Synthese, Volume 189

Volume 189, Number 1, November 2012

Propositions and Same-Saying

• 
  Rachael Briggs, Mark Jago:
  Propositions and same-saying: introduction. 1-10
• 
  Rachael Briggs:
  Truthmaking without necessitation. 11-28
• 
  Kit Fine:
  A difficulty for the possible worlds analysis of counterfactuals. 29-57
• 
  Mark Jago:
  Constructing worlds. 59-74
• 
  Brian Rabern:
  Against the identification of assertoric content with compositional value. 75-96
• 
  David Ripley:
  Structures and circumstances: two ways to fine-grain propositions. 97-118
• 
  Jonathan Schaffer:
  Necessitarian propositions. 119-162
• 
  Susanna Schellenberg:
  Sameness of Fregean sense. 163-175
• 
  Laura Schroeter:
  Bootstrapping our way to samesaying. 177-197
• 
  Clas Weber:
  Eternalism and Propositional Multitasking: in defence of the Operator Argument. 199-219

Volume 189, Number 2, November 2012

Skepticism and Justification

• 
  Annalisa Coliva, Sebastiano Moruzzi, Giorgio Volpe:
  Introduction. 221-234
• 
  Annalisa Coliva:
  Varieties of failure (of warrant transmission: what else?!). 235-254
• 
  Duncan Pritchard:
  Wittgenstein and the groundlessness of our believing. 255-272
• 
  Ralph Wedgwood:
  Justified inference. 273-295
• 
  Yuval Avnur:
  Mere faith and entitlement. 297-315
• 
  Giorgio Volpe:
  Cornerstones: You'd better believe them. 317-336
• 
  Dylan Dodd:
  Evidentialism and skeptical arguments. 337-352
• 
  Alan Millar:
  Scepticism, perceptual knowledge, and doxastic responsibility. 353-372
• 
  Mikkel Gerken:
  Discursive justification and skepticism. 373-394
• 
  Jesper Kallestrup:
  Bootstrap and rollback: generalizing epistemic circularity. 395-413

Volume 189, Number 3, December 2012

Neuroscience and its Philosophy

• 
  Holly Andersen:
  The case for regularity in mechanistic causal explanation. 415-432
• 
  Brandon Towl:
  Laws and constrained kinds: a lesson from motor neuroscience. 433-450
• 
  Justin Garson:
  Function, selection, and construction in the brain. 451-481
• 
  Mitchell Herschbach:
  Mirroring versus simulation: on the representational function of simulation. 483-513
• 
  Shannon Spaulding:
  Mirror neurons are not evidence for the Simulation Theory. 515-534
• 
  Carolyn Dicey Jennings:
  The subject of attention. 535-554

Volume 189, Number Supplement-1, December 2012

Psychological models of (ir)rationality and decision making

• 
  Cilia Witteman, Wiebe van der Hoek:
  Introduction chapter. 1-3
• 
  Mark Alfano:
  Wilde heuristics and Rum Tum Tuggers: preference indeterminacy and instability. 5-15
• 
  York Hagmayer, Magda Osman:
  From colliding billiard balls to colluding desperate housewives: causal Bayes nets as rational models of everyday causal reasoning. 17-28
• 
  Adam J. L. Harris, Magda Osman:
  The illusion of control: A Bayesian perspective. 29-38
• 
  Shira Elqayam:
  Grounded rationality: Descriptivism in epistemic context. 39-49
• 
  Marija Slavkovik, Guido Boella:
  Recognition-primed group decisions via judgement aggregation. 51-65
• 
  Jared M. Hotaling, Jerome R. Busemeyer:
  DFT-D: a cognitive-dynamical model of dynamic decision making. 67-80
• 
  Avi Rosenfeld, Inon Zuckerman, Amos Azaria, Sarit Kraus:
  Combining psychological models with machine learning to better predict people's decisions. 81-93
• 
  Stephan Dickert, Daniel Västfjäll, Janet Kleber, Paul Slovic:
  Valuations of human lives: normative expectations and psychological mechanisms of (ir)rationality. 95-105
• 
  Jonathan Baron, Burcu Gürçay, Adam B. Moore, Katrin Starcke:
  Use of a Rasch model to predict response times to utilitarian moral dilemmas. 107-117
• 
  Alexander A. Aarts, Cilia Witteman, Pierre M. Souren, Jos I. M. Egger:
  Associations between psychologists' thinking styles and accuracy on a diagnostic classification task. 119-130
• 
  Shahar Ayal, Dan Zakay, Guy Hochman:
  Deliberative adjustments of intuitive anchors: the case of diversification behavior. 131-145
• 
  Marc Jekel, Andreas Glöckner, Susann Fiedler, Arndt Bröder:
  The rationality of different kinds of intuitive decision processes. 147-160
• 
  Mandeep K. Dhami, David R. Mandel:
  Forecasted risk taking in youth: evidence for a bounded-rationality perspective. 161-171
• 
  Jie W. Weiss, David J. Weiss:
  Irrational: at the moment. 173-183
• 
  Cilia Witteman, Wiebe van der Hoek:
  Erratum to: Introduction chapter. 185