Volume 66, Number 1, May 2009 Regular Articles
, Jingfeng Lu
: The beauty of "bigness": On optimal design of multi-winner contests.
: Deterministic approximation of best-response dynamics for the Matching Pennies game.
John H. Kagel
, Dan Levin
: Implementing efficient multi-object auction institutions: An experimental study of the performance of boundedly rational agents.
William S. Neilson
: A theory of kindness, reluctance, and shame for social preferences.
: Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer.
: Random assignment under weak preferences.
László Á. Kóczy
: Sequential coalition formation and the core in the presence of externalities.
: Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability.
Volume 66, Number 2, July 2009
, Harold Kuhn
, Leo A. Goodman
, Dan McFadden
, Joel Sobel
, Ilan Adler
, Jacob Feldman
, Ahmet Alkan
, Katharine Gale
, Elizabeth Dunning
, Samara Watkiss
, Roger Gilbert
, Jonathan Birt
, Graham Ingham
, Sandra M. Gilbert
: The Berkeley Memorial.
: Sex and the mathematician: The High School Prom Theorem.
: Equilibrium and optimality: Some imprints of David Gale.
: ReGale: Some memorable results.
: Topological games at Princeton, a mathematical memoir.
: Commitment and observability in a contracting environment.
: Costly risk verification without commitment in competitive insurance markets.
: Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games.
: Budget-constrained sequential auctions with incomplete information.
Michael T. Rauh
: Strategic complementarities and search market equilibrium.