Please note: This is a beta version of the new dblp website.
You can find the classic dblp view of this page here.
You can find the classic dblp view of this page here.
Steven J. Brams
2010 – today
- 2013
[j16]Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour: Kingmakers and leaders in coalition formation. Social Choice and Welfare 41(1): 1-18 (2013)- [j15]Steven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones, Christian Klamler: N-Person Cake-Cutting: There May Be No Perfect Division. The American Mathematical Monthly 120(1): 35-47 (2013)
- 2012
- [j14]Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour, Christian Klamler: The undercut procedure: an algorithm for the envy-free division of indivisible items. Social Choice and Welfare 39(2-3): 615-631 (2012)
- [c7]Steven J. Brams, Michal Feldman, John K. Lai, Jamie Morgenstern, Ariel D. Procaccia: On Maxsum Fair Cake Divisions. AAAI 2012
- 2011
- [b6]Steven J. Brams: Game Theory and the Humanities - Bridging Two Worlds. MIT Press 2011, ISBN 978-0-262-01522-6, pp. I-XI, 1-319
- [j13]Steven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones, Christian Klamler: Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Algorithm. SIAM Review 53(2): 291-307 (2011)
- [c6]D. Marc Kilgour, Steven J. Brams, Todd R. Kaplan: Three procedures for inducing honesty in bargaining. TARK 2011: 170-176
- 2010
- [j12]Stergios Athanassoglou, Steven J. Brams, Jay Sethuraman: A note on the inefficiency of bidding over the price of a share. Mathematical Social Sciences 60(3): 191-195 (2010)
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [j11]Julius B. Barbanel, Steven J. Brams, Walter Stromquist: Cutting a Pie Is Not a Piece of Cake. The American Mathematical Monthly 116(6): 496-514 (2009)
- [r1]
- 2008
- [j10]Steven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones, Christian Klamler: Proportional pie-cutting. Int. J. Game Theory 36(3-4): 353-367 (2008)
- [j9]Steven J. Brams: Mathematics and democracy: Designing better voting and fair-division procedures. Mathematical and Computer Modelling 48(9-10): 1666-1670 (2008)
- 2007
- [b5]Steven J. Brams: Mathematics and democracy - designing better voting and fair-division procedures. Princeton University Press 2007, ISBN 978-0-691-13321-8, pp. I-XVI, 1-373
- [b4]Steven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn: Approval voting (2. ed.). Springer 2007, ISBN 978-0-387-49895-9, pp. I-XXI, 1-198
- [b3]Steven J. Brams: Superior beings - if they exist, how would we know: game-theoretic implications of omniscience, omnipotence, immortality, and incomprehensibility (2. ed.). Springer 2007, ISBN 978-0-387-48065-7, pp. I-XXII, 1-202
- [c5]Steven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones, Christian Klamler: Divide-and-Conquer: A Proportional, Minimal-Envy Cake-Cutting Procedure. Fair Division 2007
- [c4]Steven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones, Christian Klamler: Better Ways to Cut a Cake - Revisited. Fair Division 2007
- [c3]
- [c2]
- [e1]Steven J. Brams, Kirk Pruhs, Gerhard J. Woeginger (Eds.): Fair Division, 24.06. - 29.06.2007. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 07261, Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum fuer Informatik (IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany 2007
- 2005
- [j8]Steven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn: Going from theory to practice: the mixed success of approval voting. Social Choice and Welfare 25(2-3): 457-474 (2005)
- 2004
- [j7]Julius B. Barbanel, Steven J. Brams: Cake division with minimal cuts: envy-free procedures for three persons, four persons, and beyond. Mathematical Social Sciences 48(3): 251-269 (2004)
- 2003
- [c1]Steven J. Brams, Michael A. Jones, D. Marc Kilgour: Dynamic models of coalition formation: fallback vs. build-up. TARK 2003: 187-200
- 2002
- [j6]Walter Bossert, Steven J. Brams, D. Marc Kilgour: Cooperative vs non-cooperative truels: little agreement, but does that matter? Games and Economic Behavior 40(2): 185-202 (2002)
- 2001
- [j5]Steven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn: A nail-biting election. Social Choice and Welfare 18(3): 409-414 (2001)
- 2000
- [b2]Steven J. Brams, Alan D. Taylor: The win-win solution - guaranteeing fair shares to everybody. W. W. Norton & Company 2000, ISBN 978-0-393-32081-7, pp. I-XI, 1-177
- [j4]Steven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn: Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity. Social Choice and Welfare 17(2): 247-267 (2000)
1990 – 1999
- 1999
- [j3]Steven J. Brams, Jeffrey M. Togman: Agreement through Threats: the Northern Ireland Case. IGTR 1(3-4): 251-265 (1999)
- 1996
- [b1]Steven J. Brams, Alan D. Taylor: Fair division - from cake-cutting to dispute resolution. Cambridge University Press 1996, ISBN 978-0-521-55644-6, pp. I-XIV, 1-272
- 1995
- [j2]
1980 – 1989
- 1982
- [j1]Steven J. Brams, Morton D. Davis: Optimal resource allocation in presidential primaries. Mathematical Social Sciences 3(4): 373-388 (1982)
Coauthor Index
data released under the ODC-BY 1.0 license. See also our legal information page
last updated on 2013-10-02 10:56 CEST by the dblp team