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7th ADT 2021: Toulouse, France
- Dimitris Fotakis, David Ríos Insua:
Algorithmic Decision Theory - 7th International Conference, ADT 2021, Toulouse, France, November 3-5, 2021, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 13023, Springer 2021, ISBN 978-3-030-87755-2
Computational Social Choice and Preference Modelling
- Abu Mohammad Hammad Ali, Howard J. Hamilton, Elizabeth Rayner, Boting Yang, Sandra Zilles:
Aggregating Preferences Represented by Conditional Preference Networks. 3-18 - Bruno Escoffier, Olivier Spanjaard, Magdaléna Tydrichová:
Measuring Nearly Single-Peakedness of an Electorate: Some New Insights. 19-34 - Arnaud Grivet Sébert, Nicolas Maudet, Patrice Perny, Paolo Viappiani:
Preference Aggregation in the Generalised Unavailable Candidate Model. 35-50 - Beatrice Napolitano, Olivier Cailloux, Paolo Viappiani:
Simultaneous Elicitation of Scoring Rule and Agent Preferences for Robust Winner Determination. 51-67
Preference Elicitation
- Loïc Adam, Sébastien Destercke:
Incremental Elicitation of Preferences: Optimist or Pessimist? 71-85 - Xudong Liu, Miroslaw Truszczynski:
Probabilistic Lexicographic Preference Trees. 86-100 - Hugo Martin, Patrice Perny:
Incremental Preference Elicitation with Bipolar Choquet Integrals. 101-116
Preference Aggregation and Voting
- Ben Abramowitz, Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon:
In the Beginning There Were n Agents: Founding and Amending a Constitution. 119-131 - Ruben Becker, Gianlorenzo D'Angelo, Esmaeil Delfaraz, Hugo Gilbert:
Unveiling the Truth in Liquid Democracy with Misinformed Voters. 132-146 - Thekla Hamm, Martin Lackner, Anna Rapberger:
Computing Kemeny Rankings from d-Euclidean Preferences. 147-161 - Gil Ben Zvi, Eyal Leizerovich, Nimrod Talmon:
Iterative Deliberation via Metric Aggregation. 162-176
Manipulation in Voting
- Haris Aziz, Alexander Lam:
Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules. 179-193 - Joanna Kaczmarek, Jörg Rothe:
Manipulation in Communication Structures of Graph-Restricted Weighted Voting Games. 194-208 - Leora Schmerler, Noam Hazon:
Strategic Voting in Negotiating Teams. 209-223 - Yongjie Yang:
The Nonmanipulative Vote-Deficits of Voting Rules. 224-240
Fair Division and Resource Allocation
- Nina Chiarelli, Clément Dallard, Andreas Darmann, Stefan Lendl, Martin Milanic, Peter Mursic, Nevena Pivac, Ulrich Pferschy:
Allocating Indivisible Items with Minimum Dissatisfaction on Preference Graphs. 243-257 - Laurent Gourvès, Julien Lesca, Anaëlle Wilczynski:
On Fairness via Picking Sequences in Allocation of Indivisible Goods. 258-272 - Luis Müller, Matthias Bentert:
On Reachable Assignments in Cycles. 273-288 - Parham Shams, Aurélie Beynier, Sylvain Bouveret, Nicolas Maudet:
Minimizing and Balancing Envy Among Agents Using Ordered Weighted Average. 289-303
Algorithmic Decision Theory
- Nawal Benabbou, Cassandre Leroy, Thibaut Lust, Patrice Perny:
Interactive Optimization of Submodular Functions Under Matroid Constraints. 307-322 - Paul Alain Kaldjob Kaldjob, Brice Mayag, Denis Bouyssou:
Necessary and Possible Interaction in a 2-Maxitive Sugeno Integral Model. 323-337
Coalition Formation
- Ben Abramowitz, Edith Elkind, Davide Grossi, Ehud Shapiro, Nimrod Talmon:
Democratic Forking: Choosing Sides with Social Choice. 341-356 - Andreas Darmann:
Hedonic Diversity Games Revisited. 357-372
Stable Matchings
- Kshitija Taywade, Judy Goldsmith, Brent Harrison:
Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning for Decentralized Stable Matching. 375-389 - Taiki Todo, Ryoji Wada, Kentaro Yahiro, Makoto Yokoo:
Lazy Gale-Shapley for Many-to-One Matching with Partial Information. 390-405
Participatory Budgeting
- Haris Aziz, Aditya Ganguly:
Participatory Funding Coordination: Model, Axioms and Rules. 409-423 - Dorothea Baumeister, Linus Boes, Johanna Hillebrand:
Complexity of Manipulative Interference in Participatory Budgeting. 424-439
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