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ORCIDGames and Economic Behavior, Volume 140
Volume 140, July 2023
- Viola Ackfeld, Werner Güth:
Personal information disclosure under competition for benefits: Is sharing caring? 1-32 - Lars-Göran Mattsson
, Jörgen W. Weibull:
An analytically solvable principal-agent model. 33-49 - Aidas Masiliunas:
Learning in rent-seeking contests with payoff risk and foregone payoff information. 50-72 - Alexandros Karakostas, Martin G. Kocher, Dominik Matzat, Holger A. Rau, Gerhard Riewe:
The team allocator game: Allocation power in public goods games. 73-87 - Alexandre Skoda, Xavier Venel:
Weighted average-convexity and Shapley values. 88-98 - Yizhaq Minchuk, Aner Sela:
Subsidy and taxation in all-pay auctions under incomplete information. 99-114 - Ailin Leng:
A Rubinstein bargaining experiment in continuous time. 115-131
- Wei He, Jiangtao Li:
Competitive information disclosure in random search markets. 132-153
- Mohamed Belhaj, Frédéric Deroïan, Shahir Safi:
Targeting in networks under costly agreements. 154-172
- Andrew McClellan:
Knowing your opponents: Information disclosure and auction design. 173-180
- Yuki Tamura:
Object reallocation problems with single-dipped preferences. 181-196 - Benjamin Balzer, Johannes Schneider:
Mechanism design with informational punishment. 197-209
- Yu Zhou, Shigehiro Serizawa:
Multi-object auction design beyond quasi-linearity: Leading examples. 210-228
- Shaul Rosner, Tami Tamir:
Scheduling games with rank-based utilities. 229-252 - Robert Somogyi, Wouter Vergote, Gábor Virág:
Price competition with capacity uncertainty - feasting on leftovers. 253-271 - Jawwad Noor, Linxia Ren:
Temptation and guilt. 272-295 - Anqi Li, Lin Hu:
Electoral accountability and selection with personalized information aggregation. 296-315 - Michal Feldman, Galia Shabtai:
Simultaneous 2nd price item auctions with no-underbidding. 316-340
- Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko:
Pure-strategy equilibrium in Bayesian potential games with absolutely continuous information. 341-347
- Pavlo Prokopovych, Nicholas C. Yannelis:
On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest. 348-362 - Tse-Min Wang, Florian Heine, Arjen van Witteloostuijn:
Pro-social risk-taking and intergroup conflict: A volunteer's dilemma experiment. 363-379 - Eberhard Feess, Florian Kerzenmacher, Gerd Muehlheusser:
Morally questionable decisions by groups: Guilt sharing and its underlying motives. 380-400
- Xinyue Cai, Mert Kimya:
Stability of alliance networks. 401-409
- Zhiwei Cui:
Linking friction, social coordination and the speed of evolution. 410-430 - Paolo Galeazzi, Johannes Marti:
Choice structures in games. 431-455 - Ahmet Altinok:
Group lending, sorting, and risk sharing. 456-480 - Geoffroy de Clippel, Rene Saran, Roberto Serrano:
Continuous level-k mechanism design. 481-501 - Marco A. Haan, Pim Heijnen, Martin Obradovits:
Competition with list prices. 502-528 - Niloofar Yousefimanesh, Iwan Bos, Dries Vermeulen:
Strategic rationing in Stackelberg games. 529-555 - Xueheng Li:
Designing weighted and directed networks under complementarities. 556-574
- Aviad Heifetz:
The non-dismal science of intergenerational affective interactions. 575-584
- Ingela Alger, Jörgen W. Weibull:
Evolution and Kantian morality: A correction and addendum. 585-587
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