default search action
Google
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Internet Archive Scholar
CiteSeerX
ORCIDYang Cai 0001
蔡洋
Person information
- unicode name: 蔡洋
- affiliation: Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
- affiliation (former): McGill University, Montréal, Québec, Canada
- affiliation (former): Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA
Other persons with the same name
- Yang Cai — disambiguation page
- Yang Cai 0002 — Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, USA
- Yang Cai 0003 — ArcSys Inc., Sunnyvale, CA, USA
- Yang Cai 0004
![[0000-0001-8015-9705]](https://dblp.uni-trier.de/img/orcid-mark.12x12.png "0000-0001-8015-9705")
— University of Southern California, Department of Electrical Engineering, Los Angeles, CA, USA (and 1 more)
Refine list
refinements active!
zoomed in on ?? of ?? records
view refined list in
export refined list as
showing all ?? records
2020 – today
- 2024
[c46]Yang Cai, Haipeng Luo, Chen-Yu Wei, Weiqiang Zheng:
Near-Optimal Policy Optimization for Correlated Equilibrium in General-Sum Markov Games. AISTATS 2024: 3889-3897- [c45]Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou, Weiqiang Zheng:
Accelerated Algorithms for Constrained Nonconvex-Nonconcave Min-Max Optimization and Comonotone Inclusion. ICML 2024 - [c44]Yang Cai, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Mingfei Zhao:
The Power of Two-Sided Recruitment in Two-Sided Markets. STOC 2024: 201-212 - [c43]Yang Cai, Zhe Feng, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Grigoris Velegkas:
User Response in Ad Auctions: An MDP Formulation of Long-term Revenue Optimization. WWW 2024: 111-122 - [i46]Yang Cai, Haipeng Luo, Chen-Yu Wei, Weiqiang Zheng:
Near-Optimal Policy Optimization for Correlated Equilibrium in General-Sum Markov Games. CoRR abs/2401.15240 (2024) - [i45]Yang Cai, Yingkai Li, Jinzhao Wu:
Algorithmic Information Disclosure in Optimal Auctions. CoRR abs/2403.08145 (2024) - [i44]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, Haipeng Luo, Chen-Yu Wei, Weiqiang Zheng:
Tractable Local Equilibria in Non-Concave Games. CoRR abs/2403.08171 (2024) - [i43]Yang Cai, Gabriele Farina, Julien Grand-Clément, Christian Kroer, Chung-Wei Lee, Haipeng Luo, Weiqiang Zheng:
Fast Last-Iterate Convergence of Learning in Games Requires Forgetful Algorithms. CoRR abs/2406.10631 (2024) - 2023
- [c42]Yang Cai, Ziyun Chen, Jinzhao Wu:
Simultaneous Auctions are Approximately Revenue-Optimal for Subadditive Bidders. FOCS 2023: 134-147 - [c41]Yang Cai, Weiqiang Zheng:
Accelerated Single-Call Methods for Constrained Min-Max Optimization. ICLR 2023 - [c40]Yang Cai, Weiqiang Zheng:
Doubly Optimal No-Regret Learning in Monotone Games. ICML 2023: 3507-3524 - [c39]Yang Cai, Haipeng Luo, Chen-Yu Wei, Weiqiang Zheng:
Uncoupled and Convergent Learning in Two-Player Zero-Sum Markov Games with Bandit Feedback. NeurIPS 2023 - [c38]Yang Cai, Eric Xue:
Nearly Optimal Committee Selection For Bias Minimization. EC 2023: 391-410 - [c37]Yang Cai, Jinzhao Wu:
On the Optimal Fixed-Price Mechanism in Bilateral Trade. STOC 2023: 737-750 - [i42]Yang Cai, Jinzhao Wu:
On the Optimal Fixed-Price Mechanism in Bilateral Trade. CoRR abs/2301.05167 (2023) - [i41]Yang Cai, Weiqiang Zheng:
Doubly Optimal No-Regret Learning in Monotone Games. CoRR abs/2301.13120 (2023) - [i40]Yang Cai, Zhe Feng, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta:
User Response in Ad Auctions: An MDP Formulation of Long-Term Revenue Optimization. CoRR abs/2302.08108 (2023) - [i39]Yang Cai, Haipeng Luo, Chen-Yu Wei, Weiqiang Zheng:
Uncoupled and Convergent Learning in Two-Player Zero-Sum Markov Games. CoRR abs/2303.02738 (2023) - [i38]Yang Cai, Eric Xue:
Nearly Optimal Committee Selection For Bias Minimization. CoRR abs/2306.11820 (2023) - [i37]Yang Cai, Michael I. Jordan, Tianyi Lin, Argyris Oikonomou, Emmanouil V. Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis:
Curvature-Independent Last-Iterate Convergence for Games on Riemannian Manifolds. CoRR abs/2306.16617 (2023) - [i36]Yang Cai, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Mingfei Zhao:
The Power of Two-sided Recruitment in Two-sided Markets. CoRR abs/2307.03844 (2023) - [i35]Yang Cai, Ziyun Chen, Jinzhao Wu:
Simultaneous Auctions are Approximately Revenue-Optimal for Subadditive Bidders. CoRR abs/2310.07977 (2023) - [i34]Yang Cai, Gabriele Farina, Julien Grand-Clément, Christian Kroer, Chung-Wei Lee, Haipeng Luo, Weiqiang Zheng:
Last-Iterate Convergence Properties of Regret-Matching Algorithms in Games. CoRR abs/2311.00676 (2023) - 2022
- [c36]Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou, Weiqiang Zheng:
Finite-Time Last-Iterate Convergence for Learning in Multi-Player Games. NeurIPS 2022 - [c35]Dirk Bergemann, Yang Cai, Grigoris Velegkas, Mingfei Zhao:
Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal? EC 2022: 608-663 - [c34]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis:
Recommender Systems meet Mechanism Design. EC 2022: 897-914 - [c33]Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou, Mingfei Zhao:
Computing simple mechanisms: Lift-and-round over marginal reduced forms. STOC 2022: 704-717 - [i33]Dirk Bergemann, Yang Cai, Grigoris Velegkas, Mingfei Zhao:
Is Selling Complete Information (Approximately) Optimal? CoRR abs/2202.09013 (2022) - [i32]Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou, Weiqiang Zheng:
Tight Last-Iterate Convergence of the Extragradient Method for Constrained Monotone Variational Inequalities. CoRR abs/2204.09228 (2022) - [i31]Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou, Weiqiang Zheng:
Accelerated Algorithms for Monotone Inclusions and Constrained Nonconvex-Nonconcave Min-Max Optimization. CoRR abs/2206.05248 (2022) - [i30]Yang Cai, Weiqiang Zheng:
Accelerated Single-Call Methods for Constrained Min-Max Optimization. CoRR abs/2210.03096 (2022) - 2021
- [j8]Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design. SIAM J. Comput. 50(3) (2021) - [c32]Yang Cai, Grigoris Velegkas:
How to Sell Information Optimally: An Algorithmic Study. ITCS 2021: 81:1-81:20 - [c31]Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou:
On Simple Mechanisms for Dependent Items. EC 2021: 242-262 - [c30]Yang Cai, Kira Goldner, Steven Ma, Mingfei Zhao:
On Multi-Dimensional Gains from Trade Maximization. SODA 2021: 1079-1098 - [c29]Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou, Grigoris Velegkas, Mingfei Zhao:
An Efficient ∊-BIC to BIC Transformation and Its Application to Black-Box Reduction in Revenue Maximization. SODA 2021: 1337-1356 - [i29]Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou:
On Simple Mechanisms for Dependent Items. CoRR abs/2106.10814 (2021) - [i28]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis:
Recommender Systems meet Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/2110.12558 (2021) - [i27]Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou, Mingfei Zhao:
Computing Simple Mechanisms: Lift-and-Round over Marginal Reduced Forms. CoRR abs/2111.03962 (2021) - 2020
- [j7]Yang Cai, Federico Echenique, Hu Fu, Katrina Ligett, Adam Wierman, Juba Ziani:
Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms. Proc. ACM Meas. Anal. Comput. Syst. 4(1): 12:1-12:31 (2020) - [c28]Johannes Brustle, Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis:
Multi-Item Mechanisms without Item-Independence: Learnability via Robustness. EC 2020: 715-761 - [c27]Yang Cai, Federico Echenique, Hu Fu, Katrina Ligett, Adam Wierman, Juba Ziani:
Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms. SIGMETRICS (Abstracts) 2020: 103 - [i26]Yang Cai, Kira Goldner, Steven Ma, Mingfei Zhao:
On Multi-Dimensional Gains from Trade Maximization. CoRR abs/2007.13934 (2020) - [i25]Yang Cai, Grigoris Velegkas:
How to Sell Information Optimally: an Algorithmic Study. CoRR abs/2011.14570 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [c26]Yang Cai, Mingfei Zhao:
Simple Mechanisms for Profit Maximization in Multi-item Auctions. EC 2019: 217-236 - [c25]Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, Kira Goldner, R. Preston McAfee:
Simple and Approximately Optimal Pricing for Proportional Complementarities. EC 2019: 239-240 - [i24]Yang Cai, Mingfei Zhao:
Simple Mechanisms for Profit Maximization in Multi-item Auctions. CoRR abs/1906.09305 (2019) - [i23]Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, Kira Goldner, R. Preston McAfee:
Simple and Approximately Optimal Pricing for Proportional Complementarities. CoRR abs/1909.00788 (2019) - [i22]Johannes Brustle, Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis:
Multi-Item Mechanisms without Item-Independence: Learnability via Robustness. CoRR abs/1911.02146 (2019) - [i21]Yang Cai, Argyris Oikonomou, Grigoris Velegkas, Mingfei Zhao:
An Efficient ε-BIC to BIC Transformation and Its Application to Black-Box Reduction in Revenue Maximization. CoRR abs/1911.10172 (2019) - 2018
- [j6]Yang Cai, Mingfei Zhao:
Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality. SIGecom Exch. 17(1): 39-53 (2018) - [c24]Jessie Huang, Fa Wu, Doina Precup, Yang Cai:
Learning Safe Policies with Expert Guidance. NeurIPS 2018: 9123-9132 - [c23]Moshe Babaioff, Yang Cai, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Mingfei Zhao:
The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade. EC 2018: 373 - [i20]Yang Cai, Federico Echenique, Hu Fu, Katrina Ligett, Adam Wierman, Juba Ziani:
Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms. CoRR abs/1802.07407 (2018) - [i19]Moshe Babaioff, Yang Cai, Yannai A. Gonczarowski, Mingfei Zhao:
The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade. CoRR abs/1802.08023 (2018) - [i18]Jessie Huang, Fa Wu, Doina Precup, Yang Cai:
Learning Safe Policies with Expert Guidance. CoRR abs/1805.08313 (2018) - [i17]Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A Duality-Based Unified Approach to Bayesian Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/1812.01577 (2018) - 2017
- [c22]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis:
Learning Multi-Item Auctions with (or without) Samples. FOCS 2017: 516-527 - [c21]Johannes Brustle, Yang Cai, Fa Wu, Mingfei Zhao:
Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms. EC 2017: 589-590 - [c20]Yang Cai, Mingfei Zhao:
Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality. STOC 2017: 170-183 - [i16]Johannes Brustle, Yang Cai, Fa Wu, Mingfei Zhao:
Approximating Gains from Trade in Two-sided Markets via Simple Mechanisms. CoRR abs/1706.04637 (2017) - [i15]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis:
Learning Multi-item Auctions with (or without) Samples. CoRR abs/1709.00228 (2017) - 2016
- [j5]Yang Cai, Ozan Candogan, Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
Zero-Sum Polymatrix Games: A Generalization of Minmax. Math. Oper. Res. 41(2): 648-655 (2016) - [j4]Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A duality-based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design. SIGecom Exch. 15(1): 71-77 (2016) - [c19]Nicolas Bousquet, Yang Cai, Christoph Hunkenschröder, Adrian Vetta:
On the Economic Efficiency of the Combinatorial Clock Auction. SODA 2016: 1407-1423 - [c18]Yang Cai, Nikhil R. Devanur, S. Matthew Weinberg:
A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design. STOC 2016: 926-939 - [e1]Yang Cai, Adrian Vetta:
Web and Internet Economics - 12th International Conference, WINE 2016, Montreal, Canada, December 11-14, 2016, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 10123, Springer 2016, ISBN 978-3-662-54109-8 [contents] - [r1]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Reducing Bayesian Mechanism Design to Algorithm Design. Encyclopedia of Algorithms 2016: 1801-1808 - [i14]Yang Cai, Mingfei Zhao:
Simple Mechanisms for Subadditive Buyers via Duality. CoRR abs/1611.06910 (2016) - 2015
- [j3]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis:
Extreme value theorems for optimal multidimensional pricing. Games Econ. Behav. 92: 266-305 (2015) - [c17]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
Optimum Statistical Estimation with Strategic Data Sources. COLT 2015: 280-296 - [c16]Nicolas Bousquet, Yang Cai, Adrian Vetta:
Welfare and Rationality Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction. WINE 2015: 216-229 - [i13]Nicolas Bousquet, Yang Cai, Christoph Hunkenschröder, Adrian Vetta:
On the Economic Efficiency of the Combinatorial Clock Auction. CoRR abs/1507.06495 (2015) - [i12]Nicolas Bousquet, Yang Cai, Adrian Vetta:
Welfare and Rationality Guarantees for the Simultaneous Multiple-Round Ascending Auction. CoRR abs/1510.00295 (2015) - 2014
- [j2]Yang Cai, Xiaoyu Li, Zhenjiang Gong, Tania Ros Codina:
Speaker Verification for Multi-Task Interactions. Interact. Comput. 26(2): 135-144 (2014) - [c15]Yang Cai, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
Simultaneous bayesian auctions and computational complexity. EC 2014: 895-910 - [c14]Gagan Aggarwal, Yang Cai, Aranyak Mehta, George Pierrakos:
Biobjective Online Bipartite Matching. WINE 2014: 218-231 - [i11]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
Optimum Statistical Estimation with Strategic Data Sources. CoRR abs/1408.2539 (2014) - 2013
- [b1]Yang Cai:
Mechanism design : a new algorithmic framework. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA, 2013 - [c13]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design Becomes Algorithm Design. FOCS 2013: 618-627 - [c12]Yang Cai, Zhiyi Huang:
Simple and Nearly Optimal Multi-Item Auctions. SODA 2013: 564-577 - [c11]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations. SODA 2013: 578-595 - [c10]Yang Cai, Mohammad Mahdian, Aranyak Mehta, Bo Waggoner:
Designing Markets for Daily Deals. WINE 2013: 82-95 - [i10]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization: Approximation Algorithms and other Generalizations. CoRR abs/1305.4000 (2013) - [i9]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Understanding Incentives: Mechanism Design becomes Algorithm Design. CoRR abs/1305.4002 (2013) - [i8]Yang Cai, Mohammad Mahdian, Aranyak Mehta, Bo Waggoner:
Designing Markets for Daily Deals. CoRR abs/1310.0548 (2013) - 2012
