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ORCID12th ACM-EC 2011: San Jose, CA, USA
- Yoav Shoham, Yan Chen, Tim Roughgarden:
Proceedings 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2011), San Jose, CA, USA, June 5-9, 2011. ACM 2011, ISBN 978-1-4503-0261-6
Network externalities
- Larry Blume, David A. Easley, Jon M. Kleinberg, Robert D. Kleinberg, Éva Tardos:
Network formation in the presence of contagious risk. 1-10 - Nima Haghpanah, Nicole Immorlica, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Kamesh Munagala:
Optimal auctions with positive network externalities. 11-20 - Daniel P. Enemark, Mathew D. McCubbins
, Ramamohan Paturi, Nicholas Weller:
Does more connectivity help groups to solve social problems. 21-26
Online mechanisms
- Santiago R. Balseiro, Jon Feldman, Vahab S. Mirrokni, S. Muthukrishnan:
Yield optimization of display advertising with ad exchange. 27-28 - Nikhil R. Devanur, Kamal Jain, Balasubramanian Sivan, Christopher A. Wilkens:
Near optimal online algorithms and fast approximation algorithms for resource allocation problems. 29-38 - Ravi Kumar, Silvio Lattanzi, Sergei Vassilvitskii, Andrea Vattani:
Hiring a secretary from a poset. 39-48
Sponsored search
- Daniel G. Goldstein, R. Preston McAfee, Siddharth Suri:
The effects of exposure time on memory of display advertisements. 49-58 - Michael Ostrovsky, Michael Schwarz:
Reserve prices in internet advertising auctions: a field experiment. 59-60 - Furcy Pin, Peter B. Key:
Stochastic variability in sponsored search auctions: observations and models. 61-70 - Brendan Lucier, Renato Paes Leme:
GSP auctions with correlated types. 71-80 - Ioannis Caragiannis, Christos Kaklamanis, Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Maria Kyropoulou:
On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions. 81-90 - Peerapong Dhangwatnotai:
Multi-keyword sponsored search. 91-100
Complexity and equilibria
- Federico Echenique, Daniel Golovin, Adam Wierman:
A revealed preference approach to computational complexity in economics. 101-110 - Michele Budinich, Lance Fortnow:
Repeated matching pennies with limited randomness. 111-118 - Albert Xin Jiang, Kevin Leyton-Brown:
Polynomial-time computation of exact correlated equilibrium in compact games. 119-126 - Benjamin E. Birnbaum, Nikhil R. Devanur, Lin Xiao:
Distributed algorithms via gradient descent for fisher markets. 127-136 - Christos H. Papadimitriou, Christopher A. Wilkens:
Economies with non-convex production and complexity equilibria. 137-146
Social networks
- Pranav Dandekar, Ashish Goel, Ramesh Govindan, Ian Post:
Liquidity in credit networks: a little trust goes a long way. 147-156 - Stephen Guo, Mengqiu Wang, Jure Leskovec:
The role of social networks in online shopping: information passing, price of trust, and consumer choice. 157-166 - Arpita Ghosh, Satyen Kale, R. Preston McAfee:
Who moderates the moderators?: crowdsourcing abuse detection in user-generated content. 167-176
Ranking, voting, and attribution
- Yi Sun, Mukund Sundararajan:
Axiomatic attribution for multilinear functions. 177-178 - Lirong Xia, Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang:
Strategic sequential voting in multi-issue domains and multiple-election paradoxes. 179-188 - Arpita Ghosh, Patrick Hummel:
A game-theoretic analysis of rank-order mechanisms for user-generated content. 189-198
New directions in mechanism design
- Arpita Ghosh, Aaron Roth:
Selling privacy at auction. 199-208 - Yuval Emek, Ron Karidi, Moshe Tennenholtz, Aviv Zohar:
Mechanisms for multi-level marketing. 209-218 - Scott Duke Kominers, E. Glen Weyl:
Concordance among holdouts: extended abstract. 219-220 - Moshe Babaioff, Liad Blumrosen, Nicolas S. Lambert, Omer Reingold:
Only valuable experts can be valued. 221-222 - Amos Fiat, Stefano Leonardi, Jared Saia, Piotr Sankowski:
Single valued combinatorial auctions with budgets. 223-232
Approximation in mechanism design
- Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
Multi-unit auctions: beyond roberts. 233-242 - Jason D. Hartline, Qiqi Yan:
Envy, truth, and profit. 243-252 - Shuchi Chawla, David L. Malec, Azarakhsh Malekian:
Bayesian mechanism design for budget-constrained agents. 253-262 - Shaddin Dughmi:
A truthful randomized mechanism for combinatorial public projects via convex optimization. 263-272 - Shahar Dobzinski, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Yaron Singer:
Mechanisms for complement-free procurement. 273-282
Mechanisms with near-optimal equilibria
- Ruben Juarez, Rajnish Kumar:
Implementing efficient graphs in connection networks. 283-284 - Philipp von Falkenhausen, Tobias Harks:
Optimal cost sharing protocols for scheduling games. 285-294 - Avinatan Hassidim, Haim Kaplan, Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan:
Non-price equilibria in markets of discrete goods. 295-296
Market-making and computational finance
- Jacob D. Abernethy, Yiling Chen, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan:
An optimization-based framework for automated market-making. 297-306 - Tanmoy Chakraborty, Michael J. Kearns:
Market making and mean reversion. 307-314 - David Zuckerman:
Pseudorandom financial derivatives. 315-320
Matching
- Itai Ashlagi, Alvin E. Roth:
Individual rationality and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange. 321-322 - Panagiotis Toulis, David C. Parkes:
A random graph model of kidney exchanges: efficiency, individual-rationality and incentives. 323-332 - Eduardo M. Azevedo, Jacob D. Leshno:
The college admissions problem with a continuum of students. 333-334 - Itai Ashlagi, Mark Braverman, Avinatan Hassidim:
Matching with couples revisited. 335-336 - John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers:
Multilateral matching. 337-338
Novel equilibrium analyses
- Krishnamurthy Iyer, Ramesh Johari, Mukund Sundararajan:
Mean field equilibria of dynamic auctions with learning. 339-340 - Paul Dütting, Felix A. Fischer, David C. Parkes:
Simplicity-expressiveness tradeoffs in mechanism design. 341-350 - Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira, Gregory Valiant, Aviv Zohar:
Best-response auctions. 351-360 - Changrong Deng, Sasa Pekec:
Money for nothing: exploiting negative externalities. 361-370 - Hamid Nazerzadeh, Georgia Perakis:
Menu pricing competition and a common agency with informed principals. 371-372
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