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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 78
Volume 78, March 2013
- Matthew Pearson, Burkhard C. Schipper:
Menstrual cycle and competitive bidding. 1-20 - Manfred Nermuth, Giacomo Pasini
, Paolo Pin
, Simon Weidenholzer:
The informational divide. 21-30 - Giacomo Bonanno:
A dynamic epistemic characterization of backward induction without counterfactuals. 31-43 - Michael Mandler:
How to win a large election. 44-63
- Françoise Forges:
A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment. 64-71
- Rene Saran, Norovsambuu Tumennasan
:
Whose opinion counts? Implementation by sortition. 72-84 - Patrick Hummel:
Candidate strategies in primaries and general elections with candidates of heterogeneous quality. 85-102 - Nicolas Jacquemet
, Frédéric Koessler:
Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information. 103-120
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