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Aranyak Mehta
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2020 – today
- 2024
- [c48]Avinava Dubey
, Zhe Feng
, Rahul Kidambi
, Aranyak Mehta
, Di Wang
:
Auctions with LLM Summaries. KDD 2024: 713-722 - [c47]Guru Guruganesh, Aranyak Mehta, Di Wang, Kangning Wang:
Prior-Independent Auctions for Heterogeneous Bidders. SODA 2024: 1-18 - [c46]Yang Cai
, Christopher Liaw
, Aranyak Mehta
, Mingfei Zhao
:
The Power of Two-Sided Recruitment in Two-Sided Markets. STOC 2024: 201-212 - [c45]Yang Cai
, Zhe Feng
, Christopher Liaw
, Aranyak Mehta
, Grigoris Velegkas
:
User Response in Ad Auctions: An MDP Formulation of Long-term Revenue Optimization. WWW 2024: 111-122 - [c44]Christopher Liaw
, Aranyak Mehta
, Wennan Zhu
:
Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding with Budget Constraints. WWW 2024: 223-234 - [i23]Martino Banchio, Aranyak Mehta, Andrés Perlroth:
Auctions with Dynamic Scoring. CoRR abs/2403.11022 (2024) - [i22]Kumar Avinava Dubey, Zhe Feng, Rahul Kidambi, Aranyak Mehta, Di Wang:
Auctions with LLM Summaries. CoRR abs/2404.08126 (2024) - [i21]Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Zhe Feng, Di Wang, Manzil Zaheer, Aranyak Mehta, David C. Parkes:
Deep Reinforcement Learning for Sequential Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR abs/2407.08022 (2024) - [i20]Kshipra Bhawalkar, Zhe Feng, Anupam Gupta, Aranyak Mehta, David Wajc, Di Wang:
The Average-Value Allocation Problem. CoRR abs/2407.10401 (2024) - [i19]Kaiwen Wang, Rahul Kidambi, Ryan Sullivan, Alekh Agarwal, Christoph Dann, Andrea Michi, Marco Gelmi, Yunxuan Li, Raghav Gupta, Avinava Dubey, Alexandre Ramé, Johan Ferret, Geoffrey Cideron, Le Hou, Hongkun Yu, Amr Ahmed, Aranyak Mehta, Léonard Hussenot, Olivier Bachem, Edouard Leurent:
Conditioned Language Policy: A General Framework for Steerable Multi-Objective Finetuning. CoRR abs/2407.15762 (2024) - 2023
- [c43]Yeganeh Alimohammadi
, Aranyak Mehta
, Andrés Perlroth
:
Incentive Compatibility in the Auto-bidding World. EC 2023: 63 - [c42]Andrés Perlroth
, Aranyak Mehta
:
Auctions without commitment in the auto-bidding world. WWW 2023: 3478-3488 - [c41]Christopher Liaw
, Aranyak Mehta
, Andrés Perlroth
:
Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding: The Power of Randomization. WWW 2023: 3561-3571 - [i18]Aranyak Mehta, Andrés Perlroth:
Auctions without commitment in the auto-bidding world. CoRR abs/2301.07312 (2023) - [i17]Yeganeh Alimohammadi, Aranyak Mehta, Andrés Perlroth:
Incentive Compatibility in the Auto-bidding World. CoRR abs/2301.13414 (2023) - [i16]Yang Cai, Zhe Feng, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta:
User Response in Ad Auctions: An MDP Formulation of Long-Term Revenue Optimization. CoRR abs/2302.08108 (2023) - [i15]Yang Cai, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Mingfei Zhao:
The Power of Two-sided Recruitment in Two-sided Markets. CoRR abs/2307.03844 (2023) - [i14]Kamyar Azizzadenesheli, Trung Dang, Aranyak Mehta, Alexandros Psomas, Qian Zhang:
Reward Selection with Noisy Observations. CoRR abs/2307.05953 (2023) - [i13]Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Wennan Zhu:
Efficiency of Non-Truthful Auctions in Auto-bidding with Budget Constraints. CoRR abs/2310.09271 (2023) - 2022
- [c40]Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Aranyak Mehta, Divyarthi Mohan, Alexandros Psomas:
Simple Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization in Rich Advertising Auctions. NeurIPS 2022 - [c39]Aranyak Mehta:
Auction Design in an Auto-bidding Setting: Randomization Improves Efficiency Beyond VCG. WWW 2022: 173-181 - [i12]Aranyak Mehta:
Auction Design in an Auto-bidding Setting: Randomization Improves Efficiency Beyond VCG. CoRR abs/2204.10956 (2022) - [i11]Gagan Aggarwal, Kshipra Bhawalkar, Aranyak Mehta, Divyarthi Mohan, Alexandros Psomas:
Simple Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization in Rich Advertising Auctions. CoRR abs/2206.02948 (2022) - [i10]Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Andrés Perlroth:
Efficiency of non-truthful auctions under auto-bidding. CoRR abs/2207.03630 (2022) - [i9]Guru Guruganesh, Aranyak Mehta, Di Wang, Kangning Wang
:
Prior-Independent Auctions for Heterogeneous Bidders. CoRR abs/2207.09429 (2022) - 2021
- [c38]Zhe Feng, Guru Guruganesh, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Abhishek Sethi:
Convergence Analysis of No-Regret Bidding Algorithms in Repeated Auctions. AAAI 2021: 5399-5406 - 2020
- [c37]Aranyak Mehta, Uri Nadav, Alexandros Psomas, Aviad Rubinstein:
Hitting the High Notes: Subset Selection for Maximizing Expected Order Statistics. NeurIPS 2020 - [i8]Zhe Feng, Guru Guruganesh, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, Abhishek Sethi:
Convergence Analysis of No-Regret Bidding Algorithms in Repeated Auctions. CoRR abs/2009.06136 (2020) - [i7]Goran Zuzic, Di Wang, Aranyak Mehta, D. Sivakumar:
Learning Robust Algorithms for Online Allocation Problems Using Adversarial Training. CoRR abs/2010.08418 (2020) - [i6]Aranyak Mehta, Uri Nadav, Alexandros Psomas, Aviad Rubinstein:
Hitting the High Notes: Subset Selection for Maximizing Expected Order Statistics. CoRR abs/2012.07935 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [c36]Weiwei Kong, Christopher Liaw, Aranyak Mehta, D. Sivakumar:
A new dog learns old tricks: RL finds classic optimization algorithms. ICLR (Poster) 2019 - [c35]Gagan Aggarwal, Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Aranyak Mehta:
Autobidding with Constraints. WINE 2019: 17-30 - 2018
- [j14]Shahar Dobzinski, Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan:
Is Shapley cost sharing optimal? Games Econ. Behav. 108: 130-138 (2018) - [c34]Florin Constantin, Christopher Harris, Samuel Ieong, Aranyak Mehta, Xi Tan:
Optimizing Ad Refresh In Mobile App Advertising. WWW 2018: 1399-1408 - 2015
- [c33]Aranyak Mehta, Bo Waggoner, Morteza Zadimoghaddam:
Online Stochastic Matching with Unequal Probabilities. SODA 2015: 1388-1404 - 2014
- [c32]Gagan Aggarwal, Yang Cai, Aranyak Mehta, George Pierrakos:
Biobjective Online Bipartite Matching. WINE 2014: 218-231 - 2013
- [j13]Aranyak Mehta:
Online Matching and Ad Allocation. Found. Trends Theor. Comput. Sci. 8(4): 265-368 (2013) - [c31]Yang Cai, Mohammad Mahdian, Aranyak Mehta, Bo Waggoner:
Designing Markets for Daily Deals. WINE 2013: 82-95 - [c30]Chinmay Karande, Aranyak Mehta, Ramakrishnan Srikant:
Optimizing budget constrained spend in search advertising. WSDM 2013: 697-706 - [i5]Yang Cai, Mohammad Mahdian, Aranyak Mehta, Bo Waggoner:
Designing Markets for Daily Deals. CoRR abs/1310.0548 (2013) - 2012
- [j12]Bahman Bahmani, Aranyak Mehta, Rajeev Motwani:
Online Graph Edge-Coloring in the Random-Order Arrival Model. Theory Comput. 8(1): 567-595 (2012) - [c29]Aranyak Mehta, Debmalya Panigrahi:
Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards. FOCS 2012: 728-737 - 2011
- [j11]Robert Krauthgamer, Aranyak Mehta, Atri Rudra:
Pricing commodities. Theor. Comput. Sci. 412(7): 602-613 (2011) - [c28]Gagan Aggarwal, Gagan Goel, Chinmay Karande, Aranyak Mehta:
Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching and Single-bid Budgeted Allocations. SODA 2011: 1253-1264 - [c27]Chinmay Karande, Aranyak Mehta, Pushkar Tripathi:
Online bipartite matching with unknown distributions. STOC 2011: 587-596 - 2010
- [j10]Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Aranyak Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Design is as Easy as Optimization. SIAM J. Discret. Math. 24(1): 270-286 (2010) - [c26]Bahman Bahmani, Aranyak Mehta, Rajeev Motwani:
A 1.43-Competitive Online Graph Edge Coloring Algorithm in the Random Order Arrival Model. SODA 2010: 31-39 - [i4]Gagan Aggarwal, Gagan Goel, Chinmay Karande, Aranyak Mehta:
Online Vertex-Weighted Bipartite Matching and Single-bid Budgeted Allocations. CoRR abs/1007.1271 (2010)
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [j9]Mihail N. Kolountzakis, Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Aranyak Mehta, Nisheeth K. Vishnoi:
On the Fourier spectrum of symmetric Boolean functions. Comb. 29(3): 363-387 (2009) - [j8]Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan:
Beyond Moulin mechanisms. Games Econ. Behav. 67(1): 125-155 (2009) - [j7]Howard J. Karloff, Subhash Khot, Aranyak Mehta, Yuval Rabani
:
On Earthmover Distance, Metric Labeling, and 0-Extension. SIAM J. Comput. 39(2): 371-387 (2009) - [j6]Constantinos Daskalakis, Aranyak Mehta, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
A note on approximate Nash equilibria. Theor. Comput. Sci. 410(17): 1581-1588 (2009) - [c25]Jon Feldman, Aranyak Mehta, Vahab S. Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan:
Online Stochastic Matching: Beating 1-1/e. FOCS 2009: 117-126 - [c24]Gagan Aggarwal, Gagan Goel, Aranyak Mehta:
Efficiency of (revenue-)optimal mechanisms. EC 2009: 235-242 - [i3]Jon Feldman, Aranyak Mehta, Vahab S. Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan:
Online Stochastic Matching: Beating 1-1/e. CoRR abs/0905.4100 (2009) - [i2]Gagan Aggarwal, Gagan Goel, Aranyak Mehta:
Efficiency of (Revenue-)Optimal Mechanisms. CoRR abs/0906.1019 (2009) - 2008
- [j5]Subhash Khot, Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Aranyak Mehta:
Inapproximability Results for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Utility Functions. Algorithmica 52(1): 3-18 (2008) - [c23]Robert Krauthgamer, Aranyak Mehta, Vijayshankar Raman, Atri Rudra:
Greedy List Intersection. ICDE 2008: 1033-1042 - [c22]Shahar Dobzinski, Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan:
Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal? SAGT 2008: 327-336 - [c21]Gagan Goel, Aranyak Mehta:
Online budgeted matching in random input models with applications to Adwords. SODA 2008: 982-991 - 2007
- [j4]Aranyak Mehta, Amin Saberi, Umesh V. Vazirani, Vijay V. Vazirani:
AdWords and generalized online matching. J. ACM 54(5): 22 (2007) - [j3]Sanjiv Kapoor, Aranyak Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani:
An auction-based market equilibrium algorithm for a production model. Theor. Comput. Sci. 378(2): 153-164 (2007) - [c20]Rob LeGrand, Evangelos Markakis, Aranyak Mehta:
Some results on approximating the minimax solution in approval voting. AAMAS 2007: 198 - [c19]Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan:
Beyond moulin mechanisms. EC 2007: 1-10 - [c18]Constantinos Daskalakis, Aranyak Mehta, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
Progress in approximate nash equilibria. EC 2007: 355-358 - [c17]Robert Krauthgamer
, Aranyak Mehta, Atri Rudra:
Pricing Commodities, or How to Sell When Buyers Have Restricted Valuations. WAOA 2007: 1-14 - [c16]Gagan Goel, Aranyak Mehta:
Adwords Auctions with Decreasing Valuation Bids. WINE 2007: 335-340 - 2006
- [j2]Aranyak Mehta, Scott Shenker, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Posted price profit maximization for multicast by approximating fixed points. J. Algorithms 58(2): 150-164 (2006) - [c15]Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Aranyak Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Design Is as Easy as Optimization. ICALP (1) 2006: 477-488 - [c14]Howard J. Karloff, Subhash Khot, Aranyak Mehta, Yuval Rabani
:
On earthmover distance, metric labeling, and 0-extension. STOC 2006: 547-556 - [c13]Constantinos Daskalakis, Aranyak Mehta, Christos H. Papadimitriou:
A Note on Approximate Nash Equilibria. WINE 2006: 297-306 - 2005
- [j1]Parikshit Gopalan, Howard J. Karloff, Aranyak Mehta, Milena Mihail, Nisheeth K. Vishnoi:
Caching with Expiration Times for Internet Applications. Internet Math. 2(2): 165-184 (2005) - [c12]Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Aranyak Mehta, Nisheeth K. Vishnoi:
On the Fourier Spectrum of Symmetric Boolean Functions with Applications to Learning Symmetric Juntas. CCC 2005: 112-119 - [c11]Aranyak Mehta, Amin Saberi, Umesh V. Vazirani, Vijay V. Vazirani:
AdWords and Generalized On-line Matching. FOCS 2005: 264-273 - [c10]Deeparnab Chakrabarty, Aranyak Mehta, Viswanath Nagarajan:
Fairness and optimality in congestion games. EC 2005: 52-57 - [c9]Subhash Khot, Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Aranyak Mehta:
Inapproximability Results for Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Utility Functions. WINE 2005: 92-101 - [c8]Sanjiv Kapoor, Aranyak Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani:
An Auction-Based Market Equilibrium Algorithm for a Production Model. WINE 2005: 102-111 - [c7]Kamal Jain, Aranyak Mehta, Kunal Talwar, Vijay V. Vazirani:
A Simple Characterization for Truth-Revealing Single-Item Auctions. WINE 2005: 122-128 - [i1]Howard J. Karloff, Subhash Khot, Aranyak Mehta, Yuval Rabani:
On earthmover distance, metric labeling, and 0-extension. Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex. TR05 (2005) - 2004
- [c6]Aranyak Mehta, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Randomized truthful auctions of digital goods are randomizations over truthful auctions. EC 2004: 120-124 - 2003
- [c5]Parikshit Gopalan, Richard J. Lipton, Aranyak Mehta:
Randomized Time-Space Tradeoffs for Directed Graph Connectivity. FSTTCS 2003: 208-216 - [c4]Richard J. Lipton, Evangelos Markakis, Aranyak Mehta:
Playing large games using simple strategies. EC 2003: 36-41 - [c3]Aranyak Mehta, Scott Shenker
, Vijay V. Vazirani:
Profit-maximizing multicast pricing by approximating fixed points. EC 2003: 218-219 - 2002
- [c2]Parikshit Gopalan, Howard J. Karloff, Aranyak Mehta, Milena Mihail, Nisheeth K. Vishnoi:
Caching with expiration times. SODA 2002: 540-547 - 2000
- [c1]Bharat Adsul, Aranyak Mehta, Milind A. Sohoni:
Keeping Track of the Latest Gossip in Shared Memory Systems. FSTTCS 2000: 477-488
Coauthor Index
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last updated on 2024-09-10 02:05 CEST by the dblp team
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