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ORCIDVasilis Gkatzelis
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- affiliation: Drexel University
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Books and Theses
- 2013
[b1]Vasilis Gkatzelis:
Incentive-Centered Design of Money-Free Mechanisms. New York University, USA, 2013
Journal Articles
- 2024
- [j16]George Christodoulou
, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alkmini Sgouritsa:
Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games. Oper. Res. 72(1): 167-184 (2024) - 2022
- [j15]Simina Brânzei, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Ruta Mehta:
Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents. Oper. Res. 70(1): 402-415 (2022) - 2021
- [j14]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline:
SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2022. SIGecom Exch. 19(2): 4-31 (2021) - 2020
- [j13]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline:
SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2021. SIGecom Exch. 18(2): 4-31 (2020) - 2019
- [j12]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline:
SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2020. SIGecom Exch. 17(2): 4-24 (2019) - 2018
- [j11]Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis:
Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items. SIAM J. Comput. 47(3): 1211-1236 (2018) - [j10]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline:
SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2019. SIGecom Exch. 17(1): 2-36 (2018) - 2017
- [j9]Paul Dütting, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Tim Roughgarden:
The Performance of Deferred-Acceptance Auctions. Math. Oper. Res. 42(4): 897-914 (2017) - [j8]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline:
SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2018. SIGecom Exch. 16(1): 2-23 (2017) - 2016
- [j7]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Konstantinos Kollias, Tim Roughgarden:
Optimal Cost-Sharing in General Resource Selection Games. Oper. Res. 64(6): 1230-1238 (2016) - [j6]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline:
SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2017. SIGecom Exch. 15(1): 2-31 (2016) - 2015
- [j5]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Christina Aperjis, Bernardo A. Huberman:
Pricing private data. Electron. Mark. 25(2): 109-123 (2015) - [j4]Richard Cole, José R. Correa, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Neil Olver:
Decentralized utilitarian mechanisms for scheduling games. Games Econ. Behav. 92: 306-326 (2015) - [j3]Shaddin Dughmi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline:
SIGecom job market candidate profiles 2016. SIGecom Exch. 14(1): 2-40 (2015) - [j2]Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis:
Approximating the nash social welfare with indivisible items. SIGecom Exch. 14(1): 84-88 (2015) - 2012
- [j1]Dimitris Fotakis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Paul G. Spirakis:
The Impact of Social Ignorance on Weighted Congestion Games. Theory Comput. Syst. 50(3): 559-578 (2012)
Conference and Workshop Papers
- 2024
- [c37]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan, Paritosh Verma:
Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division. IJCAI 2024: 2807-2815 - 2023
- [c36]Marius Garbea, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan:
EFx Budget-Feasible Allocations with High Nash Welfare. ECAI 2023: 795-802 - [c35]Siddhartha Banerjee, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Safwan Hossain, Billy Jin, Evi Micha, Nisarg Shah:
Proportionally Fair Online Allocation of Public Goods with Predictions. IJCAI 2023: 20-28 - [c34]Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan:
Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions. ITCS 2023: 11:1-11:22 - [c33]Rachel Cummings, Hadi Elzayn, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Juba Ziani:
Optimal Data Acquisition with Privacy-Aware Agents. SaTML 2023: 210-224 - [c32]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian, Nisarg Shah:
Best of Both Distortion Worlds. EC 2023: 738-758 - 2022
- [c31]Ioannis Caragiannis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Daniel Schoepflin:
Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods. AAMAS 2022: 208-216 - [c30]Giorgos Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin:
Optimal Deterministic Clock Auctions and Beyond. ITCS 2022: 49:1-49:23 - [c29]Priyank Agrawal, Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Tingting Ou, Xizhi Tan:
Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location. EC 2022: 497-528 - [c28]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kostas Kollias, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Xizhi Tan:
Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions. EC 2022: 529-557 - [c27]Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin:
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions. EC 2022: 820-845 - [c26]Siddhartha Banerjee, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Artur Gorokh, Billy Jin:
Online Nash Social Welfare Maximization with Predictions. SODA 2022: 1-19 - [c25]Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan:
Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions. SODA 2022: 2940-2963 - 2021
- [c24]Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin:
Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods. AAAI 2021: 5143-5150 - [c23]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan:
Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations. AAAI 2021: 5440-5447 - [c22]Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin:
PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents. IJCAI 2021: 24-30 - [c21]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Rishi Patel, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Daniel Schoepflin:
Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values. SAGT 2021: 64-78 - [c20]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa:
Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Mechanisms with Priors. EC 2021: 541-559 - 2020
- [c19]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Halpern, Nisarg Shah:
Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture. FOCS 2020: 1427-1438 - [c18]George Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian, Alkmini Sgouritsa:
Resource-Aware Protocols for Network Cost-Sharing Games. EC 2020: 81-107 - [c17]Rediet Abebe, Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline:
A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching. SODA 2020: 2096-2113 - 2019
- [c16]Eric J. Friedman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Christos-Alexandros Psomas, Scott Shenker:
Fair and Efficient Memory Sharing: Confronting Free Riders. AAAI 2019: 1965-1972 - [c15]Ke Yang, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Julia Stoyanovich:
Balanced Ranking with Diversity Constraints. IJCAI 2019: 6035-6042 - 2018
- [c14]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Steven Weber:
Participation Incentives on a Wireless Random Access Erasure Collision Channel. ITA 2018: 1-6 - 2017
- [c13]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Steven Weber:
Participation incentives on a wireless random access erasure collision channel. NetEcon@EC 2017: 3:1-3:6 - [c12]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Evangelos Markakis, Tim Roughgarden:
Deferred-Acceptance Auctions for Multiple Levels of Service. EC 2017: 21-38 - [c11]Giorgos Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alkmini Sgouritsa:
Cost-Sharing Methods for Scheduling Games under Uncertainty. EC 2017: 441-458 - [c10]Richard Cole, Nikhil R. Devanur, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kamal Jain, Tung Mai, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod:
Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare. EC 2017: 459-460 - [c9]Simina Brânzei, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Ruta Mehta:
Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents. EC 2017: 611-628 - [c8]Ioannis Caragiannis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Cosimo Vinci:
Coordination Mechanisms, Cost-Sharing, and Approximation Algorithms for Scheduling. WINE 2017: 74-87 - 2015
- [c7]Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis:
Approximating the Nash Social Welfare with Indivisible Items. STOC 2015: 371-380 - 2014
- [c6]Paul Dütting, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Tim Roughgarden:
The performance of deferred-acceptance auctions. EC 2014: 187-204 - [c5]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Konstantinos Kollias, Tim Roughgarden:
Optimal Cost-Sharing in Weighted Congestion Games. WINE 2014: 72-88 - 2013
- [c4]Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Gagan Goel:
Positive results for mechanism design without money. AAMAS 2013: 1165-1166 - [c3]Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Gagan Goel:
Mechanism design for fair division: allocating divisible items without payments. EC 2013: 251-268 - 2011
- [c2]Richard Cole, José R. Correa, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Neil Olver:
Inner product spaces for MinSum coordination mechanisms. STOC 2011: 539-548 - 2009
- [c1]Dimitris Fotakis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexis C. Kaporis, Paul G. Spirakis:
The Impact of Social Ignorance on Weighted Congestion Games. WINE 2009: 316-327
Informal and Other Publications
- 2024
- [i31]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan:
Clock Auctions Augmented with Unreliable Advice. CoRR abs/2408.06483 (2024) - [i30]Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Golnoosh Shahkarami:
Randomized Strategic Facility Location with Predictions. CoRR abs/2409.07142 (2024) - [i29]Kshitij Kayastha, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Shahin Jabbari:
Learning-Augmented Robust Algorithmic Recourse. CoRR abs/2410.01580 (2024) - 2023
- [i28]Marius Garbea, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan:
EFx Budget-Feasible Allocations with High Nash Welfare. CoRR abs/2305.02280 (2023) - [i27]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian, Nisarg Shah:
Best of Both Distortion Worlds. CoRR abs/2305.19453 (2023) - [i26]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan, Paritosh Verma:
Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division. CoRR abs/2306.02040 (2023) - [i25]Ben Berger, Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan:
Optimal Metric Distortion with Predictions. CoRR abs/2307.07495 (2023) - [i24]Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan, Cherlin Zhu:
Online Mechanism Design with Predictions. CoRR abs/2310.02879 (2023) - 2022
- [i23]Ioannis Caragiannis, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Daniel Schoepflin:
Beyond Cake Cutting: Allocating Homogeneous Divisible Goods. CoRR abs/2201.04662 (2022) - [i22]Michal Feldman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Nick Gravin, Daniel Schoepflin:
Bayesian and Randomized Clock Auctions. CoRR abs/2202.09291 (2022) - [i21]Priyank Agrawal, Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Tingting Ou, Xizhi Tan:
Learning-Augmented Mechanism Design: Leveraging Predictions for Facility Location. CoRR abs/2204.01120 (2022) - [i20]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kostas Kollias, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Xizhi Tan:
Improved Price of Anarchy via Predictions. CoRR abs/2205.04252 (2022) - [i19]Eric Balkanski, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Xizhi Tan:
Strategyproof Scheduling with Predictions. CoRR abs/2209.04058 (2022) - [i18]Rachel Cummings, Hadi Elzayn, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Juba Ziani:
Optimal Data Acquisition with Privacy-Aware Agents. CoRR abs/2209.06340 (2022) - [i17]Siddhartha Banerjee, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Safwan Hossain, Billy Jin, Evi Micha, Nisarg Shah:
Proportionally Fair Online Allocation of Public Goods with Predictions. CoRR abs/2209.15305 (2022) - 2021
- [i16]Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin:
PROPm Allocations of Indivisible Goods to Multiple Agents. CoRR abs/2105.11348 (2021) - [i15]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Alkmini Sgouritsa:
Resource-Aware Cost-Sharing Mechanisms with Priors. CoRR abs/2106.01588 (2021) - [i14]Eric Balkanski, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin, Xizhi Tan:
Deterministic Budget-Feasible Clock Auctions. CoRR abs/2107.09239 (2021) - [i13]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Rishi Patel, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Daniel Schoepflin:
Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent Values. CoRR abs/2107.09247 (2021) - 2020
- [i12]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Halpern, Nisarg Shah:
Resolving the Optimal Metric Distortion Conjecture. CoRR abs/2004.07447 (2020) - [i11]George Christodoulou, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Mohamad Latifian, Alkmini Sgouritsa:
Resource-Aware Protocols for Network Cost-Sharing Games. CoRR abs/2007.03751 (2020) - [i10]Artur Gorokh, Siddhartha Banerjee, Billy Jin, Vasilis Gkatzelis:
Online Nash Social Welfare via Promised Utilities. CoRR abs/2008.03564 (2020) - [i9]Artem Baklanov, Pranav Garimidi, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Daniel Schoepflin:
Achieving Proportionality up to the Maximin Item with Indivisible Goods. CoRR abs/2009.09508 (2020) - [i8]Vasilis Gkatzelis, Alexandros Psomas, Xizhi Tan:
Fair and Efficient Online Allocations with Normalized Valuations. CoRR abs/2009.12405 (2020) - 2019
- [i7]Rediet Abebe, Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Jason D. Hartline:
A Truthful Cardinal Mechanism for One-Sided Matching. CoRR abs/1903.07797 (2019) - [i6]Ke Yang, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Julia Stoyanovich:
Balanced Ranking with Diversity Constraints. CoRR abs/1906.01747 (2019) - 2016
- [i5]Simina Brânzei, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Ruta Mehta:
Nash Social Welfare Approximation for Strategic Agents. CoRR abs/1607.01569 (2016) - [i4]Richard Cole, Nikhil R. Devanur, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Kamal Jain, Tung Mai, Vijay V. Vazirani, Sadra Yazdanbod:
Convex Program Duality, Fisher Markets, and Nash Social Welfare. CoRR abs/1609.06654 (2016) - 2012
- [i3]Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Gagan Goel:
Truthful Mechanisms for Proportionally Fair Allocations. CoRR abs/1203.4627 (2012) - [i2]Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Gagan Goel:
Mechanism Design for Fair Division. CoRR abs/1212.1522 (2012) - 2010
- [i1]Richard Cole, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Vahab S. Mirrokni:
Coordination Mechanisms for Weighted Sum of Completion Times in Machine Scheduling. CoRR abs/1010.1886 (2010)
Coauthor Index
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