"An End-to-end Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-independent Auctions for ..."

Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline (2018)

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DOI: —

access: open

type: Informal or Other Publication

metadata version: 2018-08-13

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  - electronic edition @ arxiv.org (open access)
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  dblp key:
  - journals/corr/abs-1804-01977
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  persistent URL:
  - https://dblp.org/rec/journals/corr/abs-1804-01977
Yiding Feng, Jason D. Hartline:
An End-to-end Argument in Mechanism Design (Prior-independent Auctions for Budgeted Agents). CoRR abs/1804.01977 (2018)

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