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Tuomas Sandholm
2010 – today
- 2013
[j41]Abraham Othman, David M. Pennock, Daniel M. Reeves, Tuomas Sandholm: A Practical Liquidity-Sensitive Automated Market Maker. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 1(3): 14 (2013)- [c193]Nicola Gatti, Marco Rocco, Tuomas Sandholm: Algorithms for Strong Nash Equilibrium with More than Two Agents. AAAI 2013
- [c192]Nicola Gatti, Marco Rocco, Tuomas Sandholm: On the verification and computation of strong nash equilibrium. AAMAS 2013: 723-730
- [c191]Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm: Action Translation in Extensive-Form Games with Large Action Spaces: Axioms, Paradoxes, and the Pseudo-Harmonic Mapping. IJCAI 2013
- [c190]Xin Sui, Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm: Analysis and Optimization of Multi-Dimensional Percentile Mechanisms. IJCAI 2013
- [c189]John P. Dickerson, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm: Failure-aware kidney exchange. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2013: 323-340
- [c188]John Paul Dickerson, Tuomas Sandholm: Throwing Darts: Random Sampling Helps Tree Search when the Number of Short Certificates Is Moderate. SOCS 2013
- [i15]Nicola Gatti, Marco Rocco, Tuomas Sandholm: On the complexity of strong Nash equilibrium: Hard-to-solve instances and smoothed complexity. CoRR abs/1304.1351 (2013)
- 2012
- [j40]Zhengyu Yin, Albert Xin Jiang, Milind Tambe, Christopher Kiekintveld, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Tuomas Sandholm, John P. Sullivan: TRUSTS: Scheduling Randomized Patrols for Fare Inspection in Transit Systems Using Game Theory. AI Magazine 33(4): 59-72 (2012)
- [j39]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing optimal outcomes under an expressive representation of settings with externalities. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 78(1): 2-14 (2012)
- [j38]Andrew Gilpin, Javier Peña, Tuomas Sandholm: First-order algorithm with $${\mathcal{O}({\rm ln}(1{/}\epsilon))}$$ convergence for $${\epsilon}$$ -equilibrium in two-person zero-sum games. Math. Program. 133(1-2): 279-298 (2012)
- [c187]John P. Dickerson, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm: Dynamic Matching via Weighted Myopia with Application to Kidney Exchange. AAAI 2012
- [c186]
- [c185]Albert Xin Jiang, Zhengyu Yin, Matthew P. Johnson, Milind Tambe, Christopher Kiekintveld, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Tuomas Sandholm: Towards Optimal Patrol Strategies for Fare Inspection in Transit Systems. AAAI Spring Symposium: Game Theory for Security, Sustainability, and Health 2012
- [c184]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: Rational market making with probabilistic knowledge. AAMAS 2012: 645-652
- [c183]John P. Dickerson, Ariel D. Procaccia, Tuomas Sandholm: Optimizing kidney exchange with transplant chains: theory and reality. AAMAS 2012: 711-718
- [c182]
- [c181]Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm, Kevin Waugh: Strategy purification and thresholding: effective non-equilibrium approaches for playing large games. AAMAS 2012: 871-878
- [c180]Zhengyu Yin, Albert Xin Jiang, Matthew Paul Johnson, Christopher Kiekintveld, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Tuomas Sandholm, Milind Tambe, John P. Sullivan: TRUSTS: Scheduling Randomized Patrols for Fare Inspection in Transit Systems. IAAI 2012
- [c179]Samuel Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm: Safe opponent exploitation. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2012: 587-604
- [c178]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: Profit-charging market makers with bounded loss, vanishing bid/ask spreads, and unlimited market depth. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2012: 790-807
- [c177]Tuomas Sandholm, Satinder Singh: Lossy stochastic game abstraction with bounds. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2012: 880-897
- [c176]Nicola Gatti, Giorgio Patrini, Marco Rocco, Tuomas Sandholm: Combining local search techniques and path following for bimatrix games. UAI 2012: 286-295
- [i14]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators. CoRR abs/1207.1368 (2012)
- [i13]Nicola Gatti, Giorgio Patrini, Marco Rocco, Tuomas Sandholm: Combining local search techniques and path following for bimatrix games. CoRR abs/1210.4858 (2012)
- 2011
- [j37]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: Inventory-based versus Prior-based Options Trading Agents. Algorithmic Finance 1(2): 95-121 (2011)
