Volume 75, Number 1, May 2012
Nenad Kos:
Communication and efficiency in auctions.
233-249
Arjan Non:
Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers.
319-336
Mathias Staudigl:
Stochastic stability in asymmetric binary choice coordination games.
372-401
Christian Trudeau:
A new stable and more responsive cost sharing solution for minimum cost spanning tree problems.
402-412
Notes
Mark Fey:
Symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria.
424-427
Makoto Shimoji:
Outcome-equivalence of self-confirming equilibrium and Nash equilibrium.
441-447
Volume 75, Number 2, July 2012
Andreas Blume:
A class of strategy-correlated equilibria in sender-receiver games.
510-517
Yi-Chun Chen:
A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games.
587-597
Daniele Condorelli:
What money can't buy: Efficient mechanism design with costly signals.
613-624
Patrick Hummel:
Deliberative democracy and electoral competition.
646-667
Fuhito Kojima:
School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action.
685-693
Bernard Lebrun:
Optimality and the English and second-price auctions with resale.
731-751
Marc Lelarge:
Diffusion and cascading behavior in random networks.
752-775
Cameron Parker:
The influence relation for ternary voting games.
867-881
Leonidas Spiliopoulos:
Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game.
921-935
Peter Troyan:
Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare.
936-947
Rui R. Zhao:
Renegotiation and conflict resolution in relational contracting.
964-983
Notes
Scott Duke Kominers:
On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching.
984-989
Laurent Lamy:
On minimal ascending auctions with payment discounts.
990-999
Toru Suzuki:
Competitive problem solving and the optimal prize schemes.
1009-1013
Simon Weidenholzer:
Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions.
1014-1024
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