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ORCIDJason D. Hartline
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- affiliation: Northwestern University, Evanston, Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
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2020 – today
- 2024
[j29]Dongping Zhang
, Jason D. Hartline, Jessica Hullman:
Designing Shared Information Displays for Agents of Varying Strategic Sophistication. Proc. ACM Hum. Comput. Interact. 8(CSCW1): 1-34 (2024)- [j28]Yifan Wu, Ziyang Guo, Michalis Mamakos, Jason D. Hartline, Jessica Hullman:
The Rational Agent Benchmark for Data Visualization. IEEE Trans. Vis. Comput. Graph. 30(1): 338-347 (2024) - [c78]Jinshuo Dong, Jason D. Hartline, Liren Shan, Aravindan Vijayaraghavan:
Error-Tolerant E-Discovery Protocols. CSLAW 2024: 24-35 - [c77]Jason D. Hartline, Sheng Long, Chenhao Zhang:
Regulation of Algorithmic Collusion. CSLAW 2024: 98-108 - [c76]Ziyang Guo, Yifan Wu, Jason D. Hartline, Jessica Hullman:
A Decision Theoretic Framework for Measuring AI Reliance. FAccT 2024: 221-236 - [c75]Jason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen:
Equivocal Blends: Prior Independent Lower Bounds. ITCS 2024: 59:1-59:21 - [i60]Jessica Hullman, Alex Kale, Jason D. Hartline:
Decision Theoretic Foundations for Experiments Evaluating Human Decisions. CoRR abs/2401.15106 (2024) - [i59]Ziyang Guo, Yifan Wu, Jason D. Hartline, Jessica Hullman:
A Statistical Framework for Measuring AI Reliance. CoRR abs/2401.15356 (2024) - [i58]Jason D. Hartline, Sheng Long, Chenhao Zhang:
Regulation of Algorithmic Collusion. CoRR abs/2401.15794 (2024) - [i57]Yongkang Guo, Jason D. Hartline, Zhihuan Huang, Yuqing Kong, Anant Shah, Fang-Yi Yu:
Algorithmic Robust Forecast Aggregation. CoRR abs/2401.17743 (2024) - [i56]Jinshuo Dong, Jason D. Hartline, Liren Shan, Aravindan Vijayaraghavan:
Error-Tolerant E-Discovery Protocols. CoRR abs/2401.17952 (2024) - [i55]Aadityan Ganesh, Jason D. Hartline, Atanu R. Sinha, Matthew vonAllmen:
Fundamental Limits of Throughput and Availability: Applications to prophet inequalities & transaction fee mechanism design. CoRR abs/2402.19292 (2024) - [i54]Jason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen, Anant Shah:
Subgame Optimal and Prior-Independent Online Algorithms. CoRR abs/2403.10451 (2024) - [i53]Yifan Wu, Jason D. Hartline:
ElicitationGPT: Text Elicitation Mechanisms via Language Models. CoRR abs/2406.09363 (2024) - 2023
- [c74]Daniel Chui, Jason D. Hartline, James R. Wright:
Non-strategic Econometrics (for Initial Play). AAMAS 2023: 634-642 - [c73]Jason D. Hartline, Liren Shan, Yingkai Li, Yifan Wu:
Optimal Scoring Rules for Multi-dimensional Effort. COLT 2023: 2624-2650 - [c72]Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Modibo K. Camara, Jason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen, Sheng Long:
Screening with Disadvantaged Agents. FORC 2023: 6:1-6:20 - [c71]Jiale Chen, Jason D. Hartline, Onno Zoeter:
Fair Grading Algorithms for Randomized Exams. FORC 2023: 7:1-7:22 - [c70]Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline, Yingkai Li:
Simple Mechanisms for Non-linear Agents. SODA 2023: 3802-3816 - [e2]Kevin Leyton-Brown, Jason D. Hartline, Larry Samuelson:
Proceedings of the 24th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2023, London, United Kingdom, July 9-12, 2023. ACM 2023 [contents] - [i52]Aadityan Ganesh, Jason D. Hartline:
Combinatorial Pen Testing (or Consumer Surplus of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions). CoRR abs/2301.12462 (2023) - [i51]Yifan Wu, Ziyang Guo, Michalis Mamakos, Jason D. Hartline, Jessica Hullman:
The Rational Agent Benchmark for Data Visualization. CoRR abs/2304.03432 (2023) - [i50]Jiale Chen, Jason D. Hartline, Onno Zoeter:
Fair Grading Algorithms for Randomized Exams. CoRR abs/2304.06254 (2023) - [i49]Hedyeh Beyhaghi, Modibo K. Camara, Jason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen, Sheng Long:
Screening with Disadvantaged Agents. CoRR abs/2305.18068 (2023) - [i48]Jason D. Hartline, Darrell Hoy, Samuel Taggart:
Robust Analysis of Auction Equilibria. CoRR abs/2310.03702 (2023) - [i47]Dongping Zhang, Jason D. Hartline, Jessica Hullman:
Designing Shared Information Displays for Agents of Varying Strategic Sophistication. CoRR abs/2310.10858 (2023) - [i46]Jason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen:
Extension of Minimax for Algorithmic Lower Bounds. CoRR abs/2311.17038 (2023) - 2022
- [j27]Rad Niazadeh, Jason D. Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Reza Khani, Brendan Lucier:
Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions. Oper. Res. 70(1): 223-240 (2022) - [j26]Paula Kayongo, Glenn Sun, Jason D. Hartline, Jessica Hullman:
Visualization Equilibrium. IEEE Trans. Vis. Comput. Graph. 28(1): 465-474 (2022) - [c69]Jinshuo Dong, Jason D. Hartline, Aravindan Vijayaraghavan:
Classification Protocols with Minimal Disclosure. CSLAW 2022: 67-76 - [c68]Jason D. Hartline, Daniel W. Linna Jr., Liren Shan, Alex Tang:
Algorithmic Learning Foundations for Common Law. CSLAW 2022: 109-117 - [c67]Chenhao Zhang, Jason D. Hartline, Christos Dimoulas:
Karp: a language for NP reductions. PLDI 2022: 762-776 - [c66]Yiding Feng, Ronen Gradwohl, Jason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov:
Bias-Variance Games. EC 2022: 328-329 - [c65]Yingkai Li, Jason D. Hartline, Liren Shan, Yifan Wu:
Optimization of Scoring Rules. EC 2022: 988-989 - [i45]Jason D. Hartline:
Online Bipartite Matching via Smoothness. CoRR abs/2203.13140 (2022) - [i44]Daniel Chui, Jason D. Hartline, James R. Wright:
Non-strategic Structural Inference (for Initial Play). CoRR abs/2208.06521 (2022) - [i43]Jinshuo Dong, Jason D. Hartline, Aravindan Vijayaraghavan:
Classification Protocols with Minimal Disclosure. CoRR abs/2209.02690 (2022) - [i42]Jason D. Hartline, Daniel W. Linna Jr., Liren Shan, Alex Tang:
Algorithmic Learning Foundations for Common Law. CoRR abs/2209.02866 (2022) - [i41]Jason D. Hartline, Liren Shan, Yingkai Li, Yifan Wu:
Optimal Scoring Rules for Multi-dimensional Effort. CoRR abs/2211.03302 (2022) - 2021
- [j25]Shaddin Dughmi, Jason D. Hartline, Robert D. Kleinberg, Rad Niazadeh:
Bernoulli Factories and Black-box Reductions in Mechanism Design. J. ACM 68(2): 10:1-10:30 (2021) - [j24]Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg:
Full surplus extraction from samples. J. Econ. Theory 193: 105230 (2021) - [j23]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline:
SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2022. SIGecom Exch. 19(2): 4-31 (2021) - [c64]Moshe Babaioff, Richard Cole, Jason D. Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier:
Non-Quasi-Linear Agents in Quasi-Linear Mechanisms (Extended Abstract). ITCS 2021: 84:1-84:1 - [c63]Yuan Deng, Jason D. Hartline, Jieming Mao, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Welfare-maximizing Guaranteed Dashboard Mechanisms. EC 2021: 370 - [c62]Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline, Yingkai Li:
Revelation gap for pricing from samples. STOC 2021: 1438-1451 - [i40]Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline, Yingkai Li:
Revelation Gap for Pricing from Samples. CoRR abs/2102.13496 (2021) - [i39]Jason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen:
Lower Bounds for Prior Independent Algorithms. CoRR abs/2107.04754 (2021) - [i38]Paula Kayongo, Glenn Sun, Jason D. Hartline, Jessica Hullman:
Visualization Equilibrium. CoRR abs/2108.04953 (2021) - 2020
- [j22]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline:
SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2021. SIGecom Exch. 18(2): 4-31 (2020) - [c61]Modibo K. Camara, Jason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen:
Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior. FOCS 2020: 259-270 - [c60]Jason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen, Yingkai Li:
Benchmark Design and Prior-independent Optimization. FOCS 2020: 294-305 - [c59]Rediet Abebe, Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline:
A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching. SODA 2020: 2096-2113 - [c58]Jason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov, Zihe Wang:
Inference from Auction Prices. SODA 2020: 2472-2491 - [e1]Péter Biró, Jason D. Hartline, Michael Ostrovsky, Ariel D. Procaccia:
EC '20: The 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Virtual Event, Hungary, July 13-17, 2020. ACM 2020, ISBN 978-1-4503-7975-5 [contents] - [i37]Jason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen, Yingkai Li:
Benchmark Design and Prior-independent Optimization. CoRR abs/2001.10157 (2020) - [i36]Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline, Yingkai Li:
Simple Mechanisms for Non-linear Agents. CoRR abs/2003.00545 (2020) - [i35]Jason D. Hartline, Yingkai Li, Liren Shan, Yifan Wu:
Optimization of Scoring Rules. CoRR abs/2007.02905 (2020) - [i34]Modibo Camara, Jason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen:
Mechanisms for a No-Regret Agent: Beyond the Common Prior. CoRR abs/2009.05518 (2020) - [i33]Moshe Babaioff, Richard Cole, Jason D. Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier:
Non-quasi-linear Agents in Quasi-linear Mechanisms. CoRR abs/2012.02893 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j21]Nikhil R. Devanur, Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden:
Introduction to the Special Issue - Algorithmic Game Theory - STOC/FOCS/SODA 2012. Games Econ. Behav. 113: 1-3 (2019) - [j20]Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Optimal crowdsourcing contests. Games Econ. Behav. 113: 80-96 (2019) - [j19]Saeed Alaei, Jason D. Hartline, Rad Niazadeh, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Yang Yuan:
Optimal auctions vs. anonymous pricing. Games Econ. Behav. 118: 494-510 (2019) - [j18]Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Azarakhsh Malekian:
Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced Forms. Math. Oper. Res. 44(3): 1058-1086 (2019) - [j17]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline:
SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2020. SIGecom Exch. 17(2): 4-24 (2019) - [c57]Jason D. Hartline, Samuel Taggart:
Sample Complexity for Non-Truthful Mechanisms. EC 2019: 399-416 - [c56]Jason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov, Onno Zoeter:
Dashboard Mechanisms for Online Marketplaces. EC 2019: 591-592 - [c55]Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline, Yingkai Li:
Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing: Beyond Linear Utility. EC 2019: 885-886 - [i32]Jason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov, Zihe Wang:
Inference from Auction Prices. CoRR abs/1902.06908 (2019) - [i31]Rediet Abebe, Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline:
A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching. CoRR abs/1903.07797 (2019) - [i30]Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline, Yingkai Li:
Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing: Beyond Linear Utility. CoRR abs/1905.04257 (2019) - [i29]Jason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov, Onno Zoeter:
Dashboard Mechanisms for Online Marketplaces. CoRR abs/1905.05750 (2019) - [i28]Yiding Feng, Ronen Gradwohl, Jason D. Hartline, Aleck C. Johnsen, Denis Nekipelov:
Bias-Variance Games. CoRR abs/1909.03618 (2019) - 2018
- [j16]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline:
SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2019. SIGecom Exch. 17(1): 2-36 (2018) - [c54]Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline:
An End-to-End Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-Independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents). FOCS 2018: 404-415 - [c53]Jason D. Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Reza Khani, Brendan Lucier, Rad Niazadeh:
Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions. EC 2018: 111-112 - [i27]Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline:
An End-to-end Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents). CoRR abs/1804.01977 (2018) - 2017
- [j15]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline:
SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2018. SIGecom Exch. 16(1): 2-23 (2017) - [j14]Shaddin Dughmi, Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg, Rad Niazadeh:
Bernoulli factories and black-box reductions in mechanism design. SIGecom Exch. 16(1): 58-71 (2017) - [c52]Shaddin Dughmi, Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg, Rad Niazadeh:
Bernoulli factories and black-box reductions in mechanism design. STOC 2017: 158-169 - [i26]Shaddin Dughmi, Jason D. Hartline, Robert D. Kleinberg, Rad Niazadeh:
Bernoulli Factories and Black-Box Reductions in Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/1703.04143 (2017) - [i25]Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Denis Nekipelov:
Mechanism Redesign. CoRR abs/1708.04699 (2017) - 2016
- [j13]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline:
SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2017. SIGecom Exch. 15(1): 2-31 (2016) - [c51]Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Denis Nekipelov:
A/B Testing of Auctions. EC 2016: 19-20 - [c50]Eric Balkanski, Jason D. Hartline:
Bayesian Budget Feasibility with Posted Pricing. WWW 2016: 189-203 - [i24]Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Denis Nekipelov:
A/B Testing of Auctions. CoRR abs/1606.00908 (2016) - [i23]Jason D. Hartline, Samuel Taggart:
Non-Revelation Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/1608.01875 (2016) - [i22]Jason D. Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Rad Niazadeh:
Finding Bidder-Optimal Core Points Quickly. CoRR abs/1610.03564 (2016) - 2015
- [j12]Shuchi Chawla, Lisa Fleischer, Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden:
Introduction to the Special Issue - Algorithmic Game Theory - STOC/FOCS/SODA 2011. Games Econ. Behav. 92: 228-231 (2015) - [j11]Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg, Azarakhsh Malekian:
Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings. Games Econ. Behav. 92: 401-429 (2015) - [j10]Nikhil R. Devanur, Jason D. Hartline, Qiqi Yan:
Envy freedom and prior-free mechanism design. J. Econ. Theory 156: 103-143 (2015) - [j9]Shaddin Dughmi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline:
SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2016. SIGecom Exch. 14(1): 2-40 (2015) - [c49]Saeed Alaei, Jason D. Hartline, Rad Niazadeh, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Yang Yuan:
Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing. FOCS 2015: 1446-1463 - [c48]Jason D. Hartline, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos:
No-Regret Learning in Bayesian Games. NIPS 2015: 3061-3069 - [c47]Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline:
Reverse Mechanism Design. EC 2015: 757-758 - [i21]Eric Balkanski, Jason D. Hartline:
Bayesian Budget Feasibility with Posted Pricing. CoRR abs/1506.04198 (2015) - [i20]Jason D. Hartline, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos:
No-Regret Learning in Repeated Bayesian Games. CoRR abs/1507.00418 (2015) - [i19]Saeed Alaei, Jason D. Hartline, Rad Niazadeh, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Yang Yuan:
Optimal Auctions vs. Anonymous Pricing. CoRR abs/1507.02615 (2015) - 2014
- [c46]Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg:
Optimal auctions for correlated buyers with sampling. EC 2014: 23-36 - [c45]Jason D. Hartline, Darrell Hoy, Sam Taggart:
Price of anarchy for auction revenue. EC 2014: 693-710 - [c44]Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Denis Nekipelov:
Mechanism design for data science. EC 2014: 711-712 - [i18]Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline:
Reverse Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/1404.1341 (2014) - [i17]Jason D. Hartline, Darrell Hoy, Sam Taggart:
Price of Anarchy for Revenue. CoRR abs/1404.5943 (2014) - [i16]Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Denis Nekipelov:
Mechanism Design for Data Science. CoRR abs/1404.5971 (2014) - [i15]Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg:
Optimal Auctions for Correlated Buyers with Sampling. CoRR abs/1406.1571 (2014) - [i14]Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden:
Optimal Platform Design. CoRR abs/1412.8518 (2014) - 2013
- [j8]Jason D. Hartline:
Bayesian Mechanism Design. Found. Trends Theor. Comput. Sci. 8(3): 143-263 (2013) - [j7]Bach Q. Ha, Jason D. Hartline:
Mechanism Design via Consensus Estimates, Cross Checking, and Profit Extraction. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 1(2): 8:1-8:15 (2013) - [c43]Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline:
The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions. FOCS 2013: 628-637 - [c42]Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline:
Auctions with unique equilibria. EC 2013: 181-196 - [c41]Nikhil R. Devanur, Bach Q. Ha, Jason D. Hartline:
Prior-free auctions for budgeted agents. EC 2013: 287-304 - [c40]Hu Fu, Jason D. Hartline, Darrell Hoy:
Prior-independent auctions for risk-averse agents. EC 2013: 471-488 - [c39]Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, David L. Malec, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Prior-independent mechanisms for scheduling. STOC 2013: 51-60 - [i13]Hu Fu, Jason D. Hartline, Darrell Hoy:
Prior-independent Auctions for Risk-averse Agents. CoRR abs/1301.0401 (2013) - [i12]Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, David L. Malec, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Prior-Independent Mechanisms for Scheduling. CoRR abs/1305.0597 (2013) - 2012
- [c38]Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Azarakhsh Malekian:
Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction. EC 2012: 17 - [c37]Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Optimal crowdsourcing contests. SODA 2012: 856-868 - [c36]Bach Q. Ha, Jason D. Hartline:
Mechanism design via consensus estimates, cross checking, and profit extraction. SODA 2012: 887-895 - [i11]Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Azarakhsh Malekian:
Bayesian Optimal Auctions via Multi- to Single-agent Reduction. CoRR abs/1203.5099 (2012) - [i10]Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason D. Hartline, Azarakhsh Malekian:
The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions. CoRR abs/1206.3541 (2012) - [i9]Bach Q. Ha, Jason D. Hartline:
The Biased Sampling Profit Extraction Auction. CoRR abs/1206.4955 (2012) - [i8]Nikhil R. Devanur, Jason D. Hartline, Qiqi Yan:
Envy Freedom and Prior-free Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/1212.3741 (2012) - [i7]Nikhil R. Devanur, Bach Q. Ha, Jason D. Hartline:
Prior-free Auctions for Budgeted Agents. CoRR abs/1212.5766 (2012) - 2011
- [j6]Gagan Aggarwal, Amos Fiat, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Madhu Sudan:
Derandomization of auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 72(1): 1-11 (2011) - [c35]Jason D. Hartline, Qiqi Yan:
Envy, truth, and profit. EC 2011: 243-252 - [c34]Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg, Azarakhsh Malekian:
Bayesian Incentive Compatibility via Matchings. SODA 2011: 734-747 - [c33]Nikhil R. Devanur, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin, C. Thach Nguyen:
Prior-Independent Multi-parameter Mechanism Design. WINE 2011: 122-133 - [i6]Bach Q. Ha, Jason D. Hartline:
Mechanism Design via Consensus Estimates, Cross Checking, and Profit Extraction. CoRR abs/1108.4744 (2011) - [i5]Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Optimal Crowdsourcing Contests. CoRR abs/1111.2893 (2011) - 2010
- [j5]Eric Anderson, Joseph Hall, Jason D. Hartline, M. Hobbes, Anna R. Karlin, Jared Saia, Ram Swaminathan, John Wilkes:
Algorithms for Data Migration. Algorithmica 57(2): 349-380 (2010) - [c32]Jason D. Hartline, Brendan Lucier:
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design. BQGT 2010: 19:1 - [c31]Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, David L. Malec, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing. BQGT 2010: 22:1 - [c30]Jason D. Hartline:
Approximation in mechanism design. BQGT 2010: 35:1 - [c29]Jason D. Hartline, Brendan Lucier:
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design. STOC 2010: 301-310 - [c28]Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, David L. Malec, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing. STOC 2010: 311-320
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [j4]Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden:
Simple versus optimal mechanisms. SIGecom Exch. 8(1) (2009) - [c27]Nikhil R. Devanur, Jason D. Hartline:
Limited and online supply and the bayesian foundations of prior-free mechanism design. EC 2009: 41-50 - [c26]Moshe Babaioff, Jason D. Hartline, Robert D. Kleinberg:
Selling ad campaigns: online algorithms with cancellations. EC 2009: 61-70 - [c25]Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden:
Simple versus optimal mechanisms. EC 2009: 225-234 - [i4]Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, David L. Malec, Balasubramanian Sivan:
Sequential Posted Pricing and Multi-parameter Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/0907.2435 (2009) - [i3]Jason D. Hartline, Brendan Lucier:
Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/0909.4756 (2009) - 2008
- [j3]Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Jason D. Hartline, Yishay Mansour:
Reducing mechanism design to algorithm design via machine learning. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 74(8): 1245-1270 (2008) - [c24]Matthew Cary, Abraham D. Flaxman, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin:
Auctions for structured procurement. SODA 2008: 304-313 - [c23]Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden:
Optimal mechanism design and money burning. STOC 2008: 75-84 - [c22]Jason D. Hartline, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Mukund Sundararajan:
Optimal marketing strategies over social networks. WWW 2008: 189-198 - [i2]Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden:
Optimal Mechansim Design and Money Burning. CoRR abs/0804.2097 (2008) - [i1]Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Robert Kleinberg:
Algorithmic Pricing via Virtual Valuations. CoRR abs/0808.1671 (2008) - 2007
- [c21]Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Robert D. Kleinberg:
Algorithmic pricing via virtual valuations. EC 2007: 243-251 - 2006
- [j2]Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin, Michael E. Saks, Andrew Wright:
Competitive auctions. Games Econ. Behav. 55(2): 242-269 (2006) - [c20]Gagan Aggarwal, Jason D. Hartline:
Knapsack auctions. SODA 2006: 1083-1092 - [c19]Shuchi Chawla, Jason D. Hartline, Uday Rajan, R. Ravi:
Bayesian Optimal No-Deficit Mechanism Design. WINE 2006: 136-148 - 2005
- [j1]Jason D. Hartline, Edwin S. Hong, Alexander E. Mohr, William R. Pentney, Emily Rocke:
Characterizing History Independent Data Structures. Algorithmica 42(1): 57-74 (2005) - [c18]Maria-Florina Balcan, Avrim Blum, Jason D. Hartline, Yishay Mansour:
Mechanism Design via Machine Learning. FOCS 2005: 605-614 - [c17]Jason D. Hartline, Robert McGrew:
From optimal limited to unlimited supply auctions. EC 2005: 175-182 - [c16]Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline:
Collusion-resistant mechanisms for single-parameter agents. SODA 2005: 620-629 - [c15]Avrim Blum, Jason D. Hartline:
Near-optimal online auctions. SODA 2005: 1156-1163 - [c14]Venkatesan Guruswami, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin, David Kempe, Claire Kenyon, Frank McSherry:
On profit-maximizing envy-free pricing. SODA 2005: 1164-1173 - [c13]Gagan Aggarwal, Amos Fiat, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Madhu Sudan:
Derandomization of auctions. STOC 2005: 619-625 - [c12]Jason D. Hartline, Vladlen Koltun:
Near-Optimal Pricing in Near-Linear Time. WADS 2005: 422-431 - [c11]Uriel Feige, Abraham Flaxman, Jason D. Hartline, Robert D. Kleinberg:
On the Competitive Ratio of the Random Sampling Auction. WINE 2005: 878-886 - 2004
- [c10]Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin, Michael E. Saks:
A Lower Bound on the Competitive Ratio of Truthful Auctions. STACS 2004: 644-655 - 2003
- [c9]Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline:
Envy-free auctions for digital goods. EC 2003: 29-35 - [c8]Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline:
Competitiveness via consensus. SODA 2003: 215-222 - 2002
- [c7]Kaustubh Deshmukh, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin:
Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions. ESA 2002: 361-373 - [c6]Jason D. Hartline, Edwin S. Hong, Alexander E. Mohr, William R. Pentney, Emily Rocke:
Characterizing History Independent Data Structures. ISAAC 2002: 229-240 - [c5]Amos Fiat, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin:
Competitive generalized auctions. STOC 2002: 72-81 - 2001
- [c4]Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline:
Competitive Auctions for Multiple Digital Goods. ESA 2001: 416-427 - [c3]Joseph Hall, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin, Jared Saia, John Wilkes:
On algorithms for efficient data migration. SODA 2001: 620-629 - [c2]Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Andrew Wright:
Competitive auctions and digital goods. SODA 2001: 735-744 - [c1]Eric J. Anderson, Joseph Hall, Jason D. Hartline, Michael Hobbs, Anna R. Karlin, Jared Saia, Ram Swaminathan, John Wilkes:
An Experimental Study of Data Migration Algorithms. WAE 2001: 145-158
Coauthor Index
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