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Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 56
Volume 56, Number 1, January 2021
- Jan Sauermann
:
The effects of communication on the occurrence of the tyranny of the majority under voting by veto. 1-20 - Itai Sher
:
Neutral freedom and freedom as control. 21-56 - Moti Michaeli
:
On Measuring Welfare 'Behind a Veil of Ignorance'. 57-66 - Tomoya Tajika
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Polarization and inefficient information aggregation under strategic voting. 67-100 - Adrien Fabre
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Tie-breaking the highest median: alternatives to the majority judgment. 101-124 - Umut Keskin, M. Remzi Sanver, H. Berkay Tosunlu:
Recovering non-monotonicity problems of voting rules. 125-141 - Andrew C. Eggers
:
A diagram for analyzing ordinal voting systems. 143-171 - Parimal Kanti Bag, Bibhas Saha, Shiva Sikdar:
Prejudice, bias and identity neutral policy. 173-203
Volume 56, Number 2, February 2021
- Katsuya Kobayashi
, Hideo Konishi
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Effort complementarity and sharing rules in group contests. 205-221 - Philip D. Grech
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Power in the Council of the EU: organizing theory, a new index, and Brexit. 223-258 - Salvador Barberà
, Walter Bossert
, Kotaro Suzumura:
Daunou's voting rule and the lexicographic assignment of priorities. 259-289 - Masoud Seddighin
, Hamed Saleh, Mohammad Ghodsi:
Maximin share guarantee for goods with positive externalities. 291-324 - Benoit Decerf
:
Combining absolute and relative poverty: income poverty measurement with two poverty lines. 325-362 - Derek J. Clark
, Tore Nilssen:
Competitive balance when winning breeds winners. 363-384 - José Gabriel Castillo
, Zhicheng Phil Xu
, Ping Zhang, Xianchen Zhu:
The effects of centralized power and institutional legitimacy on collective action. 385-419 - Matías Núñez, M. Remzi Sanver:
On the subgame perfect implementabılıty of voting rules. 421-441
Volume 56, Number 3, April 2021
- John Duggan, Jean Guillaume Forand
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Representative Voting Games. 443-466 - Boaz Zik
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Ex-post implementation with social preferences. 467-485 - W. Henry Chiu
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Intersecting Lorenz curves and aversion to inverse downside inequality. 487-508 - René van den Brink
, Dinko Dimitrov
, Agnieszka Rusinowska
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Winning coalitions in plurality voting democracies. 509-530 - Romain Espinosa
, Nicolas Treich
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Animal welfare: antispeciesism, veganism and a "life worth living". 531-548 - Hitoshi Matsushima
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Partial ex-post verifiability and unique implementation of social choice functions. 549-567 - Sascha Kurz
, Issofa Moyouwou, Hilaire Touyem
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Axiomatizations for the Shapley-Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output. 569-594
Volume 56, Number 4, May 2021
- Victoire Girard
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Stabbed in the back? Mandated political representation and murders. 595-634 - Christos N. Mavridis
, Nikolas Tsakas
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Social Capital, Communication Channels and Opinion Formation. 635-678 - Daniel Müller
, Sander Renes
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Fairness views and political preferences: evidence from a large and heterogeneous sample. 679-711 - Domenico Cantone, Alfio Giarlotta
, Stephen Watson:
Choice resolutions. 713-753 - Nikhil Garg, Ashish Goel, Benjamin Plaut
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Markets for public decision-making. 755-801 - Antoinette Baujard
, Herrade Igersheim, Isabelle Lebon:
Some regrettable grading scale effects under different versions of evaluative voting. 803-834 - Burak Can, Mohsen Pourpouneh
, Ton Storcken:
An axiomatic characterization of the Slater rule. 835-853 - Shiran Rachmilevitch
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No individual priorities and the Nash bargaining solution. 855-863
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