Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 163

Volume 163, May 2016

Regular Articles

• 
  Yulei Luo, Eric R. Young:
  Induced uncertainty, market price of risk, and the dynamics of consumption and wealth. 1-41
• 
  Byung-Soo Lee:
  Admissibility and assumption. 42-72
• 
  Hong Liu, Yajun Wang:
  Market making with asymmetric information and inventory risk. 73-109
• 
  Claudio Michelacci, Josep Pijoan-Mas:
  Labor supply with job assignment under balanced growth. 110-140
• 
  Jonas Häckner, Mathias Herzing:
  Welfare effects of taxation in oligopolistic markets. 141-166

Notes

• 
  Tommy Andersson, Lars-Gunnar Svensson:
  Strategy-proof house allocation with price restrictions. 167-177

Regular Articles

• 
  Jun Xiao:
  Asymmetric all-pay contests with heterogeneous prizes. 178-221
• 
  J. Aislinn Bohren:
  Informational herding with model misspecification. 222-247
• 
  Sanxi Li, Hailin Sun, Tong Wang, Jun Yu:
  Assortative matching and risk sharing. 248-275
• 
  Jernej Copic, Clara Ponsati:
  Optimal robust bilateral trade: Risk neutrality. 276-287
• 
  Shankha Chakraborty, Jon C. Thompson, Etienne B. Yehoue:
  The culture of entrepreneurship. 288-317
• 
  Akira Okada:
  A non-cooperative bargaining theory with incomplete information: Verifiable types. 318-341
• 
  Penélope Hernández, Eilon Solan:
  Bounded computational capacity equilibrium. 342-364
• 
  Thomas Sampson:
  Assignment reversals: Trade, skill allocation and wage inequality. 365-409
• 
  Peter M. DeMarzo, Ilan Kremer, Yishay Mansour:
  Robust option pricing: Hannan and Blackwell meet Black and Scholes. 410-434
• 
  Lucas Rentschler, Theodore L. Turocy:
  Two-bidder all-pay auctions with interdependent valuations, including the highly competitive case. 435-466
• 
  Satyajit Chatterjee, Burcu Eyigungor:
  Continuous Markov equilibria with quasi-geometric discounting. 467-494
• 
  Maximilian Mihm:
  Reference dependent ambiguity. 495-524
• 
  Kiminori Matsuyama, Iryna Sushko, Laura Gardini:
  Revisiting the model of credit cycles with Good and Bad projects. 525-556
• 
  Felix J. Bierbrauer, Nick Netzer:
  Mechanism design and intentions. 557-603
• 
  Bing Han, Ya Tang, Liyan Yang:
  Public information and uninformed trading: Implications for market liquidity and price efficiency. 604-643

Notes

• 
  Chao Gu, Randall Wright:
  Monetary mechanisms. 644-657

Regular Articles

• 
  John Duggan:
  Limits of acyclic voting. 658-683
• 
  Rabah Amir, Natalia Lazzati:
  Endogenous information acquisition in Bayesian games with strategic complementarities. 684-698
• 
  Rohan Dutta, Ryosuke Ishii:
  Dynamic commitment games, efficiency and coordination. 699-727
• 
  Mehmet Barlo, Guilherme Carmona, Hamid Sabourian:
  Bounded memory Folk Theorem. 728-774

Notes

• 
  Christopher P. Chambers, Ce Liu, Seung-Keun Martinez:
  A test for risk-averse expected utility. 775-785

Regular Articles

• 
  William A. Branch, Bruce McGough:
  Heterogeneous beliefs and trading inefficiencies. 786-818

Notes

• 
  Bernardo Guimaraes, Ana Elisa Pereira:
  QWERTY is efficient. 819-825

Regular Articles

• 
  Stephen Morris, Hyun Song Shin, Muhamet Yildiz:
  Common belief foundations of global games. 826-848
• 
  Daniel Krähmer, Eugen Kovác:
  Optimal sequential delegation. 849-888
• 
  Yakov Babichenko, Omer Tamuz:
  Graphical potential games. 889-899
• 
  Takashi Kamihigashi, John Stachurski:
  Seeking ergodicity in dynamic economies. 900-924
• 
  Debasis Mishra:
  Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in restricted domains. 925-954
• 
  Eddie Dekel, Amanda Friedenberg, Marciano Siniscalchi:
  Lexicographic beliefs and assumption. 955-985