- [j36]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive markets for donating to charities. Artif. Intell. 175(7-8): 1251-1271 (2011)
- [j35]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Information-theoretic approaches to branching in search. Discrete Optimization 8(2): 147-159 (2011)
- [c175]Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm, Kevin Waugh: Strategy Purification. Applied Adversarial Reasoning and Risk Modeling 2011
- [c174]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: Automated Market Makers That Enable New Settings: Extending Constant-Utility Cost Functions. AMMA 2011: 19-30
- [c173]Michael Benisch, Tuomas Sandholm: A Framework for Automated Bundling and Pricing Using Purchase Data. AMMA 2011: 40-52
- [c172]Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm: Game theory-based opponent modeling in large imperfect-information games. AAMAS 2011: 533-540
- [c171]
- [c170]Pingzhong Tang, Tuomas Sandholm: Approximating Optimal Combinatorial Auctions for Complements Using Restricted Welfare Maximization. IJCAI 2011: 379-385
- [c169]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: Liquidity-Sensitive Automated Market Makers via Homogeneous Risk Measures. WINE 2011: 314-325
- 2010
- [j34]Tuomas Sandholm: The State of Solving Large Incomplete-Information Games, and Application to Poker. AI Magazine 31(4): 13-32 (2010)
- [j33]Michael Benisch, George B. Davis, Tuomas Sandholm: Algorithms for Closed Under Rational Behavior (CURB) Sets. J. Artif. Intell. Res. (JAIR) 38: 513-534 (2010)
- [j32]Samid Hoda, Andrew Gilpin, Javier Peña, Tuomas Sandholm: Smoothing Techniques for Computing Nash Equilibria of Sequential Games. Math. Oper. Res. 35(2): 494-512 (2010)
- [c168]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: Envy Quotes and the Iterated Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auction. AAAI 2010
- [c167]
- [c166]William E. Walsh, Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields, George L. Nemhauser, David C. Parkes: Automated Channel Abstraction for Advertising Auctions. AAAI 2010
- [c165]Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing equilibria by incorporating qualitative models? AAMAS 2010: 183-190
- [c164]
- [c163]
- [c162]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm, Eric Budish: Finding approximate competitive equilibria: efficient and fair course allocation. AAMAS 2010: 873-880
- [c161]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Speeding up gradient-based algorithms for sequential games. AAMAS 2010: 1463-1464
- [c160]Piotr Krysta, Tomasz P. Michalak, Tuomas Sandholm, Michael Wooldridge: Combinatorial auctions with externalities. AAMAS 2010: 1471-1472
- [c159]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: Automated market-making in the large: the gates hillman prediction market. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2010: 367-376
- [c158]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm, David M. Pennock, Daniel M. Reeves: A practical liquidity-sensitive automated market maker. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2010: 377-386
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [c157]Michael Benisch, Norman M. Sadeh, Tuomas Sandholm: Methodology for Designing Reasonably Expressive Mechanisms with Application to Ad Auctions. IJCAI 2009: 46-52
- [c156]Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing Equilibria in Multiplayer Stochastic Games of Imperfect Information. IJCAI 2009: 140-146
- [c155]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: How Pervasive Is the Myerson-Satterthwaite Impossibility? IJCAI 2009: 233-238
- [c154]Pranjal Awasthi, Tuomas Sandholm: Online Stochastic Optimization in the Large: Application to Kidney Exchange. IJCAI 2009: 405-411
- [c153]Abraham Othman, Tuomas Sandholm: Better with Byzantine: Manipulation-Optimal Mechanisms. SAGT 2009: 60-71
- [c152]Michael Benisch, Patrick Gage Kelley, Norman M. Sadeh, Tuomas Sandholm, Janice Y. Tsai, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Paul Hankes Drielsma: The impact of expressiveness on the effectiveness of privacy mechanisms for location-sharing. SOUPS 2009
- 2008
- [j31]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: New complexity results about Nash equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior 63(2): 621-641 (2008)
- [j30]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm: On the Existence of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auction Protocols. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 11(2) (2008)
- [c151]Michael Benisch, Norman M. Sadeh, Tuomas Sandholm: A Theory of Expressiveness in Mechanisms. AAAI 2008: 17-23
