Volume 102, Number 1, January 2002
V. Bhaskar,
Ichiro Obara:
Belief-Based Equilibria in the Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with Private Monitoring.
40-69
Michele Piccione:
The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring.
70-83
Olivier Compte:
On Sustaining Cooperation without Public Observations.
106-150
Olivier Compte:
On Failing to Cooperate When Monitoring Is Private.
151-188
Masaki Aoyagi:
Collusion in Dynamic Bertrand Oligopoly with Correlated Private Signals and Communication.
229-248
Volume 102, Number 2, February 2002
Peter Norman:
Legislative Bargaining and Coalition Formation.
322-353
Stéphane Gauthier:
Determinacy and Stability under Learning of Rational Expectations Equilibria.
354-374
Thomas Tröger:
Why Sunk Costs Matter for Bargaining Outcomes: An Evolutionary Approach.
375-402
Jean-Pierre Benoît:
Strategic Manipulation in Voting Games When Lotteries and Ties Are Permitted.
421-436
Erik J. Balder:
A Unifying Pair of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium Existence Results.
437-470
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