"Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems."

Lars Ehlers, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken (2004)

> Home

Details and statistics

DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2003.10.004

access: closed

type: Journal Article

metadata version: 2024-08-26

- view
  - electronic edition via DOI
  - unpaywalled version
  authority control:
- export record
  dblp key:
  - journals/geb/EhlersPS04
- ask others
- share record
  persistent URL:
  - https://dblp.org/rec/journals/geb/EhlersPS04
Lars Ehlers, Hans Peters, Ton Storcken:
Threshold strategy-proofness: on manipulability in large voting problems. Games Econ. Behav. 49(1): 103-116 (2004)

manage site settings

To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.