- [c150]Craig Boutilier, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm, William E. Walsh: Expressive Banner Ad Auctions and Model-Based Online Optimization for Clearing. AAAI 2008: 30-37
- [c149]Andrew Gilpin, Javier Peña, Tuomas Sandholm: First-Order Algorithm with O(ln(1/e)) Convergence for e-Equilibrium in Two-Person Zero-Sum Games. AAAI 2008: 75-82
- [c148]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Expectation-Based Versus Potential-Aware Automated Abstraction in Imperfect Information Games: An Experimental Comparison Using Poker. AAAI 2008: 1454-1457
- [c147]William E. Walsh, David C. Parkes, Tuomas Sandholm, Craig Boutilier: Computing Reserve Prices and Identifying the Value Distribution in Real-world Auctions with Market Disruptions. AAAI 2008: 1499-1502
- [c146]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Solving two-person zero-sum repeated games of incomplete information. AAMAS (2) 2008: 903-910
- [c145]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm, Troels Bjerre Sørensen: A heads-up no-limit Texas Hold'em poker player: discretized betting models and automatically generated equilibrium-finding programs. AAMAS (2) 2008: 911-918
- [c144]Sam Ganzfried, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing an approximate jam/fold equilibrium for 3-player no-limit Texas Hold'em tournaments. AAMAS (2) 2008: 919-925
- [c143]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm, Troels Bjerre Sørensen: GS3 and Tartanian: game theory-based heads-up limit and no-limit Texas Hold'em poker-playing programs. AAMAS (Demos) 2008: 1647-1648
- [e3]Lance Fortnow, John Riedl, Tuomas Sandholm (Eds.): Proceedings 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC-2008), Chicago, IL, USA, June 8-12, 2008. ACM 2008, ISBN 978-1-60558-169-9
- 2007
- [j29]
- [j28]Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive Commerce and Its Application to Sourcing: How We Conducted $35 Billion of Generalized Combinatorial Auctions. AI Magazine 28(3): 45-58 (2007)
- [j27]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Jérôme Lang: When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?. J. ACM 54(3): 14 (2007)
- [j26]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Lossless abstraction of imperfect information games. J. ACM 54(5) (2007)
- [j25]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: AWESOME: A general multiagent learning algorithm that converges in self-play and learns a best response against stationary opponents. Machine Learning 67(1-2): 23-43 (2007)
- [c142]Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive commerce and its application to sourcing: how we conducted $35 billion of generalized combinatorial auctions. ICEC 2007: 349-350
- [c141]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm, Troels Bjerre Sørensen: Potential-Aware Automated Abstraction of Sequential Games, and Holistic Equilibrium Analysis of Texas Hold'em Poker. AAAI 2007: 50-57
- [c140]Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Tuomas Sandholm: Automated Online Mechanism Design and Prophet Inequalities. AAAI 2007: 58-65
- [c139]Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive Commerce and Its Application to Sourcing: How We Conducted $25 Billion of Generalized Combinatorial Auctions. AAIM 2007: 426
- [c138]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Better automated abstraction techniques for imperfect information games, with application to Texas Hold'em poker. AAMAS 2007: 192
- [c137]Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Francesca Rossi, Tuomas Sandholm: 07431 Executive Summary - Computational Issues in Social Choice. Computational Issues in Social Choice 2007
- [c136]Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Francesca Rossi, Tuomas Sandholm: 07431 Abstracts Collection - Computational Issues in Social Choice. Computational Issues in Social Choice 2007
- [c135]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham: Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions. IJCAI 2007: 1207-1214
- [c134]
- [c133]Tuomas Sandholm, Vincent Conitzer, Craig Boutilier: Automated Design of Multistage Mechanisms. IJCAI 2007: 1500-1506
- [c132]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Information-Theoretic Approaches to Branching in Search. IJCAI 2007: 2286-2292
- [c131]David J. Abraham, Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm: Clearing algorithms for barter exchange markets: enabling nationwide kidney exchanges. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2007: 295-304
