Volume 102, Number 1, January 2002
, Ichiro Obara
: Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring.
: The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring.
: On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations.
: On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private.
: Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication.
Volume 102, Number 2, February 2002
: Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation.
: Determinacy and Stability under Learning of Rational Expectations Equilibria.
: Why Sunk Costs Matter for Bargaining Outcomes: An Evolutionary Approach.
: Strategic Manipulation in Voting Games When Lotteries and Ties Are Permitted.
Erik J. Balder
: A Unifying Pair of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Existence Results.