"Auction designs to increase incentive compatibility and reduce ..."

Conleigh Byers, Brent Eldridge (2022)

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DOI: 10.48550/ARXIV.2212.10234

access: open

type: Informal or Other Publication

metadata version: 2023-01-02

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  - journals/corr/abs-2212-10234
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  - https://dblp.org/rec/journals/corr/abs-2212-10234
Conleigh Byers, Brent Eldridge:
Auction designs to increase incentive compatibility and reduce self-scheduling in electricity markets. CoRR abs/2212.10234 (2022)

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