Volume 74, Number 1, January 2012
: The collective action problem: Within-group cooperation and between-group competition in a repeated rent-seeking game.
: Comment on: "Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences".
, Brian Rogers
: A comment on "Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games" by V. Bhaskar [Games Econ. Behav. 32(2000) 247-262].
: Stochastic games with information lag.
: The fragility of information aggregation in large elections.
: The strategic value of recall.
: The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: The ex post contracting case.
C. Chameni Nembua
: Linear efficient and symmetric values for TU-games: Sharing the joint gain of cooperation.
: Agreeing to agree with uncountable information structures.
Volume 74, Number 2, March 2012
: Optimal auctions with asymmetric financial externalities.
: When too little is as good as nothing at all: Rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds.
: Non-bidding equilibrium in an ascending core-selecting auction.
: Optimal auctions with information acquisition.
: On the accessibility of core-extensions.
Philipp C. Wichardt
: Existence of valuation equilibria when equilibrium strategies cannot differentiate between equal ties.