Volume 17, Number 1, January 2000
, Thomas Schwartz
: Strategic manipulability without resoluteness or shared beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite generalized.
: Interpersonal comparisons of utility and the policy paralysis problem.
Jon R. Neill
: The benefit and sacrifice principles of taxation: A synthesis.
: Double implementation of Lindahl allocations by a pure mechanism.
Volume 17, Number 2, March 2000
: An algorithm for envy-free allocations in an economy with indivisible objects and money.
: Consistency, dummy and independence of irrelevant strategies for strategic games.
: Size and distributional uncertainty, public information and the information paradox.
Steven J. Brams
, Peter C. Fishburn
: Fair division of indivisible items between two people with identical preferences: Envy-freeness, Pareto-optimality, and equity.
: Unlikelihood of Condorcet's paradox in a large society.
: Monotonicity implies generalized strategy-proofness for correspondences.
Volume 17, Number 3, May 2000
H. Reiju Mihara
: Coalitionally strategyproof functions depend only on the most-preferred alternatives.
: Institutional innovation, contingency and war: A review.
: Manipulability, unanimity, anonymity and merging functions.
: Agreement, separability, and other axioms for quasi-linear social choice problems.
: A note on the non-emptiness of the stability set.
Volume 17, Number 4, August 2000
: A characterization of natural and double implementation in production economies.
Philippe De Donder
: Majority voting solution concepts and redistributive taxation.
: Characterizations of Lorenz curves and income distributions.