![](https://dblp.uni-trier.de/img/logo.ua.320x120.png)
![](https://dblp.uni-trier.de/img/dropdown.dark.16x16.png)
![](https://dblp.uni-trier.de/img/peace.dark.16x16.png)
Остановите войну!
for scientists:
![search dblp search dblp](https://dblp.uni-trier.de/img/search.dark.16x16.png)
![search dblp](https://dblp.uni-trier.de/img/search.dark.16x16.png)
default search action
Journal of Philosophical Logic, Volume 14
Volume 14, Number 1, February 1985
- Nino B. Cocchiarella:
Frege's double correlation thesis and quine's set theories NF and ML. 1-39 - Solomon Feferman:
Intensionality in mathematics. 41-55 - Kit Fine:
Natural deduction and arbitrary objects. 57-107
Volume 14, Number 2, May 1985
- Herbert E. Hendry, Michael L. Pokriefka:
Carnapian extensions of S5. 111-128 - Erik C. W. Krabbe:
Noncumulative dialectical models and formal dialectics. 129-168 - Donald Nute:
Permission. 169-190 - Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz:
Intuitionistic truth. 191-228
Volume 14, Number 3, August 1985
- Max J. Cresswell:
The decidable normal modal logics are not recursively enumerable. 231-233 - Steve Giambrone:
TW+ and RW+ are decidable. 235-254 - Timothy McCarthy:
Abstraction and definability in semantically closed structures. 255-266 - James van Aken:
Analysis of quantum probability theory. I. 267-296 - Stephen Yablo:
Truth and reflection. 297-349
Volume 14, Number 4, November 1985
- George Boolos, Giovanni Sambin:
An incomplete system of modal logic. 351-358 - Branislav R. Boricic:
On sequence-conclusion natural deduction systems. 359-377 - Enrico Martino:
On the Brouwerian concept of negative continuity. 379-398 - Vann McGee:
How truthlike can a predicate be? A negative result. 399-410 - R. I. G. Hughes:
Semantic alternatives in partial Boolean quantum logic. 411-446 - Alberto Zanardo:
A finite axiomatization of the set of strongly valid Ockhamist formulas. 447-468
![](https://dblp.uni-trier.de/img/cog.dark.24x24.png)
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.