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ORCIDVijay V. Vazirani
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- affiliation: Unniversity of California, Irvine, CA, USA
- affiliation: Georgia Institute of Technology, College of Computing, Atlanta, GA, USA
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2020 – today
- 2024
[j67]Jugal Garg, Thorben Tröbst, Vijay V. Vazirani:
One-sided matching markets with endowments: equilibria and algorithms. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 38(2): 40 (2024)- [j66]Vijay V. Vazirani
:
A Theory of Alternating Paths and Blossoms from the Perspective of Minimum Length. Math. Oper. Res. 49(3): 2009-2047 (2024) - [c118]Vijay V. Vazirani:
The Investment Management Game: Extending the Scope of the Notion of Core. SAGT 2024: 223-239 - [i56]Thorben Tröbst, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Cardinal-Utility Matching Markets: The Quest for Envy-Freeness, Pareto-Optimality, and Efficient Computability. CoRR abs/2402.08851 (2024) - [i55]Vijay V. Vazirani:
The Assignment Game: New Mechanisms for Equitable Core Imputations. CoRR abs/2402.11437 (2024) - [i54]Rohith Reddy Gangam, Naveen Garg, Parnian Shahkar, Vijay V. Vazirani:
The Flow Game: Leximin and Leximax Core Imputations. CoRR abs/2403.06037 (2024) - [i53]Ilan Adler, Martin Bullinger, Vijay V. Vazirani:
A Generalization of von Neumann's Reduction from the Assignment Problem to Zero-Sum Games. CoRR abs/2410.10767 (2024) - 2023
- [j65]Thorben Tröbst, Vijay V. Vazirani:
A real polynomial for bipartite graph minimum weight perfect matchings. Inf. Process. Lett. 179: 106286 (2023) - [c117]Jugal Garg, Thorben Tröbst, Vijay V. Vazirani:
A Nash-Bargaining-Based Mechanism for One-Sided Matching Markets and Dichotomous Utilities. AAMAS 2023: 2721-2723 - [c116]Vijay V. Vazirani:
Towards a Practical, Budget-Oblivious Algorithm for the Adwords Problem Under Small Bids. FSTTCS 2023: 21:1-21:14 - [i52]Vijay V. Vazirani:
The Investment Management Game: Extending the Scope of the Notion of Core. CoRR abs/2302.00608 (2023) - [i51]Vijay V. Vazirani:
LP-Duality Theory and the Cores of Games. CoRR abs/2302.07627 (2023) - [i50]Rohith Reddy Gangam, Tung Mai, Nitya Raju, Vijay V. Vazirani:
A Structural and Algorithmic Study of Stable Matching Lattices of Multiple Instances. CoRR abs/2304.02590 (2023) - [i49]Thorben Tröbst, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Two-Sided Matching Markets: Impossibility Results on Existence of Efficient and Envy Free Solutions. CoRR abs/2310.16807 (2023) - 2022
- [j64]Vijay V. Vazirani:
The general graph matching game: Approximate core. Games Econ. Behav. 132: 478-486 (2022) - [c115]Jugal Garg, Thorben Tröbst, Vijay V. Vazirani:
One-Sided Matching Markets with Endowments: Equilibria and Algorithms. AAMAS 2022: 463-471 - [c114]Rohith Reddy Gangam, Tung Mai, Nitya Raju, Vijay V. Vazirani:
A Structural and Algorithmic Study of Stable Matching Lattices of "Nearby" Instances, with Applications. FSTTCS 2022: 19:1-19:20 - [c113]Vijay V. Vazirani:
New Characterizations of Core Imputations of Matching and b-Matching Games. FSTTCS 2022: 28:1-28:13 - [c112]Mojtaba Hosseini, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Nash-Bargaining-Based Models for Matching Markets: One-Sided and Two-Sided; Fisher and Arrow-Debreu. ITCS 2022: 86:1-86:20 - [c111]Vijay V. Vazirani:
Online Bipartite Matching and Adwords (Invited Talk). MFCS 2022: 5:1-5:11 - [i48]Vijay V. Vazirani:
Insights into the Core of the Assignment Game via Complementarity. CoRR abs/2202.00619 (2022) - [i47]Vijay V. Vazirani:
Cores of Games via Total Dual Integrality, with Applications to Perfect Graphs and Polymatroids. CoRR abs/2209.04903 (2022) - 2021
- [j63]David Eppstein, Vijay V. Vazirani:
NC Algorithms for Computing a Perfect Matching and a Maximum Flow in One-Crossing-Minor-Free Graphs. SIAM J. Comput. 50(3): 1014-1033 (2021) - [c110]Vijay V. Vazirani, Mihalis Yannakakis:
Computational Complexity of the Hylland-Zeckhauser Scheme for One-Sided Matching Markets. ITCS 2021: 59:1-59:19 - [i46]Vijay V. Vazirani:
The General Graph Matching Game: Approximate Core. CoRR abs/2101.07390 (2021) - [i45]Mojtaba Hosseini, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Nash-Bargaining-Based Models for Matching Markets, with Implementations and Experimental Results. CoRR abs/2105.10704 (2021) - [i44]Ioannis Panageas, Thorben Tröbst, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Combinatorial Algorithms for Matching Markets via Nash Bargaining: One-Sided, Two-Sided and Non-Bipartite. CoRR abs/2106.02024 (2021) - [i43]Vijay V. Vazirani:
Randomized Online Algorithms for Adwords. CoRR abs/2107.10777 (2021) - 2020
- [j62]Nima Anari, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Planar Graph Perfect Matching Is in NC. J. ACM 67(4): 21:1-21:34 (2020) - [j61]Ruta Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani:
An incentive compatible, efficient market for air traffic flow management. Theor. Comput. Sci. 818: 41-50 (2020) - [c109]Karthik Gajulapalli, James A. Liu, Tung Mai, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Stability-Preserving, Time-Efficient Mechanisms for School Choice in Two Rounds. FSTTCS 2020: 21:1-21:15 - [c108]Nima Anari, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Matching Is as Easy as the Decision Problem, in the NC Model. ITCS 2020: 54:1-54:25 - [i42]Thorben Tröbst, Vijay V. Vazirani:
A Real Polynomial for Bipartite Graph Minimum Weight Perfect Matchings. CoRR abs/2003.08917 (2020) - [i41]Vijay V. Vazirani, Mihalis Yannakakis:
Computational Complexity of the Hylland-Zeckhauser Scheme for One-Sided Matching Markets. CoRR abs/2004.01348 (2020) - [i40]Jugal Garg, Thorben Tröbst, Vijay V. Vazirani:
An Arrow-Debreu Extension of the Hylland-Zeckhauser Scheme: Equilibrium Existence and Algorithms. CoRR abs/2009.10320 (2020) - [i39]Vijay V. Vazirani:
An Extension of the Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem to Non-Bipartite Graphs. CoRR abs/2010.05984 (2020) - [i38]Vijay V. Vazirani:
A Proof of the MV Matching Algorithm. CoRR abs/2012.03582 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [c107]David Eppstein, Vijay V. Vazirani:
NC Algorithms for Computing a Perfect Matching, the Number of Perfect Matchings, and a Maximum Flow in One-Crossing-Minor-Free Graphs. SPAA 2019: 23-30 - [i37]Nima Anari, Vijay V. Vazirani:
A Pseudo-Deterministic RNC Algorithm for General Graph Perfect Matching. CoRR abs/1901.10387 (2019) - [i36]Tung Mai, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Stability-Preserving, Incentive-Compatible, Time-Efficient Mechanisms for Increasing School Capacity. CoRR abs/1904.04431 (2019) - [i35]Karthik Gajulapalli, James A. Liu, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Further Results on Stability-Preserving Mechanisms for School Choice. CoRR abs/1906.11475 (2019) - 2018
- [j60]Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Substitution with Satiation: A New Class of Utility Functions and a Complementary Pivot Algorithm. Math. Oper. Res. 43(3): 996-1024 (2018) - [j59]Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod:
∃R-Completeness for Decision Versions of Multi-Player (Symmetric) Nash Equilibria. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 6(1): 1:1-1:23 (2018) - [c106]Tung Mai, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Finding Stable Matchings That Are Robust to Errors in the Input. ESA 2018: 60:1-60:11 - [c105]Nima Anari, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Planar Graph Perfect Matching Is in NC. FOCS 2018: 650-661 - [c104]Tung Mai, Milena Mihail, Ioannis Panageas, Will Ratcliff, Vijay V. Vazirani, Peter Yunker:
Cycles in Zero-Sum Differential Games and Biological Diversity. EC 2018: 339-350 - [c103]Nima Anari, Tung Mai, Shayan Oveis Gharan, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Nash Social Welfare for Indivisible Items under Separable, Piecewise-Linear Concave Utilities. SODA 2018: 2274-2290 - [c102]Nikhil R. Devanur, Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod:
A New Class of Combinatorial Markets with Covering Constraints: Algorithms and Applications. SODA 2018: 2311-2325 - [i34]David Eppstein, Vijay V. Vazirani:
NC Algorithms for Perfect Matching and Maximum Flow in One-Crossing-Minor-Free Graphs. CoRR abs/1802.00084 (2018) - [i33]Tung Mai, Vijay V. Vazirani:
A Natural Generalization of Stable Matching Solved via New Insights into Ideal Cuts. CoRR abs/1802.06621 (2018) - [i32]Tung Mai, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Finding Stable Matchings that are Robust to Errors in the Input. CoRR abs/1804.00553 (2018) - [i31]Tung Mai, Vijay V. Vazirani:
A Generalization of Birkhoff's Theorem for Distributive Lattices, with Applications to Robust Stable Matchings. CoRR abs/1804.05537 (2018) - 2017
- [c101]Rahul Nihalani, Sriram P. Chockalingam, Shaowei Zhu, Vijay V. Vazirani, Srinivas Aluru:
Probabilistic estimation of overlap graphs for large sequence datasets. BIBM 2017: 247-252 - [c100]Ruta Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani:
An Incentive Compatible, Efficient Market for Air Traffic Flow Management. COCOON 2017: 407-419 - [c99]Tung Mai, Ioannis Panageas, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Opinion Dynamics in Networks: Convergence, Stability and Lack of Explosion. ICALP 2017: 140:1-140:14 - [c98]Ruta Mehta, Ioannis Panageas, Georgios Piliouras, Prasad Tetali, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Mutation, Sexual Reproduction and Survival in Dynamic Environments. ITCS 2017: 16:1-16:29 - [c97]Richard Cole, Nikhil R. Devanur, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kamal Jain, Tung Mai, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod:
Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare. EC 2017: 459-460 - [c96]Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod:
Settling the complexity of Leontief and PLC exchange markets under exact and approximate equilibria. STOC 2017: 890-901 - [c95]Kamal Jain, Tung Mai, Vijay V. Vazirani:
A Performance-Based Scheme for Pricing Resources in the Cloud. WINE 2017: 281-293 - [i30]Tung Mai, Richard Peng, Anup B. Rao, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Concave Flow on Small Depth Directed Networks. CoRR abs/1704.07791 (2017) - [i29]Nima Anari, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Planar Graph Perfect Matching is in NC. CoRR abs/1709.07822 (2017) - [i28]Tung Mai, Ioannis Panageas, Will Ratcliff, Vijay V. Vazirani, Peter Yunker:
Rock-Paper-Scissors, Differential Games and Biological Diversity. CoRR abs/1710.11249 (2017) - 2016
- [j58]Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Dichotomies in Equilibrium Computation and Membership of PLC Markets in FIXP. Theory Comput. 12(1): 1-25 (2016) - [i27]Nikhil R. Devanur, Kamal Jain, Tung Mai, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod:
New Convex Programs for Fisher's Market Model and its Generalizations. CoRR abs/1603.01257 (2016) - [i26]Tung Mai, Ioannis Panageas, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Opinion Dynamics in Networks: Convergence, Stability and Lack of Explosion. CoRR abs/1607.03881 (2016) - [i25]Richard Cole, Nikhil R. Devanur, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kamal Jain, Tung Mai, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod:
Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare. CoRR abs/1609.06654 (2016) - [i24]Kamal Jain, Tung Mai, Vijay V. Vazirani:
A Performance-Based Scheme for Pricing Resources in the Cloud. CoRR abs/1610.00157 (2016) - [i23]Nima Anari, Tung Mai, Shayan Oveis Gharan, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Nash Social Welfare for Indivisible Items under Separable, Piecewise-Linear Concave Utilities. CoRR abs/1612.05191 (2016) - 2015
- [j57]Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Milind A. Sohoni, Vijay V. Vazirani:
A Complementary Pivot Algorithm for Market Equilibrium under Separable, Piecewise-Linear Concave Utilities. SIAM J. Comput. 44(6): 1820-1847 (2015) - [c94]Leonard J. Schulman, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Allocation of Divisible Goods Under Lexicographic Preferences. FSTTCS 2015: 543-559 - [c93]Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod:
ETR-Completeness for Decision Versions of Multi-player (Symmetric) Nash Equilibria. ICALP (1) 2015: 554-566 - [c92]Ruta Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod:
Settling Some Open Problems on 2-Player Symmetric Nash Equilibria. SAGT 2015: 272-284 - [i22]Ruta Mehta, Ioannis Panageas, Georgios Piliouras, Prasad Tetali, Vijay V. Vazirani:
