default search action
Google
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Internet Archive Scholar
CiteSeerX
ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 45
Volume 45, Number 1, October 2003
- Ehud Kalai:
Introduction to the Games 2000 Special Issue. 1 - Robert J. Aumann:
Presidential address. 2-14 - Kenneth J. Arrow:
Introductory remarks on the history of game theory. 15-18 - Reinhard Selten, Klaus Abbink
, Joachim Buchta, Abdolkarim Sadrieh:
How to play (3×3)-games.: A strategy method experiment. 19-37 - Pierpaolo Battigalli, Marciano M. Siniscalchi:
Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions. 38-72 - Dean P. Foster, H. Peyton Young:
Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium. 73-96 - Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt, Thomas R. Palfrey:
Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games. 97-113 - Joseph Y. Halpern:
A computer scientist looks at game theory. 114-131 - Xingwei Hu, Lloyd S. Shapley:
On authority distributions in organizations: equilibrium. 132-152 - Xingwei Hu, Lloyd S. Shapley:
On authority distributions in organizations: controls. 153-170 - Yakar Kannai:
Costly Nash paths. 171-180 - Daphne Koller, Brian Milch:
Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games. 181-221 - Richard P. McLean, Andrew Postlewaite:
Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information. 222-241 - Hervé Moulin, Richard Stong:
Filling a multicolor urn: an axiomatic analysis. 242-269
Volume 45, Number 2, November 2003
- Andrew Postlewaite, Robert Wilson:
Introduction to the special issue in memory of Robert W. Rosenthal. 271-277 - Balázs Szentes, Robert W. Rosenthal:
Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games. 278-295 - Ken Binmore, Larry Samuelson, Peyton Young:
Equilibrium selection in bargaining models. 296-328 - Douglas Gale, Shachar Kariv:
Bayesian learning in social networks. 329-346 - Uri Gneezy, Ernan Haruvy, Alvin E. Roth:
Bargaining under a deadline: evidence from the reverse ultimatum game. 347-368 - Srihari Govindan, Philip J. Reny, Arthur J. Robson:
A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem. 369-374 - Sergiu Hart, Andreu Mas-Colell:
Regret-based continuous-time dynamics. 375-394 - Eric Maskin, John Riley:
Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions. 395-409 - Richard P. McLean, Andrew Postlewaite:
Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty. 410-433 - Martin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein:
Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting. 434-441 - Roy Radner, Thomas J. Richardson:
Monopolists and viscous demand. 442-464 - Muhamet Yildiz:
Walrasian bargaining. 465-487 - Robert J. Weber:
Auction Theory: By Vijay Krishna. Academic Press, 2002. 488-497
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.
last updated on 2025-07-25 19:07 CEST by the dblp team
all metadata released as open data under CC0 1.0 license
see also: Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Imprint
dblp was originally created in 1993 at:
since 2018, dblp has been operated and maintained by:
the dblp computer science bibliography is funded and supported by:
