Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 21
Volume 21, Number 1, August 2003
- Kotaro Suzumura, Yongsheng Xu: Recoverability of choice functions and binary relations: some duality results. 21-37
- Miguel A. Ballester, Juan R. de Miguel: Extending an order to the power set: The Leximax Criterion. 63-71
- Biung-Ghi Ju: Strategy-proofness versus efficiency in exchange economies: General domain properties and applications. 73-93
- Edi Karni: Impartiality and interpersonal comparisons of variations in well-being. 95-111
- Yew-Kwang Ng: Appropriate discounting of future utilities need not be the dictatorship of the present: A note on Chichilnisky. 113-116
- Somdeb Lahiri: Justifiable preferences over opportunity sets. 117-129
- Sam Bucovetsky: The optimal majority with an endogenous status quo. 131-148
- Michel Regenwetter, A. A. J. Marley, Bernard Grofman: General concepts of value restriction and preference majority. 149-173
Volume 21, Number 2, October 2003
- Peter J. Hammond: Equal rights to trade and mediate. 181-193
- William Thomson: On monotonicity in economies with indivisible goods. 195-205
- Erik Schokkaert, Kurt Devooght: Responsibility-sensitive fair compensation in different cultures. 207-242
- Lars Ehlers, Bettina Klaus: Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems. 265-280
- Claude d'Aspremont, Jacques Crémer, Louis-André Gérard-Varet: Correlation, independence, and Bayesian incentives. 281-310
- Frédéric Gaspart: A general concept of procedural fairness for one-stage implementation. 311-322
- François Maniquet: Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information. 323-346
- Marc Fleurbaey: On the informational basis of social choice. 347-384
Volume 21, Number 3, December 2003
- John Broome: Obituary. 385
- Ilia Tsetlin, Michel Regenwetter, Bernard Grofman: The impartial culture maximizes the probability of majority cycles. 387-398
- Josep Freixas, William S. Zwicker: Weighted voting, abstention, and multiple levels of approval. 399-431
- Thomas C. Ratliff: Some startling inconsistencies when electing committees. 433-454
- Jac C. Heckelman: Probabilistic Borda rule voting. 455-468
- Biung-Ghi Ju: A characterization of strategy-proof voting rules for separable weak orderings. 469-499
- Yukihiro Nishimura: Optimal commodity taxation for reduction of envy. 501-527
- Donald E. Campbell: Book review. 529-530
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