- [c130]Andrew Gilpin, Samid Hoda, Javier Peña, Tuomas Sandholm: Gradient-Based Algorithms for Finding Nash Equilibria in Extensive Form Games. WINE 2007: 57-69
- [e2]Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Francesca Rossi, Tuomas Sandholm (Eds.): Computational Issues in Social Choice, 21.10. - 26.10.2007. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 07431, Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum fuer Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany 2007
- 2006
- [j24]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of constructing solutions in the core based on synergies among coalitions. Artif. Intell. 170(6-7): 607-619 (2006)
- [j23]Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri: Side constraints and non-price attributes in markets. Games and Economic Behavior 55(2): 321-330 (2006)
- [j22]Tuomas Sandholm, David Levine, Michael Concordia, Paul Martyn, Rick Hughes, Jim Jacobs, Dennis Begg: Changing the Game in Strategic Sourcing at Procter & Gamble: Expressive Competition Enabled by Optimization. Interfaces 36(1): 55-68 (2006)
- [j21]Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich: Online algorithms for market clearing. J. ACM 53(5): 845-879 (2006)
- [c129]Michael Benisch, George B. Davis, Tuomas Sandholm: Algorithms for Rationalizability and CURB Sets. AAAI 2006: 598-604
- [c128]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Nonexistence of Voting Rules That Are Usually Hard to Manipulate. AAAI 2006: 627-634
- [c127]Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Kohki Maruono, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: A Compact Representation Scheme for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. AAAI 2006: 697-702
- [c126]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: A Competitive Texas Hold'em Poker Player via Automated Abstraction and Real-Time Equilibrium Computation. AAAI 2006: 1007-1013
- [c125]
- [c124]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Failures of the VCG mechanism in combinatorial auctions and exchanges. AAMAS 2006: 521-528
- [c123]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: A technique for reducing normal-form games to compute a Nash equilibrium. AAMAS 2006: 537-544
- [c122]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Information-theoretic approaches to branching in search. AAMAS 2006: 545-547
- [c121]Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin: Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation. AAMAS 2006: 1127-1134
- [c120]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: A Texas Hold'em poker player based on automated abstraction and real-time equilibrium computation. AAMAS 2006: 1453-1454
- [c119]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing the optimal strategy to commit to. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006: 82-90
- [c118]Andrew Gilpin, Tuomas Sandholm: Finding equilibria in large sequential games of imperfect information. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2006: 160-169
- 2005
- [j20]Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, David Levine: CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions. Management Science 51(3): 374-390 (2005)
- [c117]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Paolo Santi: Combinatorial Auctions with k-wise Dependent Valuations. AAAI 2005: 248-254
- [c116]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive Negotiation in Settings with Externalities. AAAI 2005: 255-260
- [c115]Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm: Approximating Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auctions. AAAI 2005: 267-274
- [c114]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: A Generalized Strategy Eliminability Criterion and Computational Methods for Applying It. AAAI 2005: 483-488
- [c113]Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin, Vincent Conitzer: Mixed-Integer Programming Methods for Finding Nash Equilibria. AAAI 2005: 495-501
- [c112]Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki: Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. AAAI 2005: 509-515
- [c111]
- [c110]
- [c109]
- [c108]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham: Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions. Computing and Markets 2005
- [c107]Daniel J. Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm: 05011 Executive Summary - Computing and Markets. Computing and Markets 2005
- [c106]Daniel J. Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm: 05011 Abstracts Collection - Computing and Markets. Computing and Markets 2005
- [c105]
