Stop the war!Остановите войну!
for scientists:
default search action
Google
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Internet Archive Scholar
CiteSeerX
ORCIDInternational Journal of Game Theory, Volume 48
Volume 48, Number 1, March 2019
- Peter A. Streufert
:
Equivalences among five game specifications, including a new specification whose nodes are sets of past choices. 1-32 - Gaëtan Fournier:
General distribution of consumers in pure Hotelling games. 33-59 - Philipp E. Otto, Daniel Dittmer:
Simultaneous but independent ultimatum game: strategic elasticity or social motive dependency? 61-80 - Brian R. Powers:
An analysis of dual-issue final-offer arbitration. 81-108 - Zhuozheng Li, Huanxing Yang, Lan Zhang:
Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information. 109-141 - Suchan Chae, Seho Kim:
The effects of third-party transfers in sequential anchored bargaining. 143-155 - Paula Jaramillo, Çagatay Kayi, Flip Klijn:
The core of roommate problems: size and rank-fairness within matched pairs. 157-179 - Andrés Perea, Arkadi Predtetchinski:
An epistemic approach to stochastic games. 181-203 - William Phan:
Efficient and incentive compatible exchange of real-time information. 205-242 - Eun Jeong Heo:
Preference profiles for efficiency, fairness, and consistency in school choice problems. 243-266 - Daehyun Kim:
Comparison of information structures in stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring. 267-285 - Pedro Calleja, Francesc Llerena:
Path monotonicity, consistency and axiomatizations of some weighted solutions. 287-310 - Andrea Gallice:
Bankruptcy problems with reference-dependent preferences. 311-336 - Sven O. Krumke, Clemens Thielen, Philipp Weinschenk, Stephan Westphal:
Full implementation of social choice functions in dominant strategies. 337-361
Volume 48, Number 2, June 2019
- In memoriam Bezalel Peleg (1936-2019). 363
- Jens Gudmundsson:
Compromises and Rewards: stable and non-manipulable probabilistic matching. 365-392 - Kyle Burke, Robert A. Hearn:
PSPACE-complete two-color planar placement games. 393-410 - Avishay Aiche:
On the equal treatment imputations subset in the bargaining set for smooth vector-measure games with a mixed measure space of players. 411-421 - Oleg V. Baskov:
Equilibrium payoffs in repeated two-player zero-sum games of finite automata. 423-431 - Boris G. Pittel:
On random stable partitions. 433-480 - Mehdi Salimi, Massimiliano Ferrara:
Differential game of optimal pursuit of one evader by many pursuers. 481-490 - Antoine Dailly, Valentin Gledel, Marc Heinrich:
A generalization of Arc-Kayles. 491-511 - János Flesch, Dries Vermeulen, Anna Zseleva:
Catch games: the impact of modeling decisions. 513-541 - Tomoya Tajika, Tomoya Kazumura:
Non-manipulability of uniform price auctions with a large number of objects. 543-569 - Andrés Perea, Elias Tsakas:
Limited focus in dynamic games. 571-607 - Martin Van der Linden:
Deferred acceptance is minimally manipulable. 609-645 - Joseph Armel Momo Kenfack, Bertrand Tchantcho, Bill Proces Tsague:
On the ordinal equivalence of the Jonhston, Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices for voting games with abstention. 647-671 - Yasuo Sasaki:
Rationalizability in multicriteria games. 673-685 - Alice Peng-Ju Su:
Team incentives with imperfect mutual inference. 687-712
Volume 48, Number 3, September 2019
- Alexander Shapoval, Shlomo Weber, Alexei V. Zakharov:
Valence influence in electoral competition with rank objectives. 713-753 - Ori Haimanko:
Composition independence in compound games: a characterization of the Banzhaf power index and the Banzhaf value. 755-768 - Yongsheng Xu, Naoki Yoshihara:
An equitable Nash solution to nonconvex bargaining problems. 769-779 - Koki Suetsugu:
Multiplayer games as extension of misère games. 781-796 - Kenju Kamei:
Cooperation and endogenous repetition in an infinitely repeated social dilemma. 797-834 - Ágnes Cseh, Martin Skutella:
Paths to stable allocations. 835-862 - Stefano Vannucci:
Majority judgment and strategy-proofness: a characterization. 863-886 - Zhigang Cao, Cheng-Zhong Qin, Xiaoguang Yang, Boyu Zhang:
Dynamic matching pennies on networks. 887-920 - Stéphan Sémirat:
Strategic information transmission despite conflict. 921-956 - Mustafa Oguz Afacan:
Matching with restricted trade. 957-977 - André Casajus, Koji Yokote:
Weakly differentially monotonic solutions for cooperative games. 979-997 - Robert J. Aumann:
My scientific first-born: a clarification. 999-1000
Volume 48, Number 4, December 2019
- Oliver Kirchkamp, J. Philipp Reiß:
Heterogeneous bids in auctions with rational and boundedly rational bidders: theory and experiment. 1001-1031 - Jiwoong Lee, Rudolf Müller, Dries Vermeulen:
Separating equilibrium in quasi-linear signaling games. 1033-1054 - Bo Chen:
Downstream competition and upstream labor market matching. 1055-1085 - Tamás Solymosi:
Weighted nucleoli and dually essential coalitions. 1087-1109 - Bertrand Mbama Engoulou, Lawrence Diffo Lambo:
Amplitude of weighted representation of voting games with several levels of approval. 1111-1137 - Daeyoung Jeong:
Job market signaling with imperfect competition among employers. 1139-1167 - Joshua S. Gans, Peter Landry:
Self-recognition in teams. 1169-1201 - Ivan Balbuzanov:
Lies and consequences. 1203-1240 - Geir B. Asheim, Andrés Perea:
Algorithms for cautious reasoning in games. 1241-1275 - Aviad Heifetz:
Robust multiplicity with (transfinitely) vanishing naiveté. 1277-1296
a service of 
manage site settings
To protect your privacy, all features that rely on external API calls from your browser are turned off by default. You need to opt-in for them to become active. All settings here will be stored as cookies with your web browser. For more information see our F.A.Q.
last updated on 2024-05-06 21:20 CEST by the dblp team
all metadata released as open data under CC0 1.0 license
see also: Terms of Use | Privacy Policy | Imprint
dblp was originally created in 1993 at:
since 2018, dblp has been operated and maintained by:
the dblp computer science bibliography is funded and supported by:
