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11th WINE 2015: Amsterdam, The Netherlands
- Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer:

Web and Internet Economics - 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 9-12, 2015, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 9470, Springer 2015, ISBN 978-3-662-48994-9 - Marek Adamczyk, Allan Borodin, Diodato Ferraioli, Bart de Keijzer, Stefano Leonardi:

Sequential Posted Price Mechanisms with Correlated Valuations. 1-15 - Elliot Anshelevich

, Shreyas Sekar:
Price Competition in Networked Markets: How Do Monopolies Impact Social Welfare? 16-30 - Elliot Anshelevich

, Shreyas Sekar:
Computing Stable Coalitions: Approximation Algorithms for Reward Sharing. 31-45 - Nick Arnosti, Nicole Immorlica, Brendan Lucier:

The (Non)-Existence of Stable Mechanisms in Incomplete Information Environments. 46-59 - Sepehr Assadi, Sanjeev Khanna, Yang Li, Rakesh V. Vohra:

Fast Convergence in the Double Oral Auction. 60-73 - Vincenzo Auletta, Ioannis Caragiannis, Diodato Ferraioli, Clemente Galdi

, Giuseppe Persiano:
Minority Becomes Majority in Social Networks. 74-88 - Soumya Basu, Thanasis Lianeas, Evdokia Nikolova:

New Complexity Results and Algorithms for the Minimum Tollbooth Problem. 89-103 - Oren Ben-Zwi, Monika Henzinger, Veronika Loitzenbauer:

Ad Exchange: Envy-Free Auctions with Mediators. 104-117 - Vittorio Bilò

, Michele Flammini
, Gianpiero Monaco, Luca Moscardelli:
Computing Approximate Nash Equilibria in Network Congestion Games with Polynomially Decreasing Cost Functions. 118-131 - Vittorio Bilò

, Cosimo Vinci
:
On Stackelberg Strategies in Affine Congestion Games. 132-145 - Antje Bjelde

, Felix A. Fischer, Max Klimm:
Impartial Selection and the Power of up to Two Choices. 146-158 - Avrim Blum, Yishay Mansour, Liu Yang:

Online Allocation and Pricing with Economies of Scale. 159-172 - Liad Blumrosen, Osnat Zohar:

Multilateral Deferred-Acceptance Mechanisms. 173-186 - Shant Boodaghians, Adrian Vetta:

Testing Consumer Rationality Using Perfect Graphs and Oriented Discs. 187-200 - Branislav Bosanský, Simina Brânzei, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen

, Peter Bro Miltersen, Troels Bjerre Sørensen:
Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games. 201-215 - Nicolas Bousquet

, Yang Cai, Adrian Vetta:
Welfare and Rationality Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction. 216-229 - Yun Kuen Cheung, Monika Henzinger, Martin Hoefer, Martin Starnberger:

Combinatorial Auctions with Conflict-Based Externalities. 230-243 - Richard Cole, Shravas Rao:

Applications of α-Strongly Regular Distributions to Bayesian Auctions. 244-257 - José Correa, Jasper de Jong, Bart de Keijzer, Marc Uetz:

The Curse of Sequentiality in Routing Games. 258-271 - José Correa, Marcos A. Kiwi

, Neil Olver
, Alberto Vera:
Adaptive Rumor Spreading. 272-285 - Rachel Cummings, Michael J. Kearns, Aaron Roth

, Zhiwei Steven Wu:
Privacy and Truthful Equilibrium Selection for Aggregative Games. 286-299 - Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Omri Weinstein:

Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium. 300-313 - Britta Dorn, Dominikus Krüger, Patrick Scharpfenecker:

Often Harder than in the Constructive Case: Destructive Bribery in CP-nets. 314-327 - Dimitris Fotakis, Dimitris Kalimeris, Thanasis Lianeas:

Improving Selfish Routing for Risk-Averse Players. 328-342 - Yiannis Giannakopoulos

, Maria Kyropoulou
:
The VCG Mechanism for Bayesian Scheduling. 343-356 - Paul W. Goldberg

, Stefano Turchetta:
Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria in Anonymous Games. 357-369 - Li Han, David Kempe, Ruixin Qiang:

Incentivizing Exploration with Heterogeneous Value of Money. 370-383 - Tobias Harks, Max Klimm, Manuel Schneider:

Bottleneck Routing with Elastic Demands. 384-397 - Annamária Kovács, Ulrich Meyer, Carmine Ventre

:
Mechanisms with Monitoring for Truthful RAM Allocation. 398-412 - Volodymyr Kuleshov, Okke Schrijvers:

Inverse Game Theory: Learning Utilities in Succinct Games. 413-427

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