- [c104]Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin: Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation. Computing and Markets 2005
- [c103]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm: Efficient Privacy-Preserving Protocols for Multi-unit Auctions. Financial Cryptography 2005: 298-312
- [c102]Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki: Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. IJCAI 2005: 1668-1669
- [c101]Makoto Yokoo, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm, Naoki Ohta, Atsushi Iwasaki: A New Solution Concept for Coalitional Games in Open Anonymous Environments. JSAI Workshops 2005: 53-64
- [c100]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Communication complexity of common voting rules. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 78-87
- [c99]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of (iterated) dominance. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005: 88-97
- [c98]
- [c97]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Common Voting Rules as Maximum Likelihood Estimators. UAI 2005: 145-152
- [e1]Daniel J. Lehmann, Rudolf Müller, Tuomas Sandholm (Eds.): Computing and Markets, 3.-7. January 2005. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 05011, Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum für Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany 2005
- 2004
- [j19]Avrim Blum, Jeffrey C. Jackson, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich: Preference Elicitation and Query Learning. Journal of Machine Learning Research 5: 649-667 (2004)
- [c96]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Using Performance Profile Trees to Improve Deliberation Control. AAAI 2004: 73-79
- [c95]Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm, Rob Shields: Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences in (Combinatorial) Auctions. AAAI 2004: 204-211
- [c94]Vincent Conitzer, Jonathan Derryberry, Tuomas Sandholm: Combinatorial Auctions with Structured Item Graphs. AAAI 2004: 212-218
- [c93]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computing Shapley Values, Manipulating Value Division Schemes, and Checking Core Membership in Multi-Issue Domains. AAAI 2004: 219-225
- [c92]Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm: Methods for Boosting Revenue in Combinatorial Auctions. AAAI 2004: 232-237
- [c91]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Revenue Failures and Collusion in Combinatorial Auctions and Exchanges with VCG Payments. AMEC 2004: 1-14
- [c90]
- [c89]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: An Algorithm for Automatically Designing Deterministic Mechanisms without Payments. AAMAS 2004: 128-135
- [c88]Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Anonymous Pricing of Efficient Allocations in Combinatorial Economies. AAMAS 2004: 254-260
- [c87]Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm: Effectiveness of Query Types and Policies for Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions. AAMAS 2004: 386-393
- [c86]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Experiments on Deliberation Equilibria in Auctions. AAMAS 2004: 394-401
- [c85]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm: Im)Possibility of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auctions. AAMAS 2004: 810-817
- [c84]Anshul Kothari, Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri: Solving Combinatorial Exchanges: Optimality via a Few Partial Bids. AAMAS 2004: 1418-1419
- [c83]Paolo Santi, Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Towards a Characterization of Polynomial Preference Elicitation with Value Queries in Combinatorial Auctions (Extended Abstract). COLT 2004: 1-16
- [c82]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Communication complexity as a lower bound for learning in games. ICML 2004
- [c81]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Expressive negotiation over donations to charities. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 51-60
- [c80]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Self-interested automated mechanism design and implications for optimal combinatorial auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 132-141
- [c79]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Computational criticisms of the revelation principle. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 262-263
- [c78]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Strategic deliberation and truthful revelation: an impossibility result. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 264-265
- [c77]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with vcg payments. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 266-267
- [c76]Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm: Mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency in multi-unit auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2004: 268-269
- 2003
- [j18]Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri: BOB: Improved winner determination in combinatorial auctions and generalizations. Artif. Intell. 145(1-2): 33-58 (2003)
- [j17]Subhash Suri, Tuomas Sandholm, Priyank Ramesh Warkhede: Compressing Two-Dimensional Routing Tables. Algorithmica 35(4): 287-300 (2003)
- [c75]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Automated mechanism design: complexity results stemming from the single-agent setting. ICEC 2003: 17-24
- [c74]Tuomas Sandholm, Andrew Gilpin: Sequences of Take-It-or-Leave-It Offers: Near-Optimal Auctions Without Full Valuation Revelation. AMEC 2003: 73-91
- [c73]Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm: Mechanism for Optimally Trading Off Revenue and Efficiency in Multi-unit Auctions. AMEC 2003: 92-108
- [c72]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Miscomputing ratio: social cost of selfish computing. AAMAS 2003: 273-280
- [c71]Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm: Generalizing preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. AAMAS 2003: 1014-1015
- [c70]Avrim Blum, Jeffrey C. Jackson, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich: Preference Elicitation and Query Learning. COLT 2003: 13-25
- [c69]Tuomas Sandholm: Automated Mechanism Design: A New Application Area for Search Algorithms. CP 2003: 19-36
- [c68]
- [c67]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents. ICML 2003: 83-90
- [c66]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games. ICML 2003: 91-98
- [c65]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core. IJCAI 2003: 613-618
- [c64]
- [c63]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. IJCAI 2003: 781-788
- [c62]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems. IJCAI 2003: 1099-1106
- [c61]Tuomas Sandholm: Making Markets and Democracy Work: A Story of Incentives and Computing. IJCAI 2003: 1649-
- [c60]Xiao Feng Wang, Tuomas Sandholm: Learning Near-Pareto-Optimal Conventions in Polynomial Time. NIPS 2003
- [c59]Martin Zinkevich, Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm: On polynomial-time preference elicitation with value queries. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 176-185
- [c58]Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 196-197
- [c57]Anton Likhodedov, Tuomas Sandholm: Auction mechanism for optimally trading off revenue and efficiency. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 212-213
- [c56]Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm: Using value queries in combinatorial auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 226-227
- [c55]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of determining nonemptiness of the core. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 230-231
- [c54]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Automated mechanism design for a self-interested designer. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 232-233
- [c53]Anshul Kothari, Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri: Solving combinatorial exchanges: optimality via a few partial bids. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2003: 236-237
- [c52]Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm: How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? TARK 2003: 201-214
- [c51]
- [i12]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Definition and Complexity of Some Basic Metareasoning Problems. CoRR cs.AI/0307017 (2003)
- [i11]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: AWESOME: A General Multiagent Learning Algorithm that Converges in Self-Play and Learns a Best Response Against Stationary Opponents. CoRR cs.GT/0307002 (2003)
- [i10]Vincent Conitzer, Jérôme Lang, Tuomas Sandholm: How many candidates are needed to make elections hard to manipulate? CoRR cs.GT/0307003 (2003)
- [i9]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: BL-WoLF: A Framework For Loss-Bounded Learnability In Zero-Sum Games. CoRR cs.GT/0307006 (2003)
- [i8]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Determining Nonemptiness of the Core. CoRR cs.GT/0307016 (2003)
- [i7]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard. CoRR cs.GT/0307018 (2003)
- 2002
- [j16]Tuomas Sandholm: Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Artif. Intell. 135(1-2): 1-54 (2002)
- [j15]Tuomas Sandholm, Yunhong Zhou: Surplus equivalence of leveled commitment contracts. Artif. Intell. 142(2): 239-264 (2002)
- [j14]Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser: Leveled-Commitment Contracting: A Backtracking Instrument for Multiagent Systems. AI Magazine 23(3): 89-100 (2002)
- [j13]Sviatoslav Braynov, Tuomas Sandholm: Contracting With Uncertain Level Of Trust. Computational Intelligence 18(4): 501-514 (2002)
- [j12]Tuomas Sandholm: eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server. Computational Intelligence 18(4): 656-676 (2002)
- [c50]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 314-319
- [c49]Tuomas Sandholm, Xiao Feng Wang: (Im)possibility of Safe Exchange Mechanism Design. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 338-344
- [c48]Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Partial-Revelation VCG Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 367-372
- [c47]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness. AAAI/IAAI 2002: 392-397
- [c46]Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Differential -Revelation VCG Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions. AMEC 2002: 34-51
- [c45]Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm: Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions. AMEC 2002: 69-86
- [c44]Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, David Levine: Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations. AAMAS 2002: 69-76
- [c43]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: An alternating offers bargaining model for computationally limited agents. AAMAS 2002: 135-142
- [c42]
- [c41]Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. AAMAS 2002: 168-169
- [c40]Sviatoslav Braynov, Tuomas Sandholm: Incentive compatible mechanism for trust revelation. AAMAS 2002: 310-311
- [c39]
- [c38]Xiaofeng Wang, Tuomas Sandholm: Reinforcement Learning to Play an Optimal Nash Equilibrium in Team Markov Games. NIPS 2002: 1571-1578
- [c37]Avrim Blum, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich: Online algorithms for market clearing. SODA 2002: 971-980
- [c36]
- [i6]Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm: Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR cs.GT/0205066 (2002)
- [i5]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Vote Elicitation: Complexity and Strategy-Proofness. CoRR cs.GT/0205073 (2002)
- [i4]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria. CoRR cs.GT/0205074 (2002)
- [i3]
- [i2]Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm: Complexity of Manipulating Elections with Few Candidates. CoRR cs.GT/0205076 (2002)
- 2001
- [j11]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibrium. Artif. Intell. 132(2): 183-217 (2001)
- [j10]Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser: Leveled Commitment Contracts and Strategic Breach. Games and Economic Behavior 35(1-2): 212-270 (2001)
- [c35]Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri, Andrew Gilpin, David Levine: CABOB: A Fast Optimal Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions. IJCAI 2001: 1102-1108
- [c34]
- [c33]Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm: Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2001: 256-259
- 2000
- [j9]Tuomas Sandholm: Agents in Electronic Commerce: Component Technologies for Automated Negation and Coalition Formation. Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 3(1): 73-96 (2000)
- [j8]Tuomas Sandholm: Approaches to winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Decision Support Systems 28(1-2): 165-176 (2000)
- [j7]Tuomas Sandholm, Qianbo Huai: Nomad: Mobile Agent System for an Internet-Based Auction House. IEEE Internet Computing 4(2): 80-86 (2000)
- [j6]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Anytime coalition structure generation: an average case study. J. Exp. Theor. Artif. Intell. 12(1): 23-42 (2000)
- [c32]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Deliberation in Equilibrium: Bargaining in Computationally Complex Problems. AAAI/IAAI 2000: 48-55
- [c31]Tuomas Sandholm, Subhash Suri: Improved Algorithms for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions and Generalizations. AAAI/IAAI 2000: 90-97
- [c30]
- [c29]Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm: Contract Type Sequencing for Reallocative Negotiation. ICDCS 2000: 154-160
- [c28]Sviatoslav Brainov, Tuomas Sandholm: Reasoning About Others: Representing and Processing Infinite Belief Hierarchies. ICMAS 2000: 71-78
- [c27]Tuomas Sandholm, Yunhong Zhou: Surplus Equivalence of Leveled Commitment Contracts. ICMAS 2000: 247-254
- [c26]
- [c25]Subhash Suri, Tuomas Sandholm, Priyank Ramesh Warkhede: Optimal Flow Aggregation. SWAT 2000: 462-475
1990 – 1999
- 1999
- [j5]Tuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory, Fernando Tohmé: Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees. Artif. Intell. 111(1-2): 209-238 (1999)
- [j4]
- [j3]Fernando Tohmé, Tuomas Sandholm: Coalition Formation Processes with Belief Revision among Bounded-rational Self-interested Agents. J. Log. Comput. 9(6): 793-815 (1999)
- [c24]Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm: Time-Quality Tradeoffs in Reallocative Negotiation with Combinatorial Contract Types. AAAI/IAAI 1999: 3-10
- [c23]Sviatoslav Brainov, Tuomas Sandholm: Power, Dependence and Stability in Multiagent Plans. AAAI/IAAI 1999: 11-16
- [c22]
- [c21]
- [c20]Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm: Anytime Coalition Structure Generation: An Average Case Study. Agents 1999: 40-47
- [c19]Tuomas Sandholm, Sandeep Sikka, Samphel Norden: Algorithms for Optimizing Leveled Commitment Contracts. IJCAI 1999: 535-541
- [c18]Tuomas Sandholm: An Algorithm for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions. IJCAI 1999: 542-547
- [c17]Sviatoslav Brainov, Tuomas Sandholm: Contracting with uncertain level of trust. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 1999: 15-21
- 1998
- [c16]Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm: Leveled Commitment Contracts with Myopic and Strategic Agents. AAAI/IAAI 1998: 38-45
- [c15]Tuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory, Fernando Tohmé: Anytime Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees. AAAI/IAAI 1998: 46-53
- [c14]Hyacinth S. Nwana, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein, Tuomas Sandholm, Carles Sierra, Pattie Maes, Robert H. Guttman: Agent-Mediated Electronic Commerce: Issues, Challenges and Some Viewpoints. Agents 1998: 189-196
- [c13]Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm: Sequencing of Contract Types for Anytime Task Reallocation. AMET 1998: 54-69
- [c12]Tuomas Sandholm: Agents in Electronic Commerce: Component Technologies for Automated Negation and Coalition Formation. CIA 1998: 113-134
- [c11]Tuomas Sandholm: Agents in Electronic Commerce: Component Technologies for Automated Negotiation and Coalition Formation. ICMAS 1998: 10-11
- [c10]Martin Andersson, Tuomas Sandholm: Leveled Commitment Contracting among Myopic Individually Rational Agents. ICMAS 1998: 26-33
- [i1]Tuomas Sandholm, Kate Larson, Martin Andersson, Onn Shehory, Fernando Tohmé: Anytime Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees. CoRR cs.MA/9810005 (1998)
- 1997
- [j2]Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser: Coalitions Among Computationally Bounded Agents. Artif. Intell. 94(1-2): 99-137 (1997)
- [j1]
- [c9]Tuomas Sandholm, Fredrik Ygge: On the Gains and Losses of Speculation in Equilibrium Markets. IJCAI (1) 1997: 632-639
- 1996
- [c8]Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser: Advantages of a Leveled Commitment Contracting Protocol. AAAI/IAAI, Vol. 1 1996: 126-133
- [c7]
- 1995
- [c6]Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser: Issues in Automated Negotiation and Electronic Commerce: Extending the Contract Net Framework. ICMAS 1995: 328-335
- [c5]Tuomas Sandholm, Robert H. Crites: On Multiagent Q-Learning in a Semi-Competitive Domain. Adaption and Learning in Multi-Agent Systems 1995: 191-205
- [c4]Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser: Coalition Formation among Bounded Rational Agents. IJCAI (1) 1995: 662-671
- [c3]Tuomas Sandholm, Victor R. Lesser: Equilibrium Analysis of the Possibilities of Unenforced Exchange in Multiagent Systems. IJCAI (1) 1995: 694-703
- 1994
- [c2]Daniel E. Neiman, David W. Hildum, Victor R. Lesser, Tuomas Sandholm: Exploiting Meta-Level information in a Distributed Scheduling System. AAAI 1994: 394-400
- 1993
- [c1]Tuomas Sandholm: An Implementation of the Contract Net Protocol Based on Marginal Cost Calculations. AAAI 1993: 256-262
Coauthor Index
[j39] [i14] [j36] [j31] [j27] [j25] [c134] [c133] [j24] [c128] [c127] [c124] [c123] [c119] [c117] [c116] [c114] [c113] [c112] [c102] [c101] [c100] [c99] [c97] [c94] [c93] [c91] [c89] [c83] [c82] [c81] [c80] [c79] [c77] [c75] [c67] [c66] [c65] [c64] [c63] [c62] [c55] [c54] [c52] [i12] [i11] [i10] [i9] [i8] [i7] [c50] [c47] [c36] [i5] [i4] [i3] [i2]
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last updated on 2013-10-02 10:55 CEST by the dblp team