Volume 67, Number 1, September 2009

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  David C. Parkes, Moshe Tennenholtz: Special Section of Games and Economic Behavior dedicated to the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. 1
• 
  Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz: Mediators in position auctions. 2-21
• 
  Moshe Babaioff, Robert Kleinberg, Christos H. Papadimitriou: Congestion games with malicious players. 22-35
• 
  Lawrence E. Blume, David A. Easley, Jon M. Kleinberg, Éva Tardos: Trading networks with price-setting agents. 36-50
• 
  Amir Epstein, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour: Strong equilibrium in cost sharing connection games. 51-68
• 
  Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer: Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments in multi-unit auctions. 69-98
• 
  Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy: Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity. 99-124
• 
  Aranyak Mehta, Tim Roughgarden, Mukund Sundararajan: Beyond Moulin mechanisms. 125-155
• 
  Michal Penn, Maria Polukarov, Moshe Tennenholtz: Congestion games with load-dependent failures: Identical resources. 156-173
• 
  Yogeshwer Sharma, David P. Williamson: Stackelberg thresholds in network routing games or the value of altruism. 174-190

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  Scott Ashworth, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita: Elections with platform and valence competition. 191-216
• 
  Stefano Barbieri, Andrea Mattozzi: Membership in citizen groups. 217-232
• 
  Charles Bellemare, Bruce Shearer: Gift giving and worker productivity: Evidence from a firm-level experiment. 233-244
• 
  Peter Borm, Arantza Estévez-Fernández, M. Gloria Fiestras-Janeiro: Competitive environments and protective behavior. 245-252
• 
  Anabela Botelho, Glenn W. Harrison, Lígia M. Costa Pinto, Elisabet E. Rutström: Testing static game theory with dynamic experiments: A case study of public goods. 253-265
• 
  Péter Csóka, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, László Á. Kóczy: Stable allocations of risk. 266-276
• 
  Yuk-fai Fong, Jay Surti: The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with side payments. 277-291
• 
  Miltiadis Makris: Private provision of discrete public goods. 292-299
• 
  Michael Mandler: Indifference and incompleteness distinguished by rational trade. 300-314
• 
  Gábor Virág: Efficiency and competition in the long run: The survival of the unfit. 315-330

• 
  Giorgos Stamatopoulos, Tami Tauman: On the superiority of fixed fee over auction in asymmetric markets. 331-333

Volume 67, Number 2, November 2009

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  Fabrizio Adriani, Luca G. Deidda: Price signaling and the strategic benefits of price rigidities. 335-350
• 
  Yaron Azrieli: Categorizing others in a large game. 351-362
• 
  Paulo Barelli: Consistency of beliefs and epistemic conditions for Nash and correlated equilibria. 363-375
• 
  James Bergin, Dan Bernhardt: Cooperation through imitation. 376-388
• 
  V. Bhaskar: Games played in a contracting environment. 389-398
• 
  Dirk Engelmann, Urs Fischbacher: Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation building in an experimental helping game. 399-407
• 
  Larry G. Epstein, Kyoungwon Seo: Subjective states: A more robust model. 408-427
• 
  Josep Freixas, William S. Zwicker: Anonymous yes-no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval. 428-444
• 
  Jacob K. Goeree, Arno Riedl, Aljaz Ule: In search of stars: Network formation among heterogeneous agents. 445-466
• 
  Volker Hahn: Reciprocity and voting. 467-480
• 
  Daniel Halbheer, Ernst Fehr, Lorenz Goette, Armin Schmutzler: Self-reinforcing market dominance. 481-502
• 
  Joseph Y. Halpern, Leandro Chaves Rêgo: Reasoning about knowledge of unawareness. 503-525
• 
  P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Ana Mauleon, Vincent Vannetelbosch: Farsightedly stable networks. 526-541
• 
  Florian Herold, Christoph Kuzmics: Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability. 542-551
• 
  Ed Hopkins, Tatiana Kornienko: Status, affluence, and inequality: Rank-based comparisons in games of status. 552-568
• 
  Roger Lagunoff: Dynamic stability and reform of political institutions. 569-583
• 
  Wooyoung Lim, Alexander Matros: Contests with a stochastic number of players. 584-597
• 
  Marina Núñez, Carles Rafels: A glove-market partitioned matrix related to the assignment game. 598-610
• 
  Robert Powell: Sequential, nonzero-sum "Blotto": Allocating defensive resources prior to attack. 611-615
• 
  E. Elisabet Rutström, Nathaniel T. Wilcox: Stated beliefs versus inferred beliefs: A methodological inquiry and experimental test. 616-632
• 
  Evan Shellshear, Peter Sudhölter: On core stability, vital coalitions, and extendability. 633-644
• 
  Nicholas Shunda: Auctions with a buy price: The case of reference-dependent preferences. 645-664
• 
  Anton Suvorov, Jeroen van de Ven: Discretionary rewards as a feedback mechanism. 665-681
• 
  Tristan Tomala: Perfect communication equilibria in repeated games with imperfect monitoring. 682-694
• 
  Christian Trudeau: Cost sharing with multiple technologies. 695-707
• 
  Elias Tsakas, Mark Voorneveld: The target projection dynamic. 708-719
• 
  Alexander Wolitzky: Fully sincere voting. 720-735

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  Alexander Guembel, Silvia Rossetto: Reputational cheap talk with misunderstanding. 736-744
• 
  John William Hatfield, Fuhito Kojima: Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts. 745-749
• 
  Igal Milchtaich: Weighted congestion games with separable preferences. 750-757

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