Volume 75, Number 1, May 2012
: Communication and efficiency in auctions.
: Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers.
: Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games.
: A new stable and more responsive cost sharing solution for minimum cost spanning tree problems.
: Symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria.
: Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium.
Volume 75, Number 2, July 2012
: A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games.
: A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games.
: What money can't buy: Efficient mechanism design with costly signals.
: Deliberative democracy and electoral competition.
: School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action.
: Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale.
: Diffusion and cascading behavior in random networks.
: The influence relation for ternary voting games.
: Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game.
: Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare.
Rui R. Zhao
: Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting.
Scott Duke Kominers
: On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching.
: On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts.
: Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes.
: Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions.