Auctions I

• 
  John W. Byers, Michael Mitzenmacher, Georgios Zervas: Information asymmetries in pay-per-bid auctions. 1-12
• 
  Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Aaron Roth: Auctions with online supply. 13-22
• 
  Jon Feldman, Vahab S. Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan, Mallesh M. Pai: Auctions with intermediaries: extended abstract. 23-32

Mechanism design and incentives engineering

• 
  David Buchfuhrer, Michael Schapira, Yaron Singer: Computation and incentives in combinatorial public projects. 33-42
• 
  Moshe Babaioff, Robert D. Kleinberg, Aleksandrs Slivkins: Truthful mechanisms with implicit payment computation. 43-52
• 
  Stanko Dimitrov, Rahul Sami: Composition of markets with conflicting incentives. 53-62

Computational game theory

• 
  Christopher Thomas Ryan, Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin Leyton-Brown: Computing pure strategy nash equilibria in compact symmetric games. 63-72
• 
  Anand Bhalgat, Tanmoy Chakraborty, Sanjeev Khanna: Approximating pure nash equilibrium in cut, party affiliation, and satisfiability games. 73-82
• 
  Joshua Letchford, Vincent Conitzer: Computing optimal strategies to commit to in extensive-form games. 83-92

Platforms and services

• 
  Ramesh Johari, Sunil Kumar: Congestible services and network effects. 93-94
• 
  Geoffrey G. Parker, Marshall W. van Alstyne: Innovation, openness & platform control. 95-96
• 
  Sven Seuken, Denis Xavier Charles, Max Chickering, Sidd Puri: Market design & analysis for a P2P backup system. 97-108

Assignments and matchings

• 
  Erik Vee, Sergei Vassilvitskii, Jayavel Shanmugasundaram: Optimal online assignment with forecasts. 109-118
• 
  John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers: Matching in networks with bilateral contracts: extended abstract. 119-120
• 
  Denis Xavier Charles, Max Chickering, Nikhil R. Devanur, Kamal Jain, Manan Sanghi: Fast algorithms for finding matchings in lopsided bipartite graphs with applications to display ads. 121-128

Auctions II

• 
  Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Tim Roughgarden, Qiqi Yan: Revenue maximization with a single sample. 129-138
• 
  Mukund Sundararajan, Qiqi Yan: Robust mechanisms for risk-averse sellers. 139-148
• 
  Shuchi Chawla, David L. Malec, Balasubramanian Sivan: The power of randomness in bayesian optimal mechanism design. 149-158

Computational game theory: privacy, vaccines and envy-freeness

• 
  Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Haim Kaplan, Svetlana Olonetsky: Envy-free makespan approximation: extended abstract. 159-166
• 
  Joan Feigenbaum, Aaron D. Jaggard, Michael Schapira: Approximate privacy: foundations and quantification (extended abstract). 167-178
• 
  Po-An Chen, Mary David, David Kempe: Better vaccination strategies for better people. 179-188

Prediction markets I

• 
  Yiling Chen, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan: A new understanding of prediction markets via no-regret learning. 189-198
• 
  Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari, Ciamac Cyrus Moallemi: Information aggregation in smooth markets. 199-206
• 
  Lian Jian, Rahul Sami: Aggregation and manipulation in prediction markets: effects of trading mechanism and information distribution. 207-208

Recommender systems and crowdsourcing

• 
  John Joseph Horton, Lydia B. Chilton: The labor economics of paid crowdsourcing. 209-218
• 
  Darius Braziunas, Craig Boutilier: Assessing regret-based preference elicitation with the UTPREF recommendation system. 219-228
• 
  Daniel M. Fleder, Kartik Hosanagar, Andreas Buja: Recommender systems and their effects on consumers: the fragmentation debate. 229-230

Social networks

• 
  Sanmay Das, Malik Magdon-Ismail: Collective wisdom: information growth in wikis and blogs. 231-240
• 
  Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier, Brian Rogers: Cooperation in anonymous dynamic social networks. 241-242
• 
  Tanmoy Chakraborty, J. Stephen Judd, Michael Kearns, Jinsong Tan: A behavioral study of bargaining in social networks. 243-252

Computational social choice

• 
  Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Nikos Karanikolas, Ariel D. Procaccia: Socially desirable approximations for Dodgson's voting rule. 253-262
• 
  Tyler Lu, Craig Boutilier: The unavailable candidate model: a decision-theoretic view of social choice. 263-274
• 
  Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Ariel D. Procaccia: A scheduling approach to coalitional manipulation. 275-284

Combinatorial and ad auctions

• 
  Martin Bichler, Pasha Shabalin, Georg Ziegler: Efficiency with linear prices: a theoretical and experimental analysis of the combinatorial clock auction. 285-286
• 
  Patrick R. Jordan, Michael P. Wellman, Guha Balakrishnan: Strategy and mechanism lessons from the first ad auctions trading agent competition. 287-296
• 
  David H. Reiley, Sai-Ming Li, Randall A. Lewis: Northern exposure: a field experiment measuring externalities between search advertisements. 297-304

Approximate mechanism design without money

• 
  Itai Ashlagi, Felix A. Fischer, Ian A. Kash, Ariel D. Procaccia: Mix and match. 305-314
• 
  Pinyan Lu, Xiaorui Sun, Yajun Wang, Zeyuan Allen Zhu: Asymptotically optimal strategy-proof mechanisms for two-facility games. 315-324
• 
  Shaddin Dughmi, Arpita Ghosh: Truthful assignment without money. 325-334

Game theory

• 
  Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldberg, Piotr Krysta, Carmine Ventre: Ranking games that have competitiveness-based strategies. 335-344
• 
  Adam Tauman Kalai, Ehud Kalai: Cooperation and competition in strategic games with private information. 345-346
• 
  Yvo Desmedt, Edith Elkind: Equilibria of plurality voting with abstentions. 347-356

Prediction markets II

• 
  Sharad Goel, Daniel M. Reeves, Duncan J. Watts, David M. Pennock: Prediction without markets. 357-366
• 
  Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: Automated market-making in the large: the gates hillman prediction market. 367-376
• 
  Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm, David M. Pennock, Daniel M. Reeves: A practical liquidity-sensitive automated market maker. 377-386

last updated on Sat May 25 05:35:23 2013 by the dblp team
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