"Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the ..."

Lucas Rentschler, Theodore L. Turocy (2016)

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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2016.02.005

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2020-02-24

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Lucas Rentschler, Theodore L. Turocy:
Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case. J. Econ. Theory 163: 435-466 (2016)

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