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Semantic ScholarGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 72
Volume 72, Number 1, May 2011
Gagan Aggarwal, Amos Fiat, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Nicole Immorlica, Madhu Sudan:
Derandomization of auctions. 1-11- Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal:
Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders. 38-45 - Alessandra Casella:
Agenda control as a cheap talk game: Theory and experiments with Storable Votes. 46-76 - Drew Fudenberg, Wojciech Olszewski:
Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal. 86-99 - Thomas A. Gresik:
The effects of statistically dependent values on equilibrium strategies of bilateral k-double auctions. 139-148 - Masahiro Kumabe, H. Reiju Mihara:
Preference aggregation theory without acyclicity: The core without majority dissatisfaction. 187-201 - Vlad Mares, Jeroen M. Swinkels:
Near-optimality of second price mechanisms in a class of asymmetric auctions. 218-241 - Jonathan Weinstein, Muhamet Yildiz:
Sensitivity of equilibrium behavior to higher-order beliefs in nice games. 288-300
- Toshihiro Matsumura, Noriaki Matsushima:
Collusion, agglomeration, and heterogeneity of firms. 306-313 - Hervé Moulin, Francois Laigret:
Equal-need sharing of a network under connectivity constraints. 314-320
Volume 72, Number 2, June 2011
- Mariana Blanco, Dirk Engelmann, Hans-Theo Normann:
A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences. 321-338 - Gary Charness, Ninghua Du, Chun-Lei Yang:
Trust and trustworthiness reputations in an investment game. 361-375 - Francesco Feri, Anita Gantner:
Bargaining or searching for a better price? - An experimental study. 376-399 - Daniel Granot, Herbert Hamers, Jeroen Kuipers, Michael Maschler:
On Chinese postman games where residents of each road pay the cost of their road. 427-438 - Iñigo Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Giovanni Ponti, Josefa Tomás, Luis Ubeda:
Framing effects in public goods: Prospect Theory and experimental evidence. 439-447 - Maciej H. Kotowski:
Auction choice for ambiguity-averse sellers facing strategic uncertainty: Comment. 448-451 - Christoph Kuzmics:
On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations. 452-466 - Rebecca B. Morton, Jean-Robert Tyran:
Let the experts decide? Asymmetric information, abstention, and coordination in standing committees. 485-509 - Quazi Shahriar, John Wooders:
An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values. 558-573 - Artyom Shneyerov, Adam Chi Leung Wong:
Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable. 574-582
- Maarten C. W. Janssen, Vladimir A. Karamychev, Emiel Maasland:
Auctions with flexible entry fees: A note. 594-601
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