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ORCIDMathematical Social Sciences, Volume 50
Volume 50, Number 1, July 2005
- Jean-François Laslier:
Editorial. 1-2 - Rann Smorodinsky
:
Nash's bargaining solution when the disagreement point is random. 3-11 - Walter Bossert, Jean Derks, Hans Peters:
Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games. 12-23 - Hector Chade, Bart Taub:
Stable coalitions in a continuous-time model of risk sharing. 24-38 - Ivan Arribas, Amparo Urbano:
Repeated games with probabilistic horizon. 39-60 - Geir B. Asheim, Ylva Søvik:
Preference-based belief operators. 61-82 - Luba Sapir:
Generalized means of jurors' competencies and marginal changes of jury's size. 83-101 - Theo S. H. Driessen, Holger Ingmar Meinhardt:
Convexity of oligopoly games without transferable technologies. 102-126
Volume 50, Number 2, September 2005
- Ross Cressman:
Stability of the replicator equation with continuous strategy space. 127-147 - Bhaskar Dutta, Rajiv Vohra:
Incomplete information, credibility and the core. 148-165 - Paola Manzini, Clara Ponsati:
Stakeholders in bilateral conflict. 166-180 - Hans Haller, Sudipta Sarangi:
Nash networks with heterogeneous links. 181-201 - Erkut Yusuf Özbay, Emel Filiz:
A representation for intransitive indifference relations. 202-214 - Shinji Ohseto:
Strategy-proof assignment with fair compensation. 215-226 - Alan D. Taylor:
A paradoxical Pareto frontier in the cake-cutting context. 227-233 - Tatiana Damjanovic:
Lorenz dominance for transformed income distributions: A simple proof. 234-237
Volume 50, Number 3, November 2005
- Jens Leth Hougaard, Hans Keiding:
Rawlsian maximin, Dutch books, and non-additive expected utility. 239-251 - Aviad Heifetz, Ady Pauzner:
Backward induction with players who doubt others' faultlessness. 252-267 - Charalambos Christou, Nikolaos Vettas:
Location choices under quality uncertainty. 268-278 - Sjur Didrik Flåm, Guillermo Owen, Martha Saboyá:
The not-quite non-atomic game: Non-emptiness of the core in large production games. 279-297 - Marilda Sotomayor:
An elementary non-constructive proof of the non-emptiness of the core of the Housing Market of Shapley and Scarf. 298-303 - Ipek Özkal-Sanver, M. Remzi Sanver:
Implementing matching rules by type pretension mechanisms. 304-317 - Josep M. Izquierdo, Francesc Llerena, Carles Rafels:
Sequentially compatible payoffs and the core in TU-games. 318-330 - Nikolaos Efstathiou Sofronidis:
Downsian competition with four parties. 331-335 - José Santiago Fajardo:
A note on arbitrage and exogenous collateral. 336-341
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