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ORCIDErel Segal-Halevi
Erel Segal-haLevi
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- affiliation: Ariel University, Israel
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2020 – today
- 2024
[j34]Mithun Chakraborty
, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items Revisited. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 12(3): 9:1-9:45 (2024)- [c35]Zsuzsanna Jankó, Attila Joó, Erel Segal-Halevi, Sheung Man Yuen:
On Connected Strongly-Proportional Cake-Cutting. ECAI 2024: 3356-3363 - [c34]Samuel Bismuth, Vladislav Makarov, Erel Segal-Halevi, Dana Shapira:
Partitioning Problems with Splittings and Interval Targets. ISAAC 2024: 12:1-12:15 - [c33]Samuel Bismuth, Ivan Bliznets, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Fair Division with Bounded Sharing: Binary and Non-degenerate Valuations. SAGT 2024: 89-107 - [c32]Dinesh Kumar Baghel, Alex Ravsky, Erel Segal-Halevi:
k-Times Bin Packing and its Application to Fair Electricity Distribution. SAGT 2024: 483-500 - [i54]Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Optimal Budget Aggregation with Single-Peaked Preferences. CoRR abs/2402.15904 (2024) - [i53]Eden Hartman, Yonatan Aumann, Avinatan Hassidim, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Reducing Leximin Fairness to Utilitarian Optimization. CoRR abs/2409.10395 (2024) - 2023
- [j33]Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Ascending-price mechanism for general multi-sided markets. Artif. Intell. 325: 104022 (2023) - [j32]Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Keep your distance: Land division with separation. Comput. Geom. 113: 102006 (2023) - [j31]Haris Aziz, Xin Huang, Nicholas Mattei, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Computing welfare-Maximizing fair allocations of indivisible goods. Eur. J. Oper. Res. 307(2): 773-784 (2023) - [j30]Sophie Bade, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Fairness for multi-self agents. Games Econ. Behav. 141: 321-336 (2023) - [j29]Pasin Manurangsi, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
On maximum bipartite matching with separation. Inf. Process. Lett. 182: 106388 (2023) - [j28]Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi:
On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 76: 567-611 (2023) - [j27]Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Cutting a Cake Fairly for Groups Revisited. Am. Math. Mon. 130(3): 203-213 (2023) - [c31]Hila Shoshan, Noam Hazon, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Efficient Nearly-Fair Division with Capacity Constraints. AAMAS 2023: 206-214 - [c30]Eden Hartman, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Leximin Approximation: From Single-Objective to Multi-Objective. ECAI 2023: 996-1003 - [c29]Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods (Extended Abstract). IJCAI 2023: 6894-6899 - [c28]Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Balanced Donor Coordination. EC 2023: 299 - [c27]Xin Huang, Erel Segal-Halevi:
A Reduction from Chores Allocation to Job Scheduling. EC 2023: 908 - [i52]Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Cutting a Cake Fairly for Groups Revisited. CoRR abs/2301.09061 (2023) - [i51]Xin Huang, Erel Segal-Halevi:
A Reduction from Chores Allocation to Job Scheduling. CoRR abs/2302.04581 (2023) - [i50]Pasin Manurangsi, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
On Maximum Bipartite Matching with Separation. CoRR abs/2303.02283 (2023) - [i49]Eden Hartman, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Leximin Approximation: From Single-Objective to Multi-Objective. CoRR abs/2303.12506 (2023) - [i48]Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Balanced Donor Coordination. CoRR abs/2305.10286 (2023) - [i47]Israel Jacobovich, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Efficient Almost-Egalitarian Allocation of Goods and Bads. CoRR abs/2308.15199 (2023) - [i46]Chester Lawrence, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Computing approximate roots of monotone functions. CoRR abs/2310.07333 (2023) - [i45]Dinesh Kumar Baghel, Erel Segal-Halevi:
k-times bin packing and its application to fair electricity distribution. CoRR abs/2311.16742 (2023) - [i44]Zsuzsanna Jankó, Attila Joó, Erel Segal-Halevi:
On Connected Strongly-Proportional Cake-Cutting. CoRR abs/2312.15326 (2023) - 2022
- [j26]Erel Segal-Halevi:
