis Mishra, Sanket Patil, Alessandro Pavan:
Robust Procurement Design. 445 - Théo Delemazure, Rupert Freeman, Jérôme Lang, Jean-François Laslier, Dominik Peters:
Reallocating Wasted Votes in Proportional Parliamentary Elections with Thresholds. 446 - Moshe Babaioff, Noam Manaker Morag:
On Truthful Mechanisms without Pareto-efficiency: Characterizations and Fairness. 447 - Bryan Wilder, Pim Welle:
Learning treatment effects while treating those in need. 448-473 - Zihao Li, Jonathan Libgober, Xiaosheng Mu:
Sequentially Optimal Pricing under Informational Robustness. 474 - Yifan Feng, Jussi Keppo, Qinzhen Li:
Credit Rating Design Under Adverse Selection. 475 - Thành Nguyen, Alexander Teytelboym, Shai Vardi:
Efficiency, Envy and Incentives in Combinatorial Assignment. 476 - Brendan Lucier, Raghuvansh Raj Saxena:
Approximately Optimal Mechanism Design for Competing Sellers. 477 - Eshwar Ram Arunachaleswaran, Natalie Collina, Jon Schneider:
Learning to Play Against Unknown Opponents. 478-504 - Krishna Dasaratha, Benjamin Golub, Anant Shah:
Incentive Design With Spillovers. 505 - Yuri Faenza, Aapeli Vuorinen:
Longer Lists Yield Better Matchings. 506 - Dirk Bergemann, Marek Bojko, Paul Duetting, Renato Paes Leme, Haifeng Xu, Song Zuo:
Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information. 507 - Runshan Fu, Ginger Zhe Jin, Meng Liu:
Does a Human-Algorithm Feedback Loop Lead to Error Propagation? Evidence from Zillow's Zestimate. 508 - Farbod Ekbatani, René Caldentey:
A Stochastic Growth Model for Online Platforms. 509 - Mengqian Zhang, Yuhao Li, Xinyuan Sun, Elynn Y. Chen, Xi Chen:
Maximal Extractable Value in Batch Auctions. 510 - Juan Carlos Martínez Mori, Alejandro Toriello:
Cooperation and the Design of Public Goods. 511 - Moshe Babaioff, Yiding Feng, Noam Manaker Morag:
On the Efficiency of Fair and Truthful Trade Mechanisms. 512 - Mohammad Mehrabi, Omer Karaduman, Stefan Wager:
Optimal Mechanisms for Demand Response: An Indifference Set Approach. 513 - Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Tomasz Ponitka, Ermis Soumalias:
The Pseudo-Dimension of Contracts. 514-539 - Craig Fernandes, James Siderius, Raghav Singal:
Peer Review Market Design: Effort-Based Matching and Admission Control. 540 - Marco Cosconati, Yi Xin, Fan Wu, Yizhou Jin:
Competing under Information Heterogeneity: Evidence from Auto Insurance. 541 - Yan Leng, Trung Nguyen:
Latent Neural Coupling of Risk and Time Preferences in LLMs Mirrors Human Biases. 542 - Chamsi Hssaine, Yichun Hu, Ciara Pike-Burke:
Learning Fair And Effective Points-Based Rewards Programs. 543 - José Luis Montiel Olea, Brenda Prallon, Chen Qiu, Jörg Stoye, Yiwei Sun:
Externally Valid Selection of Experimental Sites via the k-Median Problem. 544 - Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko, Fedor Sandomirskiy:
Constructive Blackwell's Theorem. 545 - Zhiyuan Tang, Wanning Chen, Kan Xu:
Match Made with Matrix Completion: Efficient Offline and Online Learning in Matching Markets. 546 - Siddarth Srinivasan, Ezra Karger, Yiling Chen:
Self-Resolving Prediction Markets for Unverifiable Outcomes. 547-573 - Teddy Mekonnen, Bobak Pakzad-Hurson:
Competition, Persuasion, and Search. 574 - David A. Easley, Yoav Kolumbus, Éva Tardos:
Markets with Heterogeneous Agents: Dynamics and Survival of Bayesian vs. No-Regret Learners. 575 - Ignacio Rios, Federico Bobbio, Margarida Carvalho, Alfredo Torrico:
Stable Matching with Contingent Priorities. 576 - Matteo Camboni, Christoph Carnehl:
Inputs or Outputs: What to Test and How to Test. 577 - Andres Aradillas Fernandez, Jose H. Blanchet, José Luis Montiel Olea, Chen Qiu, Jörg Stoye, Lezhi Tan:
Epsilon-Minimax Solutions of Statistical Decision Problems via the Hedge Algorithm. 578 - Rachitesh Kumar, Omar Mouchtaki:
Prior-Independent Bidding Strategies for First-Price Auctions. 579 - Tal Alon, Matteo Castiglioni, Junjie Chen, Tomer Ezra, Yingkai Li, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Multi-Project Contracts. 580-598 - Rian Neogi, Kanstantsin Pashkovich, Chaitanya Swamy:
An O(log log n)-approximate budget feasible mechanism for subadditive valuations. 599 - Grazia Cecere, Catherine Tucker, Vincent Lefrere:
Does Firm Size Influence the Collection of Sensitive Data?: A Study of Child-Orientated Apps. 600-636 - Mingyang Fu, Xiaobo Li, Napat Rujeerapaiboon:
Optimal Competitive Ratio in Opaque Sales. 637 - Pooja Kulkarni, Ruta Mehta, Parnian Shahkar:
Online Fair Division: Towards Ex-Post Constant MMS Guarantees. 638 - Théo Durandard, Alexis Ghersengorin:
Robust Regulation of Labour Contracts. 639 - Ming Li, Binyan Pu, Renkun Yang:
The Design of Quality Disclosure Policy and the Limits to Competition. 640 - Shahar Dobzinski, Alon Eden, Kira Goldner, Ariel Shaulker, Thodoris Tsilivis:
Bilateral Trade with Interdependent Values: Information vs. Approximation. 641-665 - Denise Cerna, Chiwei Yan, Hongyao Ma:
An Equilibrium Solver for A Dynamic Queueing Game. 666 - Shota Ichihashi, Alex Smolin:
Buyer-Optimal Algorithmic Recommendations. 667 - Isaiah Andrews, Drew Fudenberg, Lihua Lei, Annie Liang, Chaofeng Wu:
The Transfer Performance of Economic Models. 668-669 - Ben Berger, Edward W. Felten, Akaki Mamageishvili, Benny Sudakov:
Economic Censorship Games in Fraud Proofs. 670-687 - Yurong Chen, Xiaotie Deng, Jiarui Gan, Yuhao Li:
Learning a Stackelberg Leader's Incentives from Optimal Commitments. 688 - Arash Ashuri, Vasilis Gkatzelis:
Simultaneously Satisfying MXS and EFL. 689-718 - Angelos Assos, Carmel Baharav, Bailey Flanigan, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Alternates, Assemble! Selecting Optimal Alternates for Citizens' Assemblies. 719-738 - Kevin He, Ran Shorrer, Mengjia Xia:
Human Misperception of Generative-AI Alignment: A Laboratory Experiment. 739 - Moshe Babaioff, Noam Nisan:
On the Welfare of EIP-1559 with Patient Bidders. 740 - Jorge Justiniano, Andreas Kleiner, Benny Moldovanu, Martin Rumpf, Philipp Strack:
Entropy-Regularized Optimal Transport in Information Design. 741-760 - Nico Elbert, Alicia von Schenk, Fabian Kosse, Victor Klockmann, Nikolai Stein, Christoph Flath:
What Drives Team Success? Large-Scale Evidence on the Role of the Team Player Effect. 761 - Sukjin Han, Kyungho Lee:
Copyright and Competition: Estimating Supply and Demand with Unstructured Data. 762 - Bastián Bahamondes, Mathieu Dahan:
Inspection Game with Location-Specific Detection Capabilities. 763 - Masoud Seddighin, Saeed Seddighin:
Beating the Logarithmic Barrier for the Subadditive Maximin Share Problem. 764-782 - Frank Yang, Kai-Hao Yang:
Multidimensional Monotonicity and Economic Applications. 783 - Andrew Komo, Scott Duke Kominers, Tim Roughgarden:
Shill-Proof Auctions. 784 - Batya Berzack, Rotem Oshman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Dynamic Rental Games with Stagewise Individual Rationality. 785 - Dirk Bergemann, Alessandro Bonatti, Alex Smolin:
The Economics of Large Language Models: Token Allocation, Fine-Tuning, and Optimal Pricing. 786 - Tianyi Peng, Naimeng Ye, Andrew Zheng:
Differences-in-Neighbors for Network Interference in Experiments. 787 - Chiara Farronato, Andrey Fradkin, Tesary Lin:
Designing Consent: Choice Architecture and Consumer Welfare in Data Sharing. 788 - Shuo Sun, Rajan Udwani, Zuo-Jun Max Shen:
