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Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 51
Volume 51, Number 1, April 2005
- Ottorino Chillemi:
Cross-owned firms competing in auctions. 1-19 - Pradeep Dubey, Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko
:
Compound voting and the Banzhaf index. 20-30 - John Duffy
, Ed Hopkins
:
Learning, information, and sorting in market entry games: theory and evidence. 31-62 - Toru Hokari:
Consistency implies equal treatment in TU-games. 63-82 - Ulrich Horst:
Stationary equilibria in discounted stochastic games with weakly interacting players. 83-108 - Steffen Huck
, Wieland Müller
:
Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction. 109-127 - Matthew O. Jackson
:
Allocation rules for network games. 128-154 - Axel Ockenfels, Reinhard Selten:
Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions. 155-170 - Reinhard Selten, Jose Apesteguia:
Experimentally observed imitation and cooperation in price competition on the circle. 171-192 - René van den Brink
, Gerard van der Laan:
A class of consistent share functions for games in coalition structure. 193-212 - Hüseyin Yildirim:
Contests with multiple rounds. 213-227 - Mark Voorneveld:
Persistent retracts and preparation. 228-232
Volume 51, Number 2, May 2005
- Thomas R. Palfrey:
Special issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Richard D. McKelvey. 237-242
- Theodore L. Turocy
:
A dynamic homotopy interpretation of the logistic quantal response equilibrium correspondence. 243-263 - Andrew McLennan, Johannes Berg:
Asymptotic expected number of Nash equilibria of two-player normal form games. 264-295 - James W. Friedman, Claudio Mezzetti
:
Random belief equilibrium in normal form games. 296-323 - Kang-Oh Yi:
Quantal-response equilibrium models of the ultimatum bargaining game. 324-348 - Jacob K. Goeree
, Charles A. Holt:
An experimental study of costly coordination. 349-364 - Guillaume Fréchette, John H. Kagel, Massimo Morelli:
Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory. 365-390 - Alessandra Casella:
Storable votes. 391-419 - Matthew O. Jackson
, Anne van den Nouweland
:
Strongly stable networks. 420-444 - Marco Battaglini
:
Sequential voting with abstention. 445-463 - Adam Meirowitz:
Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian framework. 464-489 - John Duggan
, Mark Fey
:
Electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates. 490-522 - John Wiggs Patty:
Local equilibrium equivalence in probabilistic voting models. 523-536
- Dov Samet:
Counterfactuals in wonderland. 537-541
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