Redividing the cake. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 36(1): 14 (2022) - [j25]Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Mind the gap: Cake cutting with separation. Artif. Intell. 313: 103783 (2022) - [j24]Ron Aharoni, Eli Berger, Joseph Briggs, Erel Segal-Halevi, Shira Zerbib:
Fractionally Balanced Hypergraphs and Rainbow KKM Theorems. Comb. 42(6): 913-951 (2022) - [j23]Maria Kyropoulou, Josué Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Fair cake-cutting in practice. Games Econ. Behav. 133: 28-49 (2022) - [j22]Fedor Sandomirskiy, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Efficient Fair Division with Minimal Sharing. Oper. Res. 70(3): 1762-1782 (2022) - [j21]Elad Aigner-Horev, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Envy-free matchings in bipartite graphs and their applications to fair division. Inf. Sci. 587: 164-187 (2022) - [j20]Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 74 (2022) - [j19]Roy Baharad, Shmuel Nitzan, Erel Segal-Halevi:
One person, one weight: when is weighted voting democratic? Soc. Choice Welf. 59(2): 467-493 (2022) - [j18]Josué Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Obvious manipulations in cake-cutting. Soc. Choice Welf. 59(4): 969-988 (2022) - [j17]Erel Segal-Halevi:
Generalized Rental Harmony. Am. Math. Mon. 129(5): 403-414 (2022) - [c26]Mithun Chakraborty, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items Revisited. AAAI 2022: 4949-4956 - [c25]Simina Brânzei, Erel Segal-Halevi, Aviv Zohar:
How to Charge Lightning: The Economics of Bitcoin Transaction Channels. Allerton 2022: 1-8 - [c24]Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Chores. AAMAS 2022: 597-605 - [i43]Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Chores. CoRR abs/2201.07424 (2022) - [i42]Samuel Bismuth, Vladislav Makarov, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Partitioning Problems with Splitting and Interval Targets. CoRR abs/2204.11753 (2022) - [i41]Hila Shoshan, Erel Segal-Halevi, Noam Hazon:
Efficient Nearly-Fair Division with Capacity Constraints. CoRR abs/2205.07779 (2022) - [i40]Dinesh Kumar Baghel, Vadim E. Levit, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Fair Division Algorithms for Electricity Distribution. CoRR abs/2205.14531 (2022) - 2021
- [j16]Itay Shtechman, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Fair cake-cutting algorithms with real land-value data. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 35(2): 39 (2021) - [j15]Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Strongly budget balanced auctions for multi-sided markets. Artif. Intell. 300: 103548 (2021) - [j14]Erel Segal-Halevi:
Fair multi-cake cutting. Discret. Appl. Math. 291: 15-35 (2021) - [j13]Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
How to Cut a Cake Fairly: A Generalization to Groups. Am. Math. Mon. 128(1): 79-83 (2021) - [c23]Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi:
On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. AAAI 2021: 5312-5320 - [c22]Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Mind the Gap: Cake Cutting With Separation. AAAI 2021: 5330-5338 - [c21]Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi:
A Global Multi-Sided Market with Ascending-Price Mechanism. AAMAS 2021: 1515-1517 - [c20]Dvir Gilor, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Ascending-Price Mechanism for General Multi-sided Markets. EUMAS 2021: 1-18 - [c19]Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Graphical Cake Cutting via Maximin Share. IJCAI 2021: 161-167 - [c18]Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Keep Your Distance: Land Division With Separation. IJCAI 2021: 168-174 - [i39]Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Graphical Cake Cutting via Maximin Share. CoRR abs/2105.04755 (2021) - [i38]Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Keep Your Distance: Land Division With Separation. CoRR abs/2105.06669 (2021) - [i37]Hadi Hosseini, Andrew Searns, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods. CoRR abs/2109.01925 (2021) - [i36]Erel Segal-Halevi:
On Monotonicity of Number-Partitioning Algorithms. CoRR abs/2110.08886 (2021) - [i35]Mithun Chakraborty, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Weighted Fairness Notions for Indivisible Items Revisited. CoRR abs/2112.04166 (2021) - 2020
- [j12]Erel Segal-Halevi:
Competitive equilibrium for almost all incomes: existence and fairness. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 34(1): 26 (2020) - [j11]Erel Segal-Halevi, Shani Alkoby, David Sarne:
Obtaining costly unverifiable valuations from a single agent. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 34(2): 46 (2020) - [j10]Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Haris Aziz:
Fair Allocation with Diminishing Differences. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 67: 471-507 (2020) - [j9]Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann:
Envy-Free Division of Land. Math. Oper. Res. 45(3): 896-922 (2020) - [c17]Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets. AAAI 2020: 1998-2005 - [c16]Itay Shtechman, Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Fair Cake-Cutting Algorithms with Real Land-Value Data. AAMAS 2020: 2005-2007 - [i34]Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
How to Cut a Cake Fairly: A Generalization to Groups. CoRR abs/2001.03327 (2020) - [i33]Amitay Dror, Michal Feldman, Erel Segal-Halevi:
On Fair Division under Heterogeneous Matroid Constraints. CoRR abs/2010.07280 (2020) - [i32]Haris Aziz, Xin Huang, Nicholas Mattei, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Computing Fair Utilitarian Allocations of Indivisible Goods. CoRR abs/2012.03979 (2020) - [i31]Edith Elkind, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Mind the Gap: Cake Cutting With Separation. CoRR abs/2012.06682 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j8]Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods. Artif. Intell. 277 (2019) - [j7]Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan:
Fair cake-cutting among families. Soc. Choice Welf. 53(4): 709-740 (2019) - [c15]Erel Segal-Halevi, Shani Alkoby, Tomer Sharbaf, David Sarne:
Obtaining Costly Unverifiable Valuations from a Single Agent. AAMAS 2019: 1216-1224 - [c14]Maria Kyropoulou, Josué Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice. EC 2019: 547-548 - [i30]Erel Segal-Halevi:
Bipartite Envy-Free Matching. CoRR abs/1901.09527 (2019) - [i29]Haris Aziz, Xin Huang, Nicholas Mattei, Erel Segal-Halevi:
The Constrained Round Robin Algorithm for Fair and Efficient Allocation. CoRR abs/1908.00161 (2019) - [i28]Fedor Sandomirskiy, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Fair Division with Minimal Sharing. CoRR abs/1908.01669 (2019) - [i27]Rica Gonen, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets. CoRR abs/1911.08094 (2019) - [i26]Erel Segal-Halevi:
Fair Division with Bounded Sharing. CoRR abs/1912.00459 (2019) - [i25]Erel Segal-Halevi:
The Maximin Share Dominance Relation. CoRR abs/1912.08763 (2019) - [i24]Erel Segal-Halevi:
Quasilinear Rental Harmony. CoRR abs/1912.13249 (2019) - 2018
- [j6]Erel Segal-Halevi, Balázs R. Sziklai:
Resource-monotonicity and population-monotonicity in connected cake-cutting. Math. Soc. Sci. 95: 19-30 (2018) - [j5]Mor Nitzan, Shmuel Nitzan, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Flexible level-1 consensus ensuring stable social choice: analysis and algorithms. Soc. Choice Welf. 50(3): 457-479 (2018) - [j4]Arseniy V. Akopyan, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Counting Blanks in Polygonal Arrangements. SIAM J. Discret. Math. 32(3): 2242-2257 (2018) - [c13]Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann:
MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism. AAAI 2018: 1193-1201 - [c12]Erel Segal-Halevi:
Competitive Equilibrium For almost All Incomes. AAMAS 2018: 1267-1275 - [c11]Erel Segal-Halevi:
Fairly Dividing a Cake after Some Parts Were Burnt in the Oven. AAMAS 2018: 1276-1284 - [c10]Shani Alkoby, David Sarne, Erel Segal-Halevi, Tomer Sharbaf:
Eliciting Truthful Unverifiable Information. AAMAS 2018: 1850-1852 - [c9]Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Democratic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods. IJCAI 2018: 482-488 - [c8]Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann:
Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods. IJCAI 2018: 489-497 - [c7]Erel Segal-Halevi:
Redividing the Cake. IJCAI 2018: 498-504 - [i23]Erel Segal-Halevi:
Cake-Cutting with Different Entitlements: How Many Cuts are Needed? CoRR abs/1803.05470 (2018) - [i22]Shani Alkobi, David Sarne, Erel Segal-Halevi, Tomer Sharbaf:
Making an Appraiser Work for You. CoRR abs/1804.08314 (2018) - [i21]Maria Kyropoulou, Josue Ortega, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Fair Cake-Cutting in Practice. CoRR abs/1810.08243 (2018) - 2017
- [c6]Erel Segal-Halevi, Haris Aziz, Avinatan Hassidim:
Fair Allocation based on Diminishing Differences. IJCAI 2017: 1254-1261 - [i20]Erel Segal-Halevi, Balázs R. Sziklai:
Resource-monotonicity and Population-monotonicity in Connected Cake-cutting. CoRR abs/1703.08928 (2017) - [i19]Erel Segal-Halevi:
Cutting a Cake with both Good and Bad Parts. CoRR abs/1704.00726 (2017) - [i18]Mor Nitzan, Shmuel Nitzan, Erel Segal-Halevi:
On Level-1 Consensus Ensuring Stable Social Choice. CoRR abs/1704.06037 (2017) - [i17]Erel Segal-Halevi:
Competitive Equilibria with Indivisible Goods and Generic Budgets: Settling the Open Cases. CoRR abs/1705.04212 (2017) - [i16]Erel Segal-Halevi, Haris Aziz, Avinatan Hassidim:
Fair Allocation based on Diminishing Differences. CoRR abs/1705.07993 (2017) - [i15]Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
On Democratic Fairness for Groups of Agents. CoRR abs/1709.02564 (2017) - [i14]Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim:
Truthful Bilateral Trade is Impossible even with Fixed Prices. CoRR abs/1711.08057 (2017) - [i13]Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann:
MUDA: A Truthful Multi-Unit Double-Auction Mechanism. CoRR abs/1712.06848 (2017) - [i12]Simina Brânzei, Erel Segal-Halevi, Aviv Zohar:
How to Charge Lightning. CoRR abs/1712.10222 (2017) - 2016
- [j3]Avi Rosenfeld, Inon Zuckerman, Erel Segal-Halevi, Osnat Drein, Sarit Kraus:
NegoChat-A: a chat-based negotiation agent with bounded rationality. Auton. Agents Multi Agent Syst. 30(1): 60-81 (2016) - [j2]Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann:
Demand-flow of agents with gross-substitute valuations. Oper. Res. Lett. 44(6): 757-760 (2016) - [j1]Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann:
Waste Makes Haste: Bounded Time Algorithms for Envy-Free Cake Cutting with Free Disposal. ACM Trans. Algorithms 13(1): 12:1-12:32 (2016) - [c5]Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann:
SBBA: A Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism. SAGT 2016: 260-272 - [i11]Erel Segal-Halevi:
How to Re-Divide a Cake Fairly. CoRR abs/1603.00286 (2016) - [i10]Erel Segal-Halevi:
Cutting a Cake without Harming the Toppings. CoRR abs/1604.00960 (2016) - [i9]Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann:
A Random-Sampling Double-Auction Mechanism. CoRR abs/1604.06210 (2016) - [i8]Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann:
Demand-Flow of Agents with Gross-Substitute Valuations. CoRR abs/1607.01989 (2016) - [i7]Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann:
SBBA: a Strongly-Budget-Balanced Double-Auction Mechanism. CoRR abs/1607.05139 (2016) - [i6]Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann:
Envy-Free Cake-Cutting in Two Dimensions. CoRR abs/1609.03938 (2016) - 2015
- [c4]Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann:
Envy-Free Cake-Cutting in Two Dimensions. AAAI 2015: 1021-1028 - [c3]Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann:
Waste Makes Haste: Bounded Time Protocols for Envy-Free Cake Cutting with Free Disposal. AAMAS 2015: 901-908 - [p1]Inon Zuckerman, Erel Segal-Halevi, Avi Rosenfeld, Sarit Kraus:
First Steps in Chat-Based Negotiating Agents. Next Frontier in Agent-Based Complex Automated Negotiation 2015: 89-109 - [i5]Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann:
Fair and Square: Cake-Cutting in Two Dimensions. CoRR abs/1510.03170 (2015) - [i4]Erel Segal-Halevi, Shmuel Nitzan:
Fair Cake-Cutting among Groups. CoRR abs/1510.03903 (2015) - [i3]Balázs R. Sziklai, Erel Segal-Halevi:
Resource-monotonicity and Population-monotonicity in Cake-cutting. CoRR abs/1510.05229 (2015) - [i2]Erel Segal-Halevi, Avinatan Hassidim, Yonatan Aumann:
Waste Makes Haste: Bounded Time Protocols for Envy-Free Cake Cutting with Free Disposal. CoRR abs/1511.02599 (2015) - 2014
- [c2]Avi Rosenfeld, Inon Zuckerman, Erel Segal-Halevi, Osnat Drein, Sarit Kraus:
NegoChat: a chat-based negotiation agent. AAMAS 2014: 525-532 - 2013
- [c1]Eyal Shnarch, Erel Segal-haLevi, Jacob Goldberger, Ido Dagan:
PLIS: a Probabilistic Lexical Inference System. ACL (Conference System Demonstrations) 2013: 97-102 - 2012
- [i1]Ofer Bronstein, Erel Segal-haLevi:
Using Textual Entailment with Variables for KBP Slot Filling Task. TAC 2012
Coauthor Index
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