A Unified Algorithmic Framework for Dynamic Assortment Optimization under MNL Choice. 789 - Moses Charikar, Prasanna Ramakrishnan, Zihan Tan, Kangning Wang:
Metric Distortion for Tournament Voting and Beyond. 790-818 - Yiqi Yang, Zhi Wang, Rui Gao, Shuang Li:
Reproducing Kernel Hilbert Space Choice Model. 819 - Bo Peng, Zhihao Gavin Tang:
Revisiting Ranking for Online Bipartite Matching with Random Arrivals: the Primal-Dual Analysis. 820-835 - Ran Eilat, Kfir Eliaz, Xiaosheng Mu:
Privacy Preserving Auctions. 836 - Krishnamurthy Iyer, Alec Sun, Haifeng Xu, You Zu:
How to Sell a Service with Uncertain Outcomes. 837 - James Stratton:
Selected Communication. 838 - Julian Schwarz, Tobias Harks, Lukas Graf:
Are System Optimal Dynamic Flows Implementable by Tolls? 839 - Mohak Goyal, Sahasrajit Sarmasarkar:
Metric Distortion Under Probabilistic Voting. 840 - Georgios Papasotiropoulos, Seyedeh Zeinab Pishbin, Oskar Skibski, Piotr Skowron, Tomasz Was:
Method of Equal Shares with Bounded Overspending. 841-868 - Timothy Sudijono, Simon Ejdemyr, Apoorva Lal, Martin Tingley:
Optimizing Returns from Experimentation Programs. 869 - Ashkan Soleymani, Georgios Piliouras, Gabriele Farina:
Cautious Optimism: A Meta-Algorithm for Near-Constant Regret in General Games. 870 - Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Piotr Krysta, Mohammad Mahdavi, Suho Shin:
Delegation with Costly Inspection. 871-894 - Gil Aharoni, Martin Hoefer, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Welfare and Beyond in Multi-Agent Contracts. 895 - Haris Aziz, Patrick Lederer, Dominik Peters, Jannik Peters, Angus Ritossa:
Committee Monotonicity and Proportional Representation for Ranked Preferences. 896 - Kirill Rudov, Fedor Sandomirskiy, Leeat Yariv:
Extreme Equilibria: the Benefits of Correlation. 897 - Javier Cembrano, Andrés Moraga, Victor Verdugo:
Near-feasible Fair Allocations in Two-sided Markets. 898-915 - César Barilla:
When and what to learn in a changing world. 916 - Wenxin Zhang, Santiago R. Balseiro, Robert Kleinberg, Vahab Mirrokni, Balasubramanian Sivan, Bartek Wydrowski:
Distributed Load Balancing with Workload-Dependent Service Rates. 917 - Wenxuan Guo, Tengyuan Liang, Panos Toulis:
Gaussianized Design Optimization for Covariate Balance in Randomized Experiments. 918 - Setareh Farajollahzadeh, Soonbong Lee, Vahideh Manshadi, Faidra Monachou:
Why the Rooney Rule Fumbles: Limitations of Interview-stage Diversity Interventions in Labor Markets. 919 - Harold D. Chiang, Jack Collison, Lorenzo Magnolfi, Christopher Sullivan:
Enhancing the Merger Simulation Toolkit with ML/AI. 920 - Nima Haghpanah, Ron Siegel:
Screening Two Types. 921 - Anna Heuser, Thomas Kesselheim:
Contextual Learning for Stochastic Optimization. 922 - Aadityan Ganesh, Qianfan Zhang:
Truthful, Credible, and Optimal Auctions for Matroids via Blockchains and Commitments. 923-943 - Soumen Banerjee, Yifei Sun, Yi-Chun Chen:
Correlated equilibrium implementation: Navigating toward social optima with learning dynamics. 944 - Will Ma, Calum MacRury, Cliff Stein:
Forward-backward Contention Resolution Schemes for Fair Rationing. 945 - Dimitar Chakarov, S. Matthew Weinberg, Eric Xue:
A QPTAS For Up-To-ε Revenue Maximization With Multiple Constant-Demand Bidders Over Independent Items. 946-974 - Modibo Khane Camara, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier:
Eliciting Informed Preferences. 975 - Rachael Colley, David F. Manlove, Daniel Paulusma, Mengxiao Zhang:
Complexity and Manipulation of International Kidney Exchange Programmes with Country-Specific Parameters. 976-995 - Eden Hartman, Erel Segal-Halevi, Biaoshuai Tao:
It's Not All Black and White: Degree of Truthfulness for Risk-Avoiding Agents. 996-1016 - Junpei Komiyama, Nishant A. Mehta, Ali Mortazavi:
No-Regret Incentive-Compatible Online Learning under Exact Truthfulness with Non-Myopic Experts. 1017 - Nika Haghtalab, Mingda Qiao, Kunhe Yang:
Leakage-Robust Bayesian Persuasion. 1018 - Koji Yokote, Isa Emin Hafalir, Fuhito Kojima, M. Bumin Yenmez:
Rationalizing Path-Independent Choice Rules. 1019 - Francesco Bacchiocchi, Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, Nicola Gatti:
Regret Minimization for Piecewise Linear Rewards: Contracts, Auctions, and Beyond. 1020 - Hiroki Shinozaki, Shigehiro Serizawa:
Constrained efficiency and strategy-proofness in package assignment problems with money. 1021 - Filip Tokarski:
Equitable screening. 1022 - Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Aram Grigoryan:
Market Design for Distributional Objectives in Allocation Problems: An Axiomatic Approach. 1023-1024 - Federico Echenique, Teddy Mekonnen, M. Bumin Yenmez:
Diversity in Choice as Majorization. 1025 - Zhaohong Sun:
A Fair and Optimal Approach to Sequential Healthcare Rationing. 1026-1045 - Andreas Charalampopoulos, Dimitris Fotakis, Panagiotis Patsilinakos, Thanos Tolias:
A Competitive Posted-Price Mechanism for Online Budget-Feasible Auctions. 1046-1075 - Kiarash Banihashem, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Mahdi JafariRaviz, Danny Mittal, Alipasha Montaseri:
How Bad Is Forming Your Own Multidimensional Opinion? 1076-1104 - Brian Hu Zhang, Ioannis Anagnostides, Emanuel Tewolde, Ratip Emin Berker, Gabriele Farina, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm:
Learning and Computation of Φ-Equilibria at the Frontier of Tractability. 1105 - Raphaël Raux, Bnaya Dreyfuss:
Human Learning about AI. 1106 - Mohammad Mosaffa, Omid Rafieian, Hema Yoganarasimhan:
Visual Polarization Measurement Using Counterfactual Image Generation. 1107-1108 - Ratip Emin Berker, Sílvia Casacuberta, Isaac Robinson, Christopher Ong, Vincent Conitzer, Edith Elkind:
From Independence of Clones to Composition Consistency: A Hierarchy of Barriers to Strategic Nomination. 1109 - Yongkang Guo, Jason D. Hartline, Zhihuan Huang, Yuqing Kong, Anant Shah, Fang-Yi Yu:
Algorithmic Robust Forecast Aggregation. 1110-1129 - Benjamin Cookson, Nisarg Shah:
Fairly Stable Two-Sided Matching with Indifferences. 1130 - Gregory Kehne, Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Krzysztof Sornat:
Robust Committee Voting, or The Other Side of Representation. 1131-1151 - Ilan Lobel, Ankur Mani, Josh Reed:
Asymptotically Efficient Distributed Experimentation. 1152 - Guido Imbens, Chao Qin, Stefan Wager:
Admissibility of Completely Randomized Trials: A Large-Deviation Approach. 1153 - Maryam Farboodi, Nima Haghpanah, Ali Shourideh:
Good Data and Bad Data: The Welfare Effects of Price Discrimination. 1154 - Yi-Chun Chen, Zhengqing Gui:
A Tale of Two Monopolies. 1155 - Anand Kalvit, Divya Singhvi:
Online Learning for Repeated Nudging. 1156 - Vasilis Livanos, Ruta Mehta:
Minimization I.I.D. Prophet Inequality via Extreme Value Theory: A Unified Approach. 1157-1179 - Kshipra Bhawalkar, Jeff Dean, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Neel Patel:
Equilibrium Efficiency and Learning in Budgeted Procurement Marketplaces. 1180-1209 - Isa Emin Hafalir, Fuhito Kojima, M. Bumin Yenmez, Koji Yokote:
Market Design with Distributional Objectives. 1210 - Ali Daei Naby, Setareh Farajollahzadeh, Ming Hu:
Robust One-Shot Price Experiment. 1211 - Evan Sadler, Benjamin Golub:
Games on Endogenous Networks. 1212
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