dblp: International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 41

Yasuhiro Shirata: The evolution of fairness under an assortative matching rule in the ultimatum game. 1-21

Lisa V. Bruttel, Werner Güth, Ulrich Kamecke: Finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma experiments without a commonly known end. 23-47

Licun Xue, Lingling Zhang: Bidding and sequential coalition formation with externalities. 49-73

Péter Biró, Walter Kern, Daniël Paulusma: Computing solutions for matching games. 75-90

Liad Wagman, Vincent Conitzer: Choosing fair lotteries to defeat the competition. 91-129

Leandro Chaves Rêgo, Joseph Y. Halpern: Generalized solution concepts in games with possibly unaware players. 131-155

Sylvain Béal, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal: Compensations in the Shapley value and the compensation solutions for graph games. 157-178

Marilda Sotomayor: A further note on the college admission game. 179-193

Abraham Neyman: The value of two-person zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information and uncertain duration. 195-207

Antonio J. Morales, Gonzalo Fernández-de-Córdoba: The Walrasian output beats the market. 209-212

Omkar D. Palsule-Desai: Y. Narahari, D. Garg, R. Narayanam and H. Prakash: Game theoretic problems in network economics and mechanism design solutions - Springer-Verlag, London, 2009, 274 pp, Price USD 99.00. 213-217

David A. Malueg, Ram Orzach: Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information. 219-254

Youngsub Chun, Boram Park: Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value. 255-270

Duygu Yengin: Characterizing the Shapley value in fixed-route traveling salesman problems with appointments. 271-299

P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Arkadi Predtetchinski: Sequential share bargaining. 301-323

Yi-Chun Chen, Jeffrey C. Ely, Xiao Luo: Note on unawareness: Negative Introspection versus AU Introspection (and KU Introspection). 325-329

Rafael Hortala-Vallve, Aniol Llorente-Saguer: Pure strategy Nash equilibria in non-zero sum colonel Blotto games. 331-343

Walter O. Krawec: Analyzing n-player impartial games. 345-367

Dimitri Dubois, Marc Willinger, Phu Nguyen Van: Optimization incentive and relative riskiness in experimental stag-hunt games. 369-380

Josep M. Izquierdo, Carles Rafels: A characterization of convex TU games by means of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (à la Shimomura). 381-395

Xiaoshu Xu, Dan Levin, Lixin Ye: Auctions with synergy and resale. 397-426

Hans Gersbach, Volker Hahn: Information acquisition and transparency in committees. 427-453

Yasunori Okumura: Spatial competition and collaboration networks. 455-472

Sebastian Bervoets, Vincent Merlin: Gerrymander-proof representative democracies. 473-488

Ryoji Sawa: Mutation rates and equilibrium selection under stochastic evolutionary dynamics. 489-496

André Casajus: Amalgamating players, symmetry, and the Banzhaf value. 497-515

Julio González-Díaz, Federica Briata, Ignacio García-Jurado, Fioravante Patrone: Essential collections for equilibrium concepts. 517-552

Peter Duersch, Jörg Oechssler, Burkhard C. Schipper: Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games. 553-564

Markus Brunner, Kai Jörg Sandner: Social comparison, group composition, and incentive provision. 565-602

Haruo Imai, Hannu Salonen: A characterization of a limit solution for finite horizon bargaining problems. 603-622

Gary E. Bolton, Jeannette E. Brosig-Koch: How do coalitions get built? Evidence from an extensive form coalition game with and without communication. 623-649

Marco Scarsini, Tristan Tomala: Repeated congestion games with bounded rationality. 651-669

Cesaltina Pacheco Pires, Sílvia Ferreira Jorge: Limit pricing under third-degree price discrimination. 671-698

Takuya Masuzawa: Strong convexity of NTU games. 699-705

Hans-Theo Normann, Brian Wallace: The impact of the termination rule on cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma experiment. 707-718

Lawrence Diffo Lambo, Bertrand Tchantcho, Joël Moulen: Comparing influence theories in voting games under locally generated measures of dissatisfaction. 719-731

Shmuel's introduction. 733

Robert J. Aumann: My scientific first-born. 735-736

Mukul Majumdar, Seung Han Yoo: Strategic analysis of influence peddling. 737-762

Peter H. Knudsen, Lars Peter Østerdal: Merging and splitting in cooperative games: some (im)possibility results. 763-774

Joseph M. Abdou: Stability and index of the meet game on a lattice. 775-789

Salvador Barberà, Dolors Berga, Bernardo Moreno: Group strategy-proof social choice functions with binary ranges and arbitrary domains: characterization results. 791-808

Guni Orshan, Peter Sudhölter: Nonsymmetric variants of the prekernel and the prenucleolus. 809-828

Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Biligbaatar Tumendemberel: Continuity of the value and optimal strategies when common priors change. 829-849

Hans Peters, Dries Vermeulen: WPO, COV and IIA bargaining solutions for non-convex bargaining problems. 851-884

Camelia Bejan, Juan Camilo Gómez: Axiomatizing core extensions. 885-898

Pedro Calleja, Carles Rafels, Stef Tijs: Aggregate monotonic stable single-valued solutions for cooperative games. 899-913

Hans Peters, Peter Sudhölter: Bezalel Peleg: a bibliography. 915-930

International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 41

Volume 41, Number 1, February 2012

Volume 41, Number 2, May 2012

Volume 41, Number 3, August 2012

Volume 41, Number 4, November 2012