Shahar Dobzinski
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2010 – today
- 2017
- [j16]Keren Cohavi, Shahar Dobzinski:
Faster and Simpler Sketches of Valuation Functions. ACM Trans. Algorithms 13(3): 30:1-30:9 (2017) - [c35]
- [i25]
- [i24]
- 2016
- [j15]Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák:
Impossibility Results for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations. J. ACM 63(1): 5:1-5:19 (2016) - [c34]
- [c33]Shahar Dobzinski:
Breaking the logarithmic barrier for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. STOC 2016: 940-948 - [i23]Shahar Dobzinski:
Breaking the Logarithmic Barrier for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders. CoRR abs/1602.05914 (2016) - [i22]
- [i21]Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski:
(Almost) Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading. CoRR abs/1604.04876 (2016) - 2015
- [j14]Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg:
Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders. Games and Economic Behavior 92: 349-369 (2015) - [j13]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
Multi-unit auctions: Beyond Roberts. J. Economic Theory 156: 14-44 (2015) - [c32]Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert D. Kleinberg:
On the Complexity of Computing an Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions. SODA 2015: 110-122 - [c31]Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Omri Weinstein:
Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium. WINE 2015: 300-313 - [i20]Shahar Dobzinski, Ami Mor:
On the Greedy Algorithm for Combinatorial Auctions with a Random Order. CoRR abs/1502.02178 (2015) - [i19]Shahar Dobzinski, Ami Mor:
A Deterministic Algorithm for Maximizing Submodular Functions. CoRR abs/1507.07237 (2015) - 2014
- [c30]Shahar Dobzinski, Renato Paes Leme:
Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets. ICALP (1) 2014: 392-404 - [c29]
- [c28]
- [c27]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren:
Economic efficiency requires interaction. STOC 2014: 233-242 - [i18]
- [i17]Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg:
On the Complexity of Computing an Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR abs/1404.2041 (2014) - [i16]
- [i15]Shahar Dobzinski, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Omri Weinstein:
Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium. CoRR abs/1406.0576 (2014) - [i14]Keren Cohavi, Shahar Dobzinski:
Faster and Simpler Sketches of Valuation Functions. CoRR abs/1407.7269 (2014) - 2013
- [j12]Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi:
On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design. SIAM J. Comput. 42(6): 2287-2304 (2013) - [c26]Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák:
Communication Complexity of Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations. SODA 2013: 1205-1215 - [i13]Shahar Dobzinski, Renato Paes Leme:
Efficiency Guarantees in Auctions with Budgets. CoRR abs/1304.7048 (2013) - [i12]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Sigal Oren:
Economic Efficiency Requires Interaction. CoRR abs/1311.4721 (2013) - 2012
- [j11]Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi, Noam Nisan:
Multi-unit auctions with budget limits. Games and Economic Behavior 74(2): 486-503 (2012) - [j10]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira:
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 78(1): 15-25 (2012) - [j9]Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi:
Optimal Lower Bounds for Anonymous Scheduling Mechanisms. Math. Oper. Res. 37(2): 244-258 (2012) - [c25]Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Aviv Zohar:
On bitcoin and red balloons. EC 2012: 56-73 - [c24]Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren:
Optimization with demand oracles. EC 2012: 110-127 - [c23]Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák:
The computational complexity of truthfulness in combinatorial auctions. EC 2012: 405-422 - [c22]Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg, Noam Nisan, Tim Roughgarden:
Sketching valuation functions. SODA 2012: 1025-1035 - [c21]Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák:
From query complexity to computational complexity. STOC 2012: 1107-1116 - [i11]Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák:
The Computational Complexity of Truthfulness in Combinatorial Auctions. CoRR abs/1202.2789 (2012) - [i10]Shahar Dobzinski, Jan Vondrák:
On the Hardness of Welfare Maximization in Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations. CoRR abs/1202.2792 (2012) - 2011
- [j8]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
Limitations of VCG-based mechanisms. Combinatorica 31(4): 379-396 (2011) - [j7]Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden:
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents. SIAM J. Comput. 40(3): 915-933 (2011) - [j6]Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Aviv Zohar:
On Bitcoin and red balloons. SIGecom Exchanges 10(3): 5-9 (2011) - [c20]
- [c19]Shahar Dobzinski, Christos H. Papadimitriou, Yaron Singer:
Mechanisms for complement-free procurement. EC 2011: 273-282 - [c18]Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert D. Kleinberg:
Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy. STOC 2011: 129-138 - [c17]Shahar Dobzinski:
An impossibility result for truthful combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations. STOC 2011: 139-148 - [i9]Ashwinkumar Badanidiyuru, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren:
Optimization with Demand Oracles. CoRR abs/1107.2869 (2011) - [i8]Moshe Babaioff, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, Aviv Zohar:
On Bitcoin and Red Balloons. CoRR abs/1111.2626 (2011) - 2010
- [j5]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 37: 85-98 (2010) - [j4]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira:
Approximation Algorithms for Combinatorial Auctions with Complement-Free Bidders. Math. Oper. Res. 35(1): 1-13 (2010) - [i7]
- [i6]Shahar Dobzinski:
An Impossibility Result for Truthful Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Valuations. CoRR abs/1011.1830 (2010) - [i5]Shahar Dobzinski, Hu Fu, Robert Kleinberg:
Optimal Auctions with Correlated Bidders are Easy. CoRR abs/1011.2413 (2010) - [i4]
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [j3]Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi:
VCG is the best anonymous scheduling mechanism. SIGecom Exchanges 8(1) (2009) - [c16]Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi:
On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design. FOCS 2009: 505-514 - [c15]
- [c14]Itai Ashlagi, Shahar Dobzinski, Ron Lavi:
An optimal lower bound for anonymous scheduling mechanisms. EC 2009: 169-176 - [i3]Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi:
On the Power of Randomization in Algorithmic Mechanism Design. CoRR abs/0904.4193 (2009) - [i2]Shahar Dobzinski:
A Note on the Power of Truthful Approximation Mechanisms. CoRR abs/0907.5219 (2009) - 2008
- [c13]Peerapong Dhangwatnotai, Shahar Dobzinski, Shaddin Dughmi, Tim Roughgarden:
Truthful Approximation Schemes for Single-Parameter Agents. FOCS 2008: 15-24 - [c12]
- [c11]Richard Cole, Shahar Dobzinski, Lisa Fleischer:
Prompt Mechanisms for Online Auctions. SAGT 2008: 170-181 - [c10]Shahar Dobzinski, Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan:
Is Shapley Cost Sharing Optimal? SAGT 2008: 327-336 - [c9]Shahar Dobzinski, Mukund Sundararajan:
On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling. EC 2008: 38-47 - [c8]Shahar Dobzinski, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Frequent Manipulability of Elections: The Case of Two Voters. WINE 2008: 653-664 - 2007
- [j2]Liad Blumrosen, Shahar Dobzinski:
Welfare Maximization in Congestion Games. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications 25(6): 1224-1236 (2007) - [j1]Shahar Dobzinski:
Better mechanisms for combinatorial auctions via maximal-in-range algorithms? SIGecom Exchanges 7(1): 30-33 (2007) - [c7]
- [c6]
- [c5]
- 2006
- [c4]
- [c3]Shahar Dobzinski, Michael Schapira:
An improved approximation algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. SODA 2006: 1064-1073 - [c2]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira:
Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. STOC 2006: 644-652 - [i1]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan:
Approximations by Computationally-Efficient VCG-Based Mechanisms. Electronic Colloquium on Computational Complexity (ECCC) 13(074) (2006) - 2005
- [c1]Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Michael Schapira:
Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders. STOC 2005: 610-618
Coauthor Index
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last updated on 2018-04-26 15:38 CEST by the dblp team