- [c9]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Optimal Multi-dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization. FOCS 2012: 130-139 - [c8]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
An algorithmic characterization of multi-dimensional mechanisms. STOC 2012: 459-478 - [c7]Yang Cai, Ting Zhang:
Can Nondeterminism Help Complementation? GandALF 2012: 57-70 - [i7]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
Optimal Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design: Reducing Revenue to Welfare Maximization. CoRR abs/1207.5518 (2012) - [i6]Yang Cai, Zhiyi Huang:
Simple and Nearly Optimal Multi-Item Auctions. CoRR abs/1210.3560 (2012) - 2011
- [j1]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
On optimal multidimensional mechanism design. SIGecom Exch. 10(2): 29-33 (2011) - [c6]Yang Cai, Ting Zhang:
Tight Upper Bounds for Streett and Parity Complementation. CSL 2011: 112-128 - [c5]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis:
Extreme-Value Theorems for Optimal Multidimensional Pricing. FOCS 2011: 522-531 - [c4]Yang Cai, Ting Zhang:
A Tight Lower Bound for Streett Complementation. FSTTCS 2011: 339-350 - [c3]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis:
On Minmax Theorems for Multiplayer Games. SODA 2011: 217-234 - [i5]Yang Cai, Ting Zhang:
Tight Upper Bounds for Streett and Parity Complementation. CoRR abs/1102.2960 (2011) - [i4]Yang Cai, Ting Zhang:
A Tight Lower Bound for Streett Complementation. CoRR abs/1102.2963 (2011) - [i3]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis:
Extreme-Value Theorems for Optimal Multidimensional Pricing. CoRR abs/1106.0519 (2011) - [i2]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
An Algorithmic Characterization of Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms. CoRR abs/1112.4572 (2011) - [i1]Yang Cai, Constantinos Daskalakis, S. Matthew Weinberg:
An Algorithmic Characterization of Multi-Dimensional Mechanisms. Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex. TR11 (2011)
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [c2]Yang Cai, Ting Zhang, Haifeng Luo:
An Improved Lower Bound for the Complementation of Rabin Automata. LICS 2009: 167-176 - [c1]Fan Long, Xi Wang, Yang Cai:
Api hyperlinking via structural overlap. ESEC/SIGSOFT FSE 2009: 203-212
Coauthor Index
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.
Unpaywalled article links
Add open access links from 
to the list of external document links (if available).
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the API of unpaywall.org to load hyperlinks to open access articles. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the Unpaywall privacy policy.
Archived links via Wayback Machine
For web page which are no longer available, try to retrieve content from the 
of the Internet Archive (if available).
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the API of archive.org to check for archived content of web pages that are no longer available. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the Internet Archive privacy policy.
Reference lists
Add a list of references from 
, 
, and 
to record detail pages.
load references from crossref.org and opencitations.net
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the APIs of crossref.org, opencitations.net, and semanticscholar.org to load article reference information. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the Crossref privacy policy and the OpenCitations privacy policy, as well as the AI2 Privacy Policy covering Semantic Scholar.
Citation data
Add a list of citing articles from and to record detail pages.
load citations from opencitations.net
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the API of opencitations.net and semanticscholar.org to load citation information. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the OpenCitations privacy policy as well as the AI2 Privacy Policy covering Semantic Scholar.
OpenAlex data
Load additional information about publications from 
.
Privacy notice: By enabling the option above, your browser will contact the API of openalex.org to load additional information. Although we do not have any reason to believe that your call will be tracked, we do not have any control over how the remote server uses your data. So please proceed with care and consider checking the information given by OpenAlex.
last updated on 2024-10-07 22:21 CEST by the dblp team
all metadata released as open data under CC0 1.0 license
see also: Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Imprint
dblp was originally created in 1993 at:
since 2018, dblp has been operated and maintained by:
the dblp computer science bibliography is funded and supported by:
