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ORCIDBrendan Lucier
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- affiliation: University of Toronto, Canada
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2020 – today
- 2025
[i75]S. Nageeb Ali, Nicole Immorlica, Meena Jagadeesan, Brendan Lucier:
Flattening Supply Chains: When do Technology Improvements lead to Disintermediation? CoRR abs/2502.20783 (2025)- 2024
- [j27]Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim
, Brendan Lucier:
An $O(\log \log m)$ Prophet Inequality for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions. SIAM J. Comput. 53(6): S20-239 (2024) - [j26]Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
Generative AI as Economic Agents. SIGecom Exch. 22(1): 93-109 (2024) - [c91]Ian Ball, James W. Bono, Justin Grana, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
Content Filtering with Inattentive Information Consumers. AAAI 2024: 9485-9493 - [c90]Brendan Lucier, Sarath Pattathil, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Mengxiao Zhang:
Autobidders with Budget and ROI Constraints: Efficiency, Regret, and Pacing Dynamics. COLT 2024: 3642-3643 - [c89]Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, Sahil Singla:
Online Combinatorial Allocations and Auctions with Few Samples. FOCS 2024: 1231-1250 - [c88]Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Markus Mobius, James Siderius:
Online Algorithms with Limited Data Retention (Extended Abstract). FORC 2024: 10:1-10:8 - [c87]Kate Donahue, Nicole Immorlica, Meena Jagadeesan, Brendan Lucier, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
Impact of Decentralized Learning on Player Utilities in Stackelberg Games. ICML 2024 - [c86]Nika Haghtalab, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Markus Mobius, Divyarthi Mohan:
Communicating with Anecdotes (Extended Abstract). ITCS 2024: 57:1-57:2 - [c85]Linda Cai, Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier:
Bundling in Oligopoly: Revenue Maximization with Single-Item Competitors. EC 2024: 465 - [c84]Andreas Alexander Haupt, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier:
Certification Design for a Competitive Market. EC 2024: 852 - [c83]Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Nicole Immorlica, Yingkai Li, Brendan Lucier:
Revenue Maximization for Buyers with Costly Participation. SODA 2024: 41-73 - [c82]Yiding Feng, Brendan Lucier, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
Strategic Budget Selection in a Competitive Autobidding World. STOC 2024: 213-224 - [c81]Nicole Immorlica, Meena Jagadeesan, Brendan Lucier:
Clickbait vs. Quality: How Engagement-Based Optimization Shapes the Content Landscape in Online Platforms. WWW 2024: 36-45 - [i74]Nicole Immorlica, Meena Jagadeesan, Brendan Lucier:
Clickbait vs. Quality: How Engagement-Based Optimization Shapes the Content Landscape in Online Platforms. CoRR abs/2401.09804 (2024) - [i73]Kate Donahue, Nicole Immorlica, Meena Jagadeesan, Brendan Lucier, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
Impact of Decentralized Learning on Player Utilities in Stackelberg Games. CoRR abs/2403.00188 (2024) - [i72]Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Markus Mobius, James Siderius:
Online Algorithms with Limited Data Retention. CoRR abs/2404.10997 (2024) - [i71]Moshe Babaioff, Linda Cai, Brendan Lucier:
Bundling in Oligopoly: Revenue Maximization with Single-Item Competitors. CoRR abs/2406.13835 (2024) - [i70]Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier, Rebecca Reiffenhäuser, Sahil Singla:
Online Combinatorial Allocations and Auctions with Few Samples. CoRR abs/2409.11091 (2024) - 2023
- [j25]Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Vahideh H. Manshadi, Alexander Wei:
Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms. Manag. Sci. 69(8): 4609-4626 (2023) - [c80]Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Yingkai Li, Brendan Lucier:
Making Auctions Robust to Aftermarkets. ITCS 2023: 9:1-9:23 - [c79]Jason Gaitonde, Yingkai Li, Bar Light, Brendan Lucier, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
