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ORCIDInternational Journal of Game Theory, Volume 52
Volume 52, Number 1, March 2023
- Minghua Chen, Konstantinos Serfes
, Eleftherios Zacharias:
Prices as signals of product quality in a duopoly. 1-31 - Bingchao Huangfu, Gagan Ghosh, Heng Liu:
Resource inequality in the war of attrition. 33-61 - Gustavo Bergantiños, Adriana Navarro-Ramos:
Cooperative approach to a location problem with agglomeration economies. 63-92 - Jaume García-Segarra, Miguel Ginés-Vilar:
Additive adjudication of conflicting claims. 93-116 - Britta Hoyer, Kris De Jaegher:
Network disruption and the common-enemy effect. 117-155 - In-Koo Cho:
Signaling games with endogenous types. 157-174 - Emin Karagözoglu, Kerim Keskin, Çagri Saglam:
(In)efficiency and equitability of equilibrium outcomes in a family of bargaining games. 175-193 - Fredrik Ødegaard, Charles Zhoucheng Zheng:
Trilateral escalation in the dollar auction. 195-230 - Keisuke Bando, Yakuma Furusawa:
The minimum set of μ-compatible subgames for obtaining a stable set in an assignment game. 231-252 - Christian Trudeau:
Minimum cost spanning tree problems as value sharing problems. 253-272 - Tami Tamir:
Cost-sharing games in real-time scheduling systems. 273-301 - Jingfeng Lu, Zhewei Wang, Lixue Zhou:
Nested Tullock contests with nonmonotone prizes. 303-332
Volume 52, Number 2, June 2023
- Özer Selçuk, Takamasa Suzuki:
Comparable axiomatizations of the average tree solution and the Myerson value. 333-362 - Alejandro Francetich:
When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships. 363-399 - Xin Feng:
Information disclosure in all-pay contests with costly entry. 401-421 - Olivier Bos, Tom Truyts:
Entry in first-price auctions with signaling. 423-450 - Erfang Shan:
Marginality and a Characterization of the Owen Graph value. 451-461 - Arnold Polanski, Mark Le Quement:
The battle of opinion: dynamic information revelation by ideological senders. 463-483 - Takaomi Notsu:
Collusion with capacity constraints under a sales maximization rationing rule. 485-516 - Takuma Wakayama, Takehiko Yamato:
Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation. 517-553 - Sebastián D. Bauer:
Buyers' welfare maximizing auction design. 555-567 - R. A. Edwards, R. R. Routledge:
Existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibrium in discontinuous Bertrand games: a complete characterization. 569-586 - Aner Sela:
All-pay matching contests. 587-606 - Kuninori Nakagawa:
Horizontal product differentiation in Varian's model of sales. 607-627
Volume 52, Number 3, September 2023
- Tamás Fleiner, Zsuzsanna Jankó, Ildikó Schlotter, Alexander Teytelboym:
Complexity of stability in trading networks. 629-648 - Ryo Kawasaki, Hideo Konishi, Junki Yukawa:
Equilibria in bottleneck games. 649-685 - Sylvain Béal, Stéphane Gonzalez, Philippe Solal, Peter Sudhölter:
Axiomatic characterizations of the core without consistency. 687-701 - Torsten Heinrich, Yoojin Jang, Luca Mungo, Marco Pangallo, Alex Scott, Bassel Tarbush, Samuel C. Wiese:
Best-response dynamics, playing sequences, and convergence to equilibrium in random games. 703-735 - Murali Agastya, Jorge Rojas-Vallejos:
The "desire to conform" and dynamic search by a committee. 737-756 - Takaaki Abe, Satoshi Nakada:
Potentials and solutions of cooperative games with a fixed player set. 757-774 - Cuihong Fan, Byoung Heon Jun, Elmar G. Wolfstetter:
Price leadership, spying, and secret price changes: a Stackelberg game with imperfect commitment. 775-804 - Miriam Al Lily:
Establishing human connections: experimental evidence from the helping game. 805-832 - Jin Hyuk Choi, Kookyoung Han:
Delegation of information acquisition, information asymmetry, and outside option. 833-860 - Jian Yang:
Nonatomic game with general preferences over returns. 861-889 - Alberto Vesperoni, Paul Schweinzer:
A threshold model of urban development. 891-924 - Zhonghao Shui:
Rejection prices and an auctioneer with non-monotonic utility. 925-951
Volume 52, Number 4, December 2023
- Peter Borm, Hans Peters:
Professor Stef Tijs (1937-2023). 953-955 - Chirantan Ganguly, Indrajit Ray:
Information revelation and coordination using cheap talk in a game with two-sided private information. 957-992 - Ville Korpela:
Irresolute mechanism design: a new path to possibility. 993-1007 - Manfred Kerber, Colin Rowat, Naoki Yoshihara:
Asymmetric majority pillage games. 1009-1035 - Jan-Peter Siedlarek:
Making friends meet: network formation with introductions. 1037-1076 - Jihwan Do:
Joint market dominance through exclusionary compatibility. 1077-1110 - Dong Liang, Yunlong Wang, Zhigang Cao, Xiaoguang Yang:
Discrete Colonel Blotto games with two battlefields. 1111-1151 - Ting Pei, Satoru Takahashi:
Nash equilibria in random games with right fat-tailed distributions. 1153-1177 - Hugo Gimbert, Edon Kelmendi:
Submixing and shift-invariant stochastic games. 1179-1214 - Dai Zusai:
Evolutionary dynamics in heterogeneous populations: a general framework for an arbitrary type distribution. 1215-1260 - Francesca Busetto, Giulio Codognato, Sayantan Ghosal, Damiano Turchet:
On the foundation of monopoly in bilateral exchange. 1261-1290 - Manuel Förster:
Strategic transmission of imperfect information: why revealing evidence (without proof) is difficult. 1291-1316 - Igal Milchtaich:
Best-response equilibrium: an equilibrium in finitely additive mixed strategies. 1317-1334
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