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ORCIDGames, Volume 13
Volume 13, Number 1, February 2022
- Andre Rossi de Oliveira
, Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva:
Self-Enforcing Collective Counterterror Retaliation. 1 - Valeria Zahoransky, Julian Gutierrez, Paul Harrenstein, Michael J. Wooldridge:
Partial Order Games. 2 - Tiago Cruz Gonçalves:
The Impact of Discretionary Measurement Criteria on Investors' Judgement and Decisions. 3 - Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva, Chikara Yamaguchi:
Overlapping Climate Clubs: Self-Enforcing R&D Networks to Mitigate Global Warming. 4 - Maria Montero, Alex Possajennikov:
An Adaptive Model of Demand Adjustment in Weighted Majority Games. 5 - Jochen Staudacher, Felix Wagner, Jan Filipp:
Dynamic Programming for Computing Power Indices for Weighted Voting Games with Precoalitions. 6 - Charles Perreault, Robert Boyd:
Evolution of Social Learning with Payoff and Content Bias. 7 - Amelia Barletta, Carlo Capuano, Alessandro De Iudicibus:
White List: An Administrative Tool to Contrast Crime. 8 - Ku-Chu Tsao, Arijit Mukherjee, Achintya Ray:
Competition and Innovation in Markets with Technology Leaders. 9 - Dario Madeo, Chiara Mocenni:
Identification and Control of Game-Based Epidemic Models. 10 - Nicola Maaser, Fabian Paetzel, Stefan Traub:
Gender and Nominal Power in Multilateral Bargaining. 11 - James W. Boudreau, Timothy Mathews, Shane Sanders, Aniruddha Bagchi:
Conflicts with Momentum. 12 - Nail Kashaev, Victor H. Aguiar:
Random Rank-Dependent Expected Utility. 13 - Marco Stimolo, Sergio Beraldo, Salvatore Capasso, Valerio Filoso:
Consciously Uncertain: A Bayesian Analysis of Preferences Formation. 14 - Fabio Römeis, Fabian Herweg, Daniel Müller:
Salience Bias and Overwork. 15 - Games Editorial Office:
Acknowledgment to Reviewers of Games in 2021. 16 - Herman Monsuur, René H. P. Janssen:
Structural Stability of Coalitions: A Formal Model Highlighting the Role of Participants Positioned between Members and Neutral Actors. 17 - Dóra Gréta Petróczy, Mark Francis Rogers, László Á. Kóczy:
Exits from the European Union and Their Effect on Power Distribution in the Council. 18 - Julian Gutierrez, Thomas Steeples, Michael J. Wooldridge:
Mean-Payoff Games with ω-Regular Specifications. 19
Volume 13, Number 2, April 2022
- Roland Mühlenbernd, Slawomir Wacewicz, Przemyslaw Zywiczynski:
The Evolution of Ambiguity in Sender - Receiver Signaling Games. 20 - Yuta Saito:
A Note on Time Inconsistency and Endogenous Exits from a Currency Union. 21 - Marek Mikolaj Kaminski:
How Strong Are Soccer Teams? The "Host Paradox" and Other Counterintuitive Properties of FIFA's Former Ranking System. 22 - Daniela Grieco:
What Economists Can Learn from "The Power of Us: Harnessing Our Shared Identities for Personal and Collective Success" by Jay J. Van Bavel and Dominick J. Packer. 23 - Marco Sahm:
Optimal Accuracy of Unbiased Tullock Contests with Two Heterogeneous Players. 24 - Anna Dodonova:
Risk Aversion, Managerial Reputation, and Debt-Equity Conflict. 25 - Lisa R. Anderson, Charles A. Holt, Katri K. Sieberg, Beth A. Freeborn:
An Experimental Study of Strategic Voting and Accuracy of Verdicts with Sequential and Simultaneous Voting. 26 - Irinel C. Dragan:
Egalitarian Allocations and Convexity. 27 - Elizabeth Schroeder, Carol Horton Tremblay, Victor J. Tremblay:
CEO Bias and Product Substitutability in Oligopoly Games. 28 - João Ricardo Faria, Daniel G. Arce:
A Preface for the Special Issue "Economics of Conflict and Terrorism". 29 - Mir Adnan Mahmood, John Rehbeck:
Correcting for Random Budgets in Revealed Preference Experiments. 30 - Tânia Saraiva, Tiago Cruz Gonçalves:
Should I Play or Should I Go? Individuals' Characteristics and Preference for Uncertainty. 31 - Naoto Aoyama, Emilson Caputo Delfino Silva:
Endogenous Abatement Technology Agreements under Environmental Regulation. 32
Volume 13, Number 3, June 2022
- Kalliopi Kastampolidou, Christos Papalitsas, Theodore Andronikos:
The Distributed Kolkata Paise Restaurant Game. 33 - Ramzi Suleiman:
Economic Harmony - A Rational Theory of Fairness and Cooperation in Strategic Interactions. 34 - Olga I. Gorbaneva, Guennady A. Ougolnitsky:
Sustainability of Intertwined Supply Networks: A Game-Theoretic Approach. 35 - Margy Nathalia Rojas Palacios, Diego León Peña Orozco, Jesús González-Feliu:
Backup Agreement as a Coordination Mechanism in a Decentralized Fruit Chain in a Developing Country. 36 - Malcolm Brady:
Asymmetric Horizontal Differentiation under Advertising in a Cournot Duopoly. 37 - Shih-Shen Chen, Chien-Shu Tsai, Chen Chen:
Quid Pro Quo CSR and Trade Liberalization in a Bilateral Monopoly. 38 - Gabriele Bellucci:
A Model of Trust. 39 - Kyle Weishaar, Igor V. Erovenko:
The Evolution of Cooperation in Two-Dimensional Mobile Populations with Random and Strategic Dispersal. 40 - King King Li:
Memory Recall Bias of Overconfident and Underconfident Individuals after Feedback. 41 - Albert Argilaga, Jijian Fan:
Optimal Policymaking under Yardstick Vote: An Experimental Study. 42 - Ernan Haruvy, Yefim Roth:
On the Impact of an Intermediary Agent in the Ultimatum Game. 43 - Yuto Ushioda, Masato Tanaka, Tomomi Matsui:
Monte Carlo Methods for the Shapley-Shubik Power Index. 44 - Malin Arve, Marco Serena:
Level-k Models and Overspending in Contests. 45 - Michael S. Harré:
What Can Game Theory Tell Us about an AI 'Theory of Mind'? 46 - Barsha Saha, Miguel Martínez-García, Sharad Nath Bhattacharya, Rohit Joshi:
Overcoming Choice Inertia through Social Interaction - An Agent-Based Study of Mobile Subscription Decision. 47
Volume 13, Number 4, August 2022
- Siddhartha Bandyopadhyay, Mandar P. Oak:
Party Formation and Coalitional Bargaining in a Model of Proportional Representation. 48 - Daniel H. Wood:
Communication-Enhancing Vagueness. 49 - Fabio Michelucci:
Promoting Entry and Efficiency via Reserve Prices. 50 - Aniruddha Ghosh, Mohammed Ali Khan, Metin Uyanik:
The Intermediate Value Theorem and Decision-Making in Psychology and Economics: An Expositional Consolidation. 51 - Iman Vakilinia, Peyman Faizian, Mohammad Mahdi Khalili:
RewardRating: A Mechanism Design Approach to Improve Rating Systems. 52 - Arnaud Dellis:
Does Party Polarization Affect the Electoral Prospects of a New Centrist Candidate? 53 - Xiaoli Guo:
Media Trust: Official versus Commercial Outlets. 54 - Jovic Aaron S. Caasi, Brian M. Joseph, Heera J. Kodiyamplakkal, Jaelene Renae U. Manibusan, Leslie J. Camacho Aquino, Hyunju Oh, Jan Rychtár, Dewey T. Taylor:
A Game-Theoretic Model of Voluntary Yellow Fever Vaccination to Prevent Urban Outbreaks. 55 - Ali Zeytoon-Nejad:
Measuring Price Risk Aversion through Indirect Utility Functions: A Laboratory Experiment. 56
Volume 13, Number 5, October 2022
- Kameshwari Shankar:
Copyright Enforcement in Content-Sharing Platforms. 57 - Jacek B. Krawczyk, Vladimir P. Petkov:
A Qualitative Game of Interest Rate Adjustments with a Nuisance Agent. 58 - Imke L. J. Lemmers-Jansen, Rune J. Wichmann, Sophie Perizonius, Sukhi S. Shergill:
The Influence of Trial-By-Trial Feedback on Trust in Health, First-Episode and Chronic Psychosis. 59 - Karl H. Schlag:
Social Learning between Groups: Imitation and the Role of Experience. 60 - Isa Emin Hafalir, Serkan Imisiker:
Call Auctions with Contingent Orders. 61 - Todd R. Kaplan, Aner Sela:
Second-Price Auctions with Private Entry Costs. 62 - Naomi Utgoff:
Informational Hold Up and Intermediaries. 63 - Chen Cohen, Ishay Rabi, Aner Sela:
Assortative Matching by Lottery Contests. 64 - Thomas Glökler, Kerstin Pull, Manfred Stadler:
Do Output-Dependent Prizes Alleviate the Sabotage Problem in Tournaments? 65 - Wicak Ananduta, Sergio Grammatico:
Equilibrium Seeking and Optimal Selection Algorithms in Peer-to-Peer Energy Markets. 66 - Caleb M. Koch, Heinrich H. Nax:
Groundwater Usage and Strategic Complements: Part I (Instrumental Variables). 67 - Caleb M. Koch, Heinrich H. Nax:
Groundwater Usage and Strategic Complements: Part II (Revealed Preferences). 68
Volume 13, Number 6, December 2022
- Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew, Victoire D'Amico, Claire Guérin:
The Strategy Method Risks Conflating Confusion with a Social Preference for Conditional Cooperation in Public Goods Games. 69 - Reza Azad Gholami, Leif Kristoffer Sandal, Jan Ubøe:
Construction of Equilibria in Strategic Stackelberg Games in Multi-Period Supply Chain Contracts. 70 - Benjamin Young:
Misperception and Cognition in Markets. 71 - Giacomo Bonanno:
Rational Play in Extensive-Form Games. 72 - Zhuohan Wang, Dong Hao:
Characterizing Agent Behavior in Revision Games with Uncertain Deadline. 73 - Emin Karagözoglu, Elif Tosun:
Endogenous Game Choice and Giving Behavior in Distribution Games. 74 - Hiroki Shinozaki:
Egalitarian-Equivalence and Strategy-Proofness in the Object Allocation Problem with Non-Quasi-Linear Preferences. 75 - Maxwell N. Burton-Chellew, Stuart A. West:
The Black Box as a Control for Payoff-Based Learning in Economic Games. 76 - Marina Bannikova, José-Manuel Giménez-Gómez:
The Unanimity Rule under a Two-Agent Fixed Sequential Order Voting. 77 - Achille Basile, Anna de Simone, Ciro Tarantino:
A Note on Binary Strategy-Proof Social Choice Functions. 78 - Clelia Mazzoni, Patrizia Sbriglia:
An Experimental Investigation of Trusting Behaviour. 79 - Stefan Rass, Sandra König, Stefan Schauer:
Games over Probability Distributions Revisited: New Equilibrium Models and Refinements. 80 - Thanh Hong Nguyen, Amulya Yadav:
A Complete Analysis on the Risk of Using Quantal Response: When Attacker Maliciously Changes Behavior under Uncertainty. 81 - Nora Grisáková, Peter Stetka:
Cournot's Oligopoly Equilibrium under Different Expectations and Differentiated Production. 82 - Alex Dickson, Ian A. MacKenzie, Petros G. Sekeris:
Rent Dissipation in Simple Tullock Contests. 83
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