Budget Pacing in Repeated Auctions: Regret and Efficiency Without Convergence. ITCS 2023: 52:1-52:1 - [i69]Brendan Lucier, Sarath Pattathil, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Mengxiao Zhang:
Autobidders with Budget and ROI Constraints: Efficiency, Regret, and Pacing Dynamics. CoRR abs/2301.13306 (2023) - [i68]Andreas A. Haupt, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier:
Certification Design for a Competitive Market. CoRR abs/2301.13449 (2023) - [i67]Yiding Feng, Brendan Lucier, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
Strategic Budget Selection in a Competitive Autobidding World. CoRR abs/2307.07374 (2023) - [i66]Keegan Harris, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
Algorithmic Persuasion Through Simulation: Information Design in the Age of Generative AI. CoRR abs/2311.18138 (2023) - 2022
- [j24]Rad Niazadeh, Jason D. Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Reza Khani, Brendan Lucier:
Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions. Oper. Res. 70(1): 223-240 (2022) - [j23]Constantinos Daskalakis, Maxwell Fishelson, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Santhoshini Velusamy:
Multi-Item Nontruthful Auctions Achieve Good Revenue. SIAM J. Comput. 51(6): 1796-1838 (2022) - [c78]Rediet Abebe, Nicole Immorlica, Jon M. Kleinberg, Brendan Lucier, Ali Shirali:
On the Effect of Triadic Closure on Network Segregation. EC 2022: 249-284 - [c77]Moshe Babaioff, Ronny Lempel, Brendan Lucier, Ishai Menache, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Sam Chiu-wai Wong:
Truthful Online Scheduling of Cloud Workloads under Uncertainty. WWW 2022: 151-161 - [i65]Moshe Babaioff, Ronny Lempel, Brendan Lucier, Ishai Menache, Aleksandrs Slivkins, Sam Chiu-wai Wong:
Truthful Online Scheduling of Cloud Workloads under Uncertainty. CoRR abs/2203.01213 (2022) - [i64]Jason Gaitonde, Yingkai Li, Bar Light, Brendan Lucier, Aleksandrs Slivkins:
Budget Pacing in Repeated Auctions: Regret and Efficiency without Convergence. CoRR abs/2205.08674 (2022) - [i63]Nika Haghtalab, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Markus Mobius, Divyarthi Mohan:
Communicating with Anecdotes. CoRR abs/2205.13461 (2022) - [i62]Rediet Abebe, Nicole Immorlica, Jon M. Kleinberg, Brendan Lucier, Ali Shirali:
On the Effect of Triadic Closure on Network Segregation. CoRR abs/2205.13658 (2022) - 2021
- [j22]Piotr Dworczak, Brendan Lucier:
SIGecom winter meeting report. SIGecom Exch. 19(1): 2-9 (2021) - [j21]Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Jieming Mao, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Christos Tzamos:
Combinatorial Assortment Optimization. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 9(1): 5:1-5:34 (2021) - [c76]Nicole Immorlica, Ian A. Kash, Brendan Lucier:
Buying Data over Time: Approximately Optimal Strategies for Dynamic Data-Driven Decisions. ITCS 2021: 77:1-77:14 - [c75]Moshe Babaioff, Richard Cole, Jason D. Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier:
Non-Quasi-Linear Agents in Quasi-Linear Mechanisms (Extended Abstract). ITCS 2021: 84:1-84:1 - [c74]Mete Seref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta:
The Price of Stability of Envy-Free Equilibria in Multi-buyer Sequential Auctions. SAGT 2021: 18-33 - [c73]Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Vahideh H. Manshadi, Alexander Wei:
Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms. EC 2021: 632-633 - [c72]Wanyi Dai Li, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier:
Contract Design for Afforestation Programs. WINE 2021: 113-130 - [i61]Nicole Immorlica, Ian A. Kash, Brendan Lucier:
Buying Data Over Time: Approximately Optimal Strategies for Dynamic Data-Driven Decisions. CoRR abs/2101.07304 (2021) - [i60]Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Vahideh H. Manshadi, Alexander Wei:
Designing Approximately Optimal Search on Matching Platforms. CoRR abs/2102.09017 (2021) - [i59]Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Nicole Immorlica, Yingkai Li, Brendan Lucier:
Revenue Maximization for Buyers with Outside Options. CoRR abs/2103.03980 (2021) - [i58]Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Yingkai Li, Brendan Lucier:
On the Impact of Information Acquisition and Aftermarkets on Auction Efficiency. CoRR abs/2107.05853 (2021) - 2020
- [j20]Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient. Games Econ. Behav. 123: 327-341 (2020) - [j19]Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer. J. ACM 67(4): 24:1-24:40 (2020) - [j18]Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier:
Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Nonstochastic Inputs. SIAM J. Comput. 49(3): 540-582 (2020) - [j17]Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier:
An O(log log m) prophet inequality for subadditive combinatorial auctions. SIGecom Exch. 18(2): 32-37 (2020) - [j16]Evangelia Gergatsouli, Brendan Lucier, Christos Tzamos:
The Complexity of Black-Box Mechanism Design with Priors. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 8(4): 20:1-20:19 (2020) - [c71]Hossein Esfandiari, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Brendan Lucier, Michael Mitzenmacher:
Prophets, Secretaries, and Maximizing the Probability of Choosing the Best. AISTATS 2020: 3717-3727 - [c70]Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier:
An O(log log m) Prophet Inequality for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions. FOCS 2020: 306-317 - [c69]Evangelia Gergatsouli, Brendan Lucier, Christos Tzamos:
Black-Box Methods for Restoring Monotonicity. ICML 2020: 3463-3473 - [c68]Nika Haghtalab, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Jack Z. Wang:
Maximizing Welfare with Incentive-Aware Evaluation Mechanisms. IJCAI 2020: 160-166 - [c67]Kira Goldner, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier:
Reducing Inefficiency in Carbon Auctions with Imperfect Competition. ITCS 2020: 15:1-15:21 - [c66]Gellért Weisz, András György, Wei-I Lin, Devon R. Graham, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Csaba Szepesvári, Brendan Lucier:
ImpatientCapsAndRuns: Approximately Optimal Algorithm Configuration from an Infinite Pool. NeurIPS 2020 - [c65]Mete Seref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta:
Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding. SAGT 2020: 3-16 - [c64]Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Brendan Lucier, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer. EC 2020: 191 - [c63]Constantinos Daskalakis, Maxwell Fishelson, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Santhoshini Velusamy:
Simple, Credible, and Approximately-Optimal Auctions. EC 2020: 713 - [c62]Natalie Collina, Nicole Immorlica, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Brendan Lucier, Neil Newman:
Dynamic Weighted Matching with Heterogeneous Arrival and Departure Rates. WINE 2020: 17-30 - [i57]Constantinos Daskalakis, Maxwell Fishelson, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Santhoshini Velusamy:
Simple, Credible, and Approximately-Optimal Auctions. CoRR abs/2002.06702 (2020) - [i56]Moshe Babaioff, Michal Feldman, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Brendan Lucier, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer. CoRR abs/2003.05913 (2020) - [i55]Evangelia Gergatsouli, Brendan Lucier, Christos Tzamos:
Black-box Methods for Restoring Monotonicity. CoRR abs/2003.09554 (2020) - [i54]Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier:
An O(log log m) Prophet Inequality for Subadditive Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR abs/2004.09784 (2020) - [i53]Mete Seref Ahunbay, Brendan Lucier, Adrian Vetta:
Two-Buyer Sequential Multiunit Auctions with No Overbidding. CoRR abs/2006.03142 (2020) - [i52]Nika Haghtalab, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Jack Z. Wang:
Maximizing Welfare with Incentive-Aware Evaluation Mechanisms. CoRR abs/2011.01956 (2020) - [i51]Natalie Collina, Nicole Immorlica, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Brendan Lucier, Neil Newman:
Dynamic Weighted Matching with Heterogeneous Arrival and Departure Rates. CoRR abs/2012.00689 (2020) - [i50]Moshe Babaioff, Richard Cole, Jason D. Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier:
Non-quasi-linear Agents in Quasi-linear Mechanisms. CoRR abs/2012.02893 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j15]Shaddin Dughmi, Katrina Ligett, Brendan Lucier:
Introduction to the Special Issue - Algorithmic Game Theory - STOC/FOCS/SODA 2014-2015. Games Econ. Behav. 118: 493 (2019) - [j14]AmirMahdi Ahmadinejad, Sina Dehghani, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Brendan Lucier, Hamid Mahini, Saeed Seddighin:
From Duels to Battlefields: Computing Equilibria of Blotto and Other Games. Math. Oper. Res. 44(4): 1304-1325 (2019) - [c61]Hossein Esfandiari, Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Brendan Lucier, Michael Mitzenmacher:
Online Pandora's Boxes and Bandits. AAAI 2019: 1885-1892 - [c60]Evangelia Gergatsouli, Brendan Lucier, Christos Tzamos:
The Complexity of Black-Box Mechanism Design with Priors. EC 2019: 869-883 - [c59]Robert Kleinberg, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Brendan Lucier, Devon R. Graham:
Procrastinating with Confidence: Near-Optimal, Anytime, Adaptive Algorithm Configuration. NeurIPS 2019: 8881-8891 - [e1]Brendan Lucier, Bary S. R. Pradelski, Bruno Tuffin:
Proceedings of the 14th Workshop on the Economics of Networks, Systems and Computation, NetEcon@SIGMETRICS 2019, Phoenix, Arizona, USA, June 28, 2019. ACM 2019, ISBN 978-1-4503-6837-7 [contents] - [i49]Hossein Esfandiari, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Brendan Lucier, Michael Mitzenmacher:
Online Pandora's Boxes and Bandits. CoRR abs/1901.10698 (2019) - [i48]Robert Kleinberg, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Brendan Lucier, Devon R. Graham:
Procrastinating with Confidence: Near-Optimal, Anytime, Adaptive Algorithm Configuration. CoRR abs/1902.05454 (2019) - [i47]Evangelia Gergatsouli, Brendan Lucier, Christos Tzamos:
The Complexity of Black-Box Mechanism Design with Priors. CoRR abs/1906.10794 (2019) - [i46]Hossein Esfandiari, Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Brendan Lucier, Michael Mitzenmacher:
Prophets, Secretaries, and Maximizing the Probability of Choosing the Best. CoRR abs/1910.03798 (2019) - [i45]Kira Goldner, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier:
Reducing Inefficiency in Carbon Auctions with Imperfect Competition. CoRR abs/1912.06428 (2019) - 2018
- [j13]Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Michael Schwarz:
Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'15. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 6(3-4): 10:1-10:2 (2018) - [c58]Neil Newman, Lauren Falcao Bergquist, Nicole Immorlica, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Brendan Lucier, Craig McIntosh, John A. Quinn, Richard Ssekibuule:
Designing and Evolving an Electronic Agricultural Marketplace in Uganda. COMPASS 2018: 14:1-14:11 - [c57]Yiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Juba Ziani:
Optimal Data Acquisition for Statistical Estimation. EC 2018: 27-44 - [c56]Jason D. Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Reza Khani, Brendan Lucier, Rad Niazadeh:
Fast Core Pricing for Rich Advertising Auctions. EC 2018: 111-112 - [c55]Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Jieming Mao, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Christos Tzamos:
Combinatorial Assortment Optimization. WINE 2018: 218-231 - 2017
- [j12]Allan Borodin, Mark Braverman, Brendan Lucier, Joel Oren:
Strategyproof Mechanisms for Competitive Influence in Networks. Algorithmica 78(2): 425-452 (2017) - [j11]Brendan Lucier, Allan Borodin:
Equilibria of Greedy Combinatorial Auctions. SIAM J. Comput. 46(2): 620-660 (2017) - [j10]Brendan Lucier:
An economic view of prophet inequalities. SIGecom Exch. 16(1): 24-47 (2017) - [c54]Melika Abolhassani, Hossein Esfandiari, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Brendan Lucier, Hadi Yami:
Market Pricing for Data Streams. AAAI 2017: 291-297 - [c53]Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier:
Prophet Inequalities Made Easy: Stochastic Optimization by Pricing Non-Stochastic Inputs. FOCS 2017: 540-551 - [c52]Robert Kleinberg, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Brendan Lucier:
Efficiency Through Procrastination: Approximately Optimal Algorithm Configuration with Runtime Guarantees. IJCAI 2017: 2023-2031 - [c51]Robert S. Chen, Brendan Lucier, Yaron Singer, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Robust Optimization for Non-Convex Objectives. NIPS 2017: 4705-4714 - [c50]Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Samuel Taggart:
Repeated Sales with Multiple Strategic Buyers. EC 2017: 167-168 - [c49]Nicole Immorlica, Robert Kleinberg, Brendan Lucier, Morteza Zadomighaddam:
Exponential Segregation in a Two-Dimensional Schelling Model with Tolerant Individuals. SODA 2017: 984-993 - [c48]Melika Abolhassani, Soheil Ehsani, Hossein Esfandiari, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Brendan Lucier:
Beating 1-1/e for ordered prophets. STOC 2017: 61-71 - [c47]Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, E. Glen Weyl, Joshua Mollner:
Approximate Efficiency in Matching Markets. WINE 2017: 252-265 - [i44]Melika Abolhassani, Soheil Ehsani, Hossein Esfandiari, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Robert Kleinberg, Brendan Lucier:
Beating 1-1/e for Ordered Prophets. CoRR abs/1704.05836 (2017) - [i43]Robert S. Chen, Brendan Lucier, Yaron Singer, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Robust Optimization for Non-Convex Objectives. CoRR abs/1707.01047 (2017) - [i42]Yiling Chen, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Juba Ziani:
Optimal Data Acquisition for Statistical Estimation. CoRR abs/1711.01295 (2017) - [i41]Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Jieming Mao, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Christos Tzamos:
Combinatorial Assortment Optimization. CoRR abs/1711.02601 (2017) - 2016
- [j9]Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium. SIAM J. Comput. 45(1): 29-48 (2016) - [j8]Allan Borodin, Brendan Lucier:
On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 5(1): 2:1-2:23 (2016) - [c46]AmirMahdi Ahmadinejad, Sina Dehghani, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Brendan Lucier, Hamid Mahini, Saeed Seddighin:
From Duels to Battlefields: Computing Equilibria of Blotto and Other Games. AAAI 2016: 376-382 - [c45]Virajith Jalaparti, Ivan Bliznets, Srikanth Kandula, Brendan Lucier, Ishai Menache:
Dynamic Pricing and Traffic Engineering for Timely Inter-Datacenter Transfers. SIGCOMM 2016: 73-86 - [c44]Nick Gravin, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Emmanouil Pountourakis:
Procrastination with Variable Present Bias. EC 2016: 361 - [c43]Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
The price of anarchy in large games. STOC 2016: 963-976 - [c42]Darrell Hoy, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier:
On-Demand or Spot? Selling the Cloud to Risk-Averse Customers. WINE 2016: 73-86 - [c41]Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan:
Correlated and Coarse Equilibria of Single-Item Auctions. WINE 2016: 131-144 - [i40]Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan:
Correlated- and Coarse- equilibria of Single-item auctions. CoRR abs/1601.07702 (2016) - [i39]Mahdi Ahmadinejad, Sina Dehghani, MohammadTaghi Hajiaghayi, Brendan Lucier, Hamid Mahini, Saeed Seddighin:
From Duels to Battefields: Computing Equilibria of Blotto and Other Games. CoRR abs/1603.00119 (2016) - [i38]Nick Gravin, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Emmanouil Pountourakis:
Procrastination with variable present bias. CoRR abs/1606.03062 (2016) - [i37]Jason D. Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Rad Niazadeh:
Finding Bidder-Optimal Core Points Quickly. CoRR abs/1610.03564 (2016) - [i36]Paul Dütting, Michal Feldman, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier:
Posted Prices, Smoothness, and Combinatorial Prophet Inequalities. CoRR abs/1612.03161 (2016) - [i35]Darrell Hoy, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier:
On-demand or Spot? Selling the cloud to risk-averse customers. CoRR abs/1612.06347 (2016) - 2015
- [j7]Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou, Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme, Éva Tardos:
Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions. J. Econ. Theory 156: 343-388 (2015) - [c40]Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes. AAAI 2015: 872-878 - [c39]Brendan Lucier, Joel Oren, Yaron Singer:
Influence at Scale: Distributed Computation of Complex Contagion in Networks. KDD 2015: 735-744 - [c38]Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Greedy Algorithms Make Efficient Mechanisms. EC 2015: 221-238 - [c37]Hu Fu, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Philipp Strack:
Randomization Beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction. EC 2015: 323 - [c36]Yossi Azar, Inna Kalp-Shaltiel, Brendan Lucier, Ishai Menache, Joseph Naor, Jonathan Yaniv:
Truthful Online Scheduling with Commitments. EC 2015: 715-732 - [c35]Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices. SODA 2015: 123-135 - [c34]Nick Arnosti, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier:
The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments. WINE 2015: 46-59 - [i34]Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Tim Roughgarden, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
The Price of Anarchy in Large Games. CoRR abs/1503.04755 (2015) - [i33]Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Greedy Algorithms make Efficient Mechanisms. CoRR abs/1503.05608 (2015) - [i32]Nick Arnosti, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier:
The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments. CoRR abs/1504.03257 (2015) - [i31]Yossi Azar, Inna Kalp-Shaltiel, Brendan Lucier, Ishai Menache, Joseph Naor, Jonathan Yaniv:
Truthful Online Scheduling with Commitments. CoRR abs/1507.00773 (2015) - [i30]Hu Fu, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Philipp Strack:
Randomization beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction. CoRR abs/1507.08042 (2015) - [i29]Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
On Welfare Approximation and Stable Pricing. CoRR abs/1511.02399 (2015) - [i28]Nicole Immorlica, Robert D. Kleinberg, Brendan Lucier, Morteza Zadomighaddam:
Exponential Segregation in a Two-Dimensional Schelling Model with Tolerant Individuals. CoRR abs/1511.02537 (2015) - 2014
- [j6]Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A simple and approximately optimal mechanism for an additive buyer. SIGecom Exch. 13(2): 31-35 (2014) - [c33]Joel Oren, Brendan Lucier:
Online (Budgeted) Social Choice. AAAI 2014: 1456-1462 - [c32]Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Reaching Consensus via Non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks. APPROX-RANDOM 2014: 192-208 - [c31]Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer. FOCS 2014: 21-30 - [c30]Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier:
Clearing Markets via Bundles. SAGT 2014: 158-169 - [c29]Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan, Renato Paes Leme:
On the efficiency of the walrasian mechanism. EC 2014: 783-800 - [c28]Christian Borgs, Michael Brautbar, Jennifer T. Chayes, Brendan Lucier:
Maximizing Social Influence in Nearly Optimal Time. SODA 2014: 946-957 - [c27]Sanjeev Khanna, Brendan Lucier:
Influence Maximization in Undirected Networks. SODA 2014: 1482-1496 - [c26]David Kempe, Brendan Lucier:
User satisfaction in competitive sponsored search. WWW 2014: 699-710 - [i27]Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier:
Clearing Markets via Bundles. CoRR abs/1401.2702 (2014) - [i26]Moshe Babaioff, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A Simple and Approximately Optimal Mechanism for an Additive Buyer. CoRR abs/1405.6146 (2014) - [i25]Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes. CoRR abs/1408.1211 (2014) - [i24]Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Reaching Consensus via non-Bayesian Asynchronous Learning in Social Networks. CoRR abs/1408.5192 (2014) - [i23]Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Combinatorial Auctions via Posted Prices. CoRR abs/1411.4916 (2014) - [i22]Uriel Feige, Michal Feldman, Nicole Immorlica, Rani Izsak, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
A Unifying Hierarchy of Valuations with Complements and Substitutes. Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex. TR14 (2014) - 2013
- [j5]Brendan Lucier:
Setting equilibrium prices, approximately. SIGecom Exch. 12(1): 30-33 (2013) - [c25]Itai Ashlagi, Brendan Lucier, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Equilibria of Online Scheduling Algorithms. AAAI 2013: 67-73 - [c24]Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan:
Bertrand networks. EC 2013: 33-34 - [c23]Michal Feldman, David Kempe, Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme:
Pricing public goods for private sale. EC 2013: 417-434 - [c22]Hu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Cost-recovering bayesian algorithmic mechanism design. EC 2013: 453-470 - [c21]Brendan Lucier, Ishai Menache, Joseph Naor, Jonathan Yaniv:
Efficient online scheduling for deadline-sensitive jobs: extended abstract. SPAA 2013: 305-314 - [c20]Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Combinatorial walrasian equilibrium. STOC 2013: 61-70 - [c19]Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient. STOC 2013: 201-210 - [c18]Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions. WINE 2013: 160-173 - [c17]Brendan Lucier, Yaron Singer, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos:
Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects. WINE 2013: 347-360 - [c16]Allan Borodin, Mark Braverman, Brendan Lucier, Joel Oren:
Strategyproof mechanisms for competitive influence in networks. WWW 2013: 141-150 - [i21]Michal Feldman, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Combinatorial Walrasian Equilibrium. CoRR abs/1304.2244 (2013) - [i20]Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan:
Bertrand Networks. CoRR abs/1304.6806 (2013) - [i19]Michal Feldman, David Kempe, Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme:
Pricing Public Goods for Private Sale. CoRR abs/1305.0085 (2013) - [i18]Hu Fu, Brendan Lucier, Balasubramanian Sivan, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Cost-Recovering Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/1305.0598 (2013) - [i17]Michal Feldman, Brendan Lucier, Vasilis Syrgkanis:
Limits of Efficiency in Sequential Auctions. CoRR abs/1309.2529 (2013) - [i16]David Kempe, Brendan Lucier:
User Satisfaction in Competitive Sponsored Search. CoRR abs/1310.4098 (2013) - [i15]Moshe Babaioff, Brendan Lucier, Noam Nisan, Renato Paes Leme:
On the Efficiency of the Walrasian Mechanism. CoRR abs/1311.0924 (2013) - 2012
- [b1]Brendan Lucier:
The Power of Uncertainty: Algorithmic Mechanism Design in Settings of Incomplete Information. University of Toronto, Canada, 2012 - [c15]Shuchi Chawla, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier:
On the limits of black-box reductions in mechanism design. STOC 2012: 435-448 - [c14]Christian Borgs, Michael Brautbar, Jennifer T. Chayes, Sanjeev Khanna, Brendan Lucier:
The Power of Local Information in Social Networks. WINE 2012: 406-419 - [c13]Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme, Éva Tardos:
On revenue in the generalized second price auction. WWW 2012: 361-370 - [i14]Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou, Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme, Éva Tardos:
On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions. CoRR abs/1201.6429 (2012) - [i13]Allan Borodin, Mark Braverman, Brendan Lucier, Joel Oren:
Truthful Mechanisms for Competing Submodular Processes. CoRR abs/1202.2097 (2012) - [i12]Christian Borgs, Michael Brautbar, Jennifer T. Chayes, Sanjeev Khanna, Brendan Lucier:
The Power of Local Information in Social Networks. CoRR abs/1202.6033 (2012) - [i11]Michal Feldman, Hu Fu, Nick Gravin, Brendan Lucier:
Simultaneous Auctions are (almost) Efficient. CoRR abs/1209.4703 (2012) - [i10]Christian Borgs, Michael Brautbar, Jennifer T. Chayes, Brendan Lucier:
Influence Maximization in Social Networks: Towards an Optimal Algorithmic Solution. CoRR abs/1212.0884 (2012) - 2011
- [j4]Brendan Lucier, Michael Molloy:
The Glauber Dynamics for Colorings of Bounded Degree Trees. SIAM J. Discret. Math. 25(2): 827-853 (2011) - [c12]Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Jian Ding, Brendan Lucier:
The Hitchhiker's Guide to Affiliation Networks: A Game-Theoretic Approach. ICS 2011: 389-400 - [c11]Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme:
GSP auctions with correlated types. EC 2011: 71-80 - [c10]Nicole Immorlica, Adam Tauman Kalai, Brendan Lucier, Ankur Moitra, Andrew Postlewaite, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Dueling algorithms. STOC 2011: 215-224 - [i9]Nicole Immorlica, Adam Tauman Kalai, Brendan Lucier, Ankur Moitra, Andrew Postlewaite, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Dueling Algorithms. CoRR abs/1101.2883 (2011) - [i8]Shuchi Chawla, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier:
On the Impossibility of Black-Box Transformations in Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/1109.2067 (2011) - 2010
- [c9]Jason D. Hartline, Brendan Lucier:
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design. BQGT 2010: 19:1 - [c8]Allan Borodin, Brendan Lucier:
On the Limitations of Greedy Mechanism Design for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions. ICALP (1) 2010: 90-101 - [c7]Brendan Lucier:
Beyond Equilibria: Mechanisms for Repeated Combinatorial Auctions. ICS 2010: 166-177 - [c6]Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Brian Rogers:
Cooperation in anonymous dynamic social networks. EC 2010: 241-242 - [c5]Brendan Lucier, Allan Borodin:
Price of Anarchy for Greedy Auctions. SODA 2010: 537-553 - [c4]Jason D. Hartline, Brendan Lucier:
Bayesian algorithmic mechanism design. STOC 2010: 301-310 - [i7]Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Jian Ding, Brendan Lucier:
The Hitchhiker's Guide to Affiliation Networks: A Game-Theoretic Approach. CoRR abs/1008.1516 (2010) - [i6]Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme:
Improved Social Welfare Bounds for GSP at Equilibrium. CoRR abs/1011.3268 (2010)
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [j3]Brendan Lucier:
Local overlaps in special unfoldings of convex polyhedra. Comput. Geom. 42(5): 495-504 (2009) - [c3]Brendan Lucier, Michael Molloy, Yuval Peres:
The Glauber Dynamics for Colourings of Bounded Degree Trees. APPROX-RANDOM 2009: 631-645 - [i5]Brendan Lucier, Allan Borodin:
Price of Anarchy for Greedy Auctions. CoRR abs/0909.0892 (2009) - [i4]Jason D. Hartline, Brendan Lucier:
Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/0909.4756 (2009) - [i3]Brendan Lucier:
Beyond Equilibria: Mechanisms for Repeated Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR abs/0909.5677 (2009) - 2008
- [i2]Brendan Lucier:
Binary Morphisms to Ultimately Periodic Words. CoRR abs/0805.1373 (2008) - 2007
- [j2]Ivan T. Bowman, Peter Bumbulis, Dan Farrar, Anil K. Goel, Brendan Lucier, Anisoara Nica, G. N. Paulley, John Smirnios, Matthew Young-Lai:
SQL Anywhere: An Embeddable DBMS. IEEE Data Eng. Bull. 30(3): 29-36 (2007) - [j1]Brendan Lucier, Tao Jiang, Ming Li:
Average-case analysis of QuickSort and Binary Insertion Tree height using incompressibility. Inf. Process. Lett. 103(2): 45-51 (2007) - [c2]Ivan T. Bowman, Peter Bumbulis, Dan Farrar, Anil K. Goel, Brendan Lucier, Anisoara Nica, G. N. Paulley, John Smirnios, Matthew Young-Lai:
SQL Anywhere: A Holistic Approach to Database Self-management. ICDE Workshops 2007: 414-423 - 2006
- [c1]Brendan Lucier:
Local Overlaps In Special Unfoldings Of Convex Polyhedra. CCCG 2006 - 2004
- [i1]Brendan Lucier:
Construction of a Function Using a Fibonacci Numeration System. CoRR cs.DM/0409023 (2004)
Coauthor Index
[i75] [j26] [c91] [c88] [c87] [c86] [c84] [c83] [c81] [i74] [i73] [i72] [j25] [c80] [i68] [i66] [j24] [c78] [i63] [i62] [j21] [c76] [c75] [c73] [c72] [i61] [i60] [i59] [i58] [j19] [c68] [c67] [c62] [i52] [i51] [i50] [i45] [c58] [c57] [c56] [c55] [c50] [c49] [c47] [i42] [i41] [c44] [c43] [c42] [i38] [i37] [i35] [c40] [c37] [c34] [i34] [i32] [i30] [i28] [j6] [c32] [c31] [i26] [i25] [i24] [i22] [c15] [c10] [i9] [i8] [c6]
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