The game of survival: Sexual evolution in dynamic environments. CoRR abs/1511.01409 (2015) - [i21]Nikhil R. Devanur, Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod:
A Market for Scheduling, with Applications to Cloud Computing. CoRR abs/1511.08748 (2015) - 2014
- [j56]Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Gagan Goel, Vijay V. Vazirani, Lei Wang, Changyuan Yu:
Submodularity Helps in Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games. SIAM J. Discret. Math. 28(1): 99-115 (2014) - [c91]Jugal Garg, Vijay V. Vazirani:
On Computability of Equilibria in Markets with Production. SODA 2014: 1329-1340 - [c90]Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Dichotomies in equilibrium computation, and complementary pivot algorithms for a new class of non-separable utility functions. STOC 2014: 525-534 - [c89]Maria-Florina Balcan, Amit Daniely, Ruta Mehta, Ruth Urner, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Learning Economic Parameters from Revealed Preferences. WINE 2014: 338-353 - [i20]Maria-Florina Balcan, Amit Daniely, Ruta Mehta, Ruth Urner, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Learning Economic Parameters from Revealed Preferences. CoRR abs/1407.7937 (2014) - [i19]Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod:
Leontief Exchange Markets Can Solve Multivariate Polynomial Equations, Yielding FIXP and ETR Hardness. CoRR abs/1411.5060 (2014) - [i18]Ruta Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod:
Settling Some Open Problems on 2-Player Symmetric Nash Equilibria. CoRR abs/1412.0969 (2014) - [i17]Nimrod Megiddo, Kurt Mehlhorn, Rahul Savani, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Equilibrium Computation (Dagstuhl Seminar 14342). Dagstuhl Reports 4(8): 73-88 (2014) - 2013
- [j55]Vijay V. Vazirani:
Nonseparable, Concave Utilities Are Easy - in a Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model. SIAM J. Discret. Math. 27(1): 266-273 (2013) - [c88]Anupam Gupta, Viswanath Nagarajan, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Thrifty Algorithms for Multistage Robust Optimization. IPCO 2013: 217-228 - [i16]Anupam Gupta, Viswanath Nagarajan, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Thrifty Algorithms for Multistage Robust Optimization. CoRR abs/1302.5445 (2013) - [i15]Ruta Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani:
An Incentive Compatible, Efficient Market for Air Traffic Flow Management. CoRR abs/1305.3241 (2013) - [i14]Jugal Garg, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Computability of Equilibria in Markets with Production. CoRR abs/1308.5272 (2013) - 2012
- [j54]Vijay V. Vazirani:
The notion of a rational convex program, and an algorithm for the arrow-debreu Nash bargaining game. J. ACM 59(2): 7:1-7:36 (2012) - [j53]Vijay V. Vazirani:
Rational Convex Programs and Efficient Algorithms for 2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games. SIAM J. Discret. Math. 26(3): 896-918 (2012) - [c87]Vijay V. Vazirani:
Can the Theory of Algorithms Ratify the "Invisible Hand of the Market"? CSR 2012: 1-5 - [c86]Vijay V. Vazirani:
The notion of a rational convex program, and an algorithm for the Arrow-Debreu Nash bargaining game. SODA 2012: 973-992 - [c85]Jugal Garg, Ruta Mehta, Milind A. Sohoni, Vijay V. Vazirani:
A complementary pivot algorithm for markets under separable, piecewise-linear concave utilities. STOC 2012: 1003-1016 - [i13]Leonard J. Schulman, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Allocation of Divisible Goods under Lexicographic Preferences. CoRR abs/1206.4366 (2012) - [i12]Vijay V. Vazirani:
An Improved Definition of Blossoms and a Simpler Proof of the MV Matching Algorithm. CoRR abs/1210.4594 (2012) - 2011
- [j52]Vijay V. Vazirani, Mihalis Yannakakis:
Market equilibrium under separable, piecewise-linear, concave utilities. J. ACM 58(3): 10:1-10:25 (2011) - [j51]Gagan Goel, Vijay V. Vazirani:
A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a Rational Convex Program for It. Math. Oper. Res. 36(4): 762-782 (2011) - [j50]Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Nikhil R. Devanur, Vijay V. Vazirani:
New geometry-inspired relaxations and algorithms for the metric Steiner tree problem. Math. Program. 130(1): 1-32 (2011) - [c84]Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, Vijay V. Vazirani:
How many tiers?: pricing in the internet transit market. SIGCOMM 2011: 194-205 - [i11]Vijay V. Vazirani:
A Market for Air Traffic Flow Management. CoRR abs/1109.5214 (2011) - [i10]Vytautas Valancius, Cristian Lumezanu, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Modeling Tiered Pricing in the Internet Transit Market. CoRR abs/1112.3740 (2011) - 2010
- [j49]Kamal Jain, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Eisenberg-Gale markets: Algorithms and game-theoretic properties. Games Econ. Behav. 70(1): 84-106 (2010) - [j48]Vijay V. Vazirani:
Spending Constraint Utilities with Applications to the Adwords Market. Math. Oper. Res. 35(2): 458-478 (2010) - [j47]Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Aranyak Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Design is as Easy as Optimization. SIAM J. Discret. Math. 24(1): 270-286 (2010) - [j46]Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Nikhil R. Devanur, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Rationality and Strongly Polynomial Solvability of Eisenberg--Gale Markets with Two Agents. SIAM J. Discret. Math. 24(3): 1117-1136 (2010) - [c83]Vijay V. Vazirani, Mihalis Yannakakis:
Market Equilibrium under Separable, Piecewise-Linear, Concave Utilities. ICS 2010: 156-165 - [c82]Gagan Goel, Vijay V. Vazirani:
A Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model with Production, and a (Rational) Convex Program for It. SAGT 2010: 186-197 - [c81]Vijay V. Vazirani:
2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining Games: Algorithms and Structural Properties. SAGT 2010: 323-334 - [c80]Vijay V. Vazirani:
Non-separable, Quasiconcave Utilities are Easy - in a Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model (Extended Abstract). WINE 2010: 563-570 - [e3]Edith Elkind, Nimrod Megiddo, Peter Bro Miltersen, Vijay V. Vazirani, Bernhard von Stengel:
Equilibrium Computation, 25.04. - 30.04.2010. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 10171, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Germany 2010 [contents] - [i9]Edith Elkind, Nimrod Megiddo, Peter Bro Miltersen, Bernhard von Stengel, Vijay V. Vazirani:
10171 Abstracts Collection - Equilibrium Computation. Equilibrium Computation 2010 - [i8]Kamal Jain, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Equilibrium Pricing of Digital Goods via a New Market Model. CoRR abs/1007.4586 (2010) - [i7]Vijay V. Vazirani:
Rational Convex Programs, Their Feasibility, and the Arrow-Debreu Nash Bargaining Game. CoRR abs/1010.4280 (2010) - [i6]Vijay V. Vazirani:
Non-Separable, Quasiconcave Utilities are Easy -- in a Perfect Price Discrimination Market Model. CoRR abs/1010.4281 (2010)
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [c79]Vijay V. Vazirani, Lei Wang:
Continuity Properties of Equilibria in Some Fisher and Arrow-Debreu Market Models. WINE 2009: 422-429 - [i5]Vijay V. Vazirani:
2-Player Nash and Nonsymmetric Bargaining via Flexible Budget Markets. CoRR abs/0908.1181 (2009) - 2008
- [j45]Nayantara Bhatnagar, Dana Randall, Vijay V. Vazirani, Eric Vigoda:
Random Bichromatic Matchings. Algorithmica 50(4): 418-445 (2008) - [j44]Nikhil R. Devanur, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Amin Saberi, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Market equilibrium via a primal-dual algorithm for a convex program. J. ACM 55(5): 22:1-22:18 (2008) - [j43]Ivona Bezáková, Daniel Stefankovic, Vijay V. Vazirani, Eric Vigoda:
Accelerating Simulated Annealing for the Permanent and Combinatorial Counting Problems. SIAM J. Comput. 37(5): 1429-1454 (2008) - [j42]Kamal Jain, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Equitable Cost Allocations via Primal--Dual-Type Algorithms. SIAM J. Comput. 38(1): 241-256 (2008) - [c78]Vijay V. Vazirani:
Nash Bargaining Via Flexible Budget Markets. AAIM 2008: 2 - [c77]Vytautas Valancius, Nick Feamster, Ramesh Johari, Vijay V. Vazirani:
MINT: a Market for INternet Transit. CoNEXT 2008: 70 - [c76]Noam Berger,