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3rd GameSec 2012: Budapest, Hungary
- Jens Grossklags, Jean C. Walrand:
Decision and Game Theory for Security - Third International Conference, GameSec 2012, Budapest, Hungary, November 5-6, 2012. Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7638, Springer 2012, ISBN 978-3-642-34265-3
Secret Communications
- Benjamin Johnson, Pascal Schöttle, Rainer Böhme:
Where to Hide the Bits ? 1-17 - Mehrdad Nojoumian, Douglas R. Stinson:
Socio-Rational Secret Sharing as a New Direction in Rational Cryptography. 18-37
Identification of Attackers
- Jeremiah Blocki
, Nicolas Christin
, Anupam Datta, Arunesh Sinha
:
Audit Mechanisms for Provable Risk Management and Accountable Data Governance. 38-59 - SingRu Celine Hoe, Murat Kantarcioglu, Alain Bensoussan
:
A Game Theoretical Analysis of Lemonizing Cybercriminal Black Markets. 60-77 - Lemonia Dritsoula, Patrick Loiseau, John Musacchio:
Computing the Nash Equilibria of Intruder Classification Games. 78-97
Multi-step Attacks
- Ahto Buldas
, Roman Stepanenko:
Upper Bounds for Adversaries' Utility in Attack Trees. 98-117 - Jingqiang Lin, Peng Liu, Jiwu Jing:
Using Signaling Games to Model the Multi-step Attack-Defense Scenarios on Confidentiality. 118-137 - Alan Nochenson, C. F. Larry Heimann:
Simulation and Game-Theoretic Analysis of an Attacker-Defender Game. 138-151
Network Security
- Aron Laszka
, Dávid Szeszlér, Levente Buttyán:
Linear Loss Function for the Network Blocking Game: An Efficient Model for Measuring Network Robustness and Link Criticality. 152-170 - Andrew Clark, Quanyan Zhu, Radha Poovendran
, Tamer Basar:
Deceptive Routing in Relay Networks. 171-185 - Assane Gueye
, Vladimir Marbukh:
A Game-Theoretic Framework for Network Security Vulnerability Assessment and Mitigation. 186-200
System Defense
- Radek Píbil, Viliam Lisý
, Christopher Kiekintveld, Branislav Bosanský, Michal Pechoucek
:
Game Theoretic Model of Strategic Honeypot Selection in Computer Networks. 201-220 - M. Patrick Collins:
A Cost-Based Mechanism for Evaluating the Effectiveness of Moving Target Defenses. 221-233 - Viet Pham
, Carlos Cid:
Are We Compromised? Modelling Security Assessment Games. 234-247 - Kevin D. Bowers, Marten van Dijk
, Robert Griffin, Ari Juels, Alina Oprea, Ronald L. Rivest, Nikos Triandopoulos:
Defending against the Unknown Enemy: Applying FlipIt to System Security. 248-263
Applications Security
- Saurabh Amin, Galina A. Schwartz, Hamidou Tembine
:
Incentives and Security in Electricity Distribution Networks. 264-280 - Yee Wei Law
, Tansu Alpcan
, Marimuthu Palaniswami, Subhrakanti Dey
:
Security Games and Risk Minimization for Automatic Generation Control in Smart Grid. 281-295 - Robert Nix, Murat Kantarcioglu:
Contractual Agreement Design for Enforcing Honesty in Cloud Outsourcing. 296-308
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