Volume 65, Number 1, January 2009

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  Rabah Amir, Robert J. Aumann, James Peck, Myrna Holtz Wooders: Introduction to the Special Issue of Games and Economic Behavior in honor of Martin Shubik. 1-6
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  Rabah Amir, Francis Bloch: Comparative statics in a simple class of strategic market games. 7-24
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  Aloisio Araujo, Luciano I. de Castro: Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values. 25-48
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  André Casajus: Outside options, component efficiency, and stability. 49-61
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  Claude d'Aspremont, Rodolphe Dos Santos Ferreira: Price-quantity competition with varying toughness. 62-82
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  Gabrielle Demange: The strategy structure of some coalition formation games. 83-104
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  Amrita Dhillon, Alexander Herzog-Stein: Games of status and discriminatory contracts. 105-123
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  Pradeep Dubey, Dieter Sondermann: Perfect competition in an oligopoly (including bilateral monopoly). 124-141
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  Isabel Grilo, Jean-François Mertens: Cournot equilibrium without apology: Existence and the Cournot inverse demand function. 142-175
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  Brit Grosskopf, Alvin E. Roth: If you are offered the Right of First Refusal, should you accept? An investigation of contract design. 176-204
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  Luis A. Guardiola, Ana Meca, Justo Puerto: Production-inventory games: A new class of totally balanced combinatorial optimