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ORCIDACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Volume 4
Volume 4, Number 1, December 2015
- Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Ingmar Weber:
An Expressive Mechanism for Auctions on the Web. 1:1-1:34 - Riccardo Colini-Baldeschi, Stefano Leonardi, Monika Henzinger
, Martin Starnberger:
On Multiple Keyword Sponsored Search Auctions with Budgets. 2:1-2:34 - Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb, Avinatan Hassidim:
Auctioning Time: Truthful Auctions of Heterogeneous Divisible Goods. 3:1-3:16 - Paul Dütting, Monika Henzinger, Martin Starnberger:
Auctions for Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits. 4:1-4:17 - Noga Alon, Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Stefan Kratsch, Rolf Niedermeier, Gerhard J. Woeginger:
How to Put Through Your Agenda in Collective Binary Decisions. 5:1-5:28 - Daniel Fragiadakis, Atsushi Iwasaki, Peter Troyan, Suguru Ueda, Makoto Yokoo:
Strategyproof Matching with Minimum Quotas. 6:1-6:40
Volume 4, Number 2, February 2016
- Moshe Babaioff, Moran Feldman, Moshe Tennenholtz:
Mechanism Design with Strategic Mediators. 7:1-7:48 - Tim Roughgarden, Okke Schrijvers:
Network Cost-Sharing without Anonymity. 8:1-8:24 - George Christodoulou, Annamária Kovács, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Bo Tang:
Tight Bounds for the Price of Anarchy of Simultaneous First-Price Auctions. 9:1-9:33 - George Christodoulou, Martin Gairing:
Price of Stability in Polynomial Congestion Games. 10:1-10:17 - Martin Hoefer, Thomas Kesselheim, Berthold Vöcking:
Truthfulness and Stochastic Dominance with Monetary Transfers. 11:1-11:18
Volume 4, Number 3, June 2016
- R. Preston McAfee, Éva Tardos:
Introduction. 12:1 - Yiling Chen, Stephen Chong, Ian A. Kash, Tal Moran, Salil P. Vadhan:
Truthful Mechanisms for Agents That Value Privacy. 13:1-13:30 - Nikhil R. Devanur, Zhiyi Huang, Nitish Korula, Vahab S. Mirrokni, Qiqi Yan:
Whole-Page Optimization and Submodular Welfare Maximization with Online Bidders. 14:1-14:20 - Ioannis Caragiannis, Ariel D. Procaccia, Nisarg Shah:
When Do Noisy Votes Reveal the Truth? 15:1-15:30 - David A. Easley, Arpita Ghosh:
Incentives, Gamification, and Game Theory: An Economic Approach to Badge Design. 16:1-16:26 - Ben Roberts, Dinan Gunawardena, Ian A. Kash, Peter B. Key:
Ranking and Tradeoffs in Sponsored Search Auctions. 17:1-17:21 - Tim Roughgarden, Inbal Talgam-Cohen:
Optimal and Robust Mechanism Design with Interdependent Values. 18:1-18:34
Volume 4, Number 4, August 2016
- Vincent Conitzer, David A. Easley:
Introduction to the Special Issue on EC'14. 19:1 - Abraham Othman, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Aviad Rubinstein:
The Complexity of Fairness Through Equilibrium. 20:1-20:19 - Avinatan Hassidim, Yishay Mansour, Shai Vardi:
Local Computation Mechanism Design. 21:1-21:24 - Arpita Ghosh, Robert D. Kleinberg:
Optimal Contest Design for Simple Agents. 22:1-22:41 - Drew Fudenberg, Alexander Peysakhovich:
Recency, Records, and Recaps: Learning and Nonequilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem. 23:1-23:18 - Paul W. Goldberg, Aaron Roth:
Bounds for the Query Complexity of Approximate Equilibria. 24:1-24:25 - John Fearnley, Rahul Savani:
Finding Approximate Nash Equilibria of Bimatrix Games via Payoff Queries. 25:1-25:19
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