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International Game Theory Review, Volume 18
Volume 18, Number 1, March 2016
- Kjell Hausken, Mthuli Ncube:
How Elections are Impacted by Production, Economic Growth and Conflict. 1550015:1-1550015:29 - Sheetal Dharmatti
:
Viscosity Solutions of Hybrid Game Problems with Unbounded Cost Functionals. 1550016:1-1550016:26 - Valentin Goranko, Paolo Turrini:
Two-Player Preplay Negotiation Games with Conditional Offers. 1550017:1-1550017:31 - Vladimir V. Mazalov
, Anna V. Melnik:
Equilibrium Prices and Flows in the Passenger Traffic Problem. 1650001:1-1650001:19 - Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal:
Characterizations of Three Linear Values for TU Games by Associated Consistency: Simple Proofs Using the Jordan Normal Form. 1650003:1-1650003:21 - Ajay Kumar Bhurjee
:
Existence of Equilibrium Points for Bimatrix Game with Interval Payoffs. 1650002:1-1650002:13
Volume 18, Number 2, June 2016
- Vladimir V. Mazalov
, David W. K. Yeung:
Preface. 1602001:1 - Vladimir V. Mazalov
, Anna A. Ivashko
, Elena N. Konovalchikova:
Optimal Strategies in Best-Choice Game with Incomplete Information - The Voice Show. 1640001:1-1640001:18 - Elena M. Parilina
, Georges Zaccour
:
Strategic Support of Node-Consistent Cooperative Outcomes in Dynamic Games Played Over Event Trees. 1640002:1-1640002:16 - Alexander Y. Krylatov
, Victor V. Zakharov
:
Competitive Traffic Assignment in a Green Transit Network. 1640003:1-1640003:14 - Ekaterina V. Gromova
, José Daniel López-Barrientos
:
A Differential Game Model for The Extraction of Nonrenewable Resources with Random Initial Times - The Cooperative and Competitive Cases. 1640004:1-1640004:19 - Elena M. Parilina
, Artem A. Sedakov
:
Stable Cooperation in a Game with a Major Player. 1640005:1-1640005:20 - Nikolay A. Zenkevich, Margarita Gladkova:
Price Competition on the Market of Counterfeiting Software. 1640006:1-1640006:10 - Ovanes L. Petrosian
:
Looking Forward Approach in Cooperative Differential Games. 1640007:1-1640007:14 - David W. K. Yeung, Leon A. Petrosyan:
A Cooperative Dynamic Environmental Game of Subgame Consistent Clean Technology Development. 1640008:1-1640008:23
Volume 18, Number 3, September 2016
- Irit Nowik:
How Risky is it to Deviate from Nash Equilibrium? 1650006:1-1650006:24 - Yasuo Sasaki:
An Equivalence Result on the Reduction of Games with Unawareness. 1650009:1-1650009:27 - Robert Joliet, Rabia Nessah:
Euro White and Euro Yolk: Sovereign Debt Structure Stability in the Eurozone. 1650004:1-1650004:15 - Emily Tanimura, Sylvie Thoron:
How Best to Disagree in Order to Agree? 1650008:1-1650008:17 - Ben van der Genugten, Peter Borm
:
Texas Hold'em: A Game of Skill. 1650005:1-1650005:13 - Anat Lerner
, Rica Gonen:
Efficient Constrained Combinatorial Auctions. 1650007:1-1650007:10
Volume 18, Number 4, December 2016
- Fouad El Ouardighi
, Gary M. Erickson, Dieter Grass, Steffen Jørgensen:
Contracts and Information Structure in a Supply Chain with Operations and Marketing Interaction. 1650014:1-1650014:36 - Jacek B. Krawczyk
, Mabel Tidball
:
Economic Problems with Constraints: How Efficiency Relates to Equilibrium. 1650011:1-1650011:19 - Hana Baili:
Chaos Propagation in Games of Control for Energy-Efficient Wireless Communications. 1650012:1-1650012:21 - Michael R. Caputo:
Intrinsic Comparative Statics of a Nash Bargaining Solution. 1650013:1-1650013:11 - Yigal Gerchak:
Procurement (Reverse) Auctions Where Service Providers have Official Ratings. 1650016:1-1650016:10 - Frank Huettner
, Harald Wiese:
The Need for Permission, the Power to Enforce, and Duality in Cooperative Games with a Hierarchy. 1650015:1-1650015:12
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