Stop the war!Остановите войну!
for scientists:
default search action
Google
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Internet Archive Scholar
CiteSeerX
ORCIDInternational Journal of Game Theory, Volume 36
Volume 36, Number 1, September 2007
- Yaron Azrieli, Ehud Lehrer:
On some families of cooperative fuzzy games. 1-15 - Josep M. Izquierdo
, Marina Núñez, Carles Rafels:
A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market. 17-26 - Julio González-Díaz, Estela Sánchez-Rodríguez:
A natural selection from the core of a TU game: the core-center. 27-46 - André Casajus:
The position value is the Myerson value, in a sense. 47-55 - Nikolai S. Kukushkin:
Congestion games revisited. 57-83 - Akira Yamada, Naoki Yoshihara:
Triple implementation by sharing mechanisms in production economies with unequal labor skills. 85-106 - Alexander Zimper:
A fixed point characterization of the dominance-solvability of lattice games with strategic substitutes. 107-117 - Edward J. Cartwright:
Imitation, coordination and the emergence of Nash equilibrium. 119-135 - Kevin Hasker:
Social norms and choice: a weak folk theorem for repeated matching games. 137-146
Volume 36, Number 2, October 2007
- Hans Peters, Dries Vermeulen:
Preface to the special issue on the occasion of the first Spain Italy Netherlands meeting on Game theory (SING 1). 147 - Arantza Estévez-Fernández, Peter Borm, Herbert Hamers:
Project games. 149-176 - Bettina Klaus, Flip Klijn:
Fair and efficient student placement with couples. 177-207 - Jesús Mario Bilbao, Julio Rodrigo Fernández García, N. Jiménez, J. J. López:
The core and the Weber set for bicooperative games. 209-222 - Gustavo Bergantiños, Juan J. Vidal-Puga:
The optimistic TU game in minimum cost spanning tree problems. 223-239 - Victor K. Domansky:
Repeated games with asymmetric information and random price fluctuations at finance markets. 241-257 - Youngsub Chun, Junghoon Lee:
On the convergence of the random arrival rule in large claims problems. 259-273 - Zafer Akin:
Time inconsistency and learning in bargaining games. 275-299 - Olivier Bochet:
Implementation of the Walrasian correspondence: the boundary problem. 301-316
Volume 36, Numbers 3-4, March 2008
- Marilda Sotomayor:
A collection of papers dedicated to David Gale on the occasion of his 85th birthday. 317-319 - Georgy Artemov:
Matching and price competition: would personalized prices help? 321-331 - Péter Biró, Katarína Cechlárová, Tamás Fleiner:
The dynamics of stable matchings and half-matchings for the stable marriage and roommates problems. 333-352 - Steven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones, Christian Klamler:
Proportional pie-cutting. 353-367 - David Cantala, Francisco Sánchez-Sánchez:
Welfare and stability in senior matching markets. 369-392 - Robert Day, Paul Milgrom:
Core-selecting package auctions. 393-407 - Kimmo Eriksson, Olle Häggström:
Instability of matchings in decentralized markets with various preference structures. 409-420 - Kimmo Eriksson, Jonas Sjöstrand, Pontus Strimling:
Asymmetric equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching markets with independent preferences. 421-440 - Sergiu Hart:
Discrete Colonel Blotto and General Lotto games. 441-460 - Elena Inarra, Concepción Larrea, Elena Molis:
Random paths to P -stability in the roommate problem. 461-471 - Fuhito Kojima, M. Utku Ünver:
Random paths to pairwise stability in many-to-many matching problems: a study on market equilibration. 473-488 - Mihai Manea:
Random serial dictatorship and ordinally efficient contracts. 489-496 - Ruth Martínez, Jordi Massó, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo:
On the invariance of the set of stable matchings with respect to substitutable preference profiles. 497-518 - Nitsan Perach, Julia Polak, Uriel G. Rothblum:
A stable matching model with an entrance criterion applied to the assignment of students to dormitories at the technion. 519-535 - Alvin E. Roth:
Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions. 537-569 - Uzi Segal, Joel Sobel:
A characterization of intrinsic reciprocity. 571-585 - Konstantinos Serfes:
Endogenous matching in a market with heterogeneous principals and agents. 587-619 - Marilda Sotomayor:
The stability of the equilibrium outcomes in the admission games induced by stable matching rules. 621-640
a service of 
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.
last updated on 2024-06-21 22:42 CEST by the dblp team
all metadata released as open data under CC0 1.0 license
see also: Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Imprint
dblp was originally created in 1993 at:
since 2018, dblp has been operated and maintained by:
the dblp computer science bibliography is funded and supported by:
