![]() | ![]() |
Ask others: ACM DL/Guide -
- CSB - MetaPress - Google - Bing - Yahoo
| 120 | Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Anonymous Pricing of Efficient Allocations in Combinatorial Economies. AAMAS 2004: 254-260 | |
| 102 | Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 196-197 | |
| 70 | Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Partial-Revelation VCG Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 367-372 | |
| 66 | Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. AAMAS 2002: 168-169 | |
| 63 | Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Differential -Revelation VCG Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions. AMEC 2002: 34-51 | |
| 47 | Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2001: 256-259 |
Selection of 6 from 237 records - Tuomas Sandholm has 95 coauthors
Last update 2012-09-10 CET by the DBLP Team —
Content released under the ODC-BY 1.0 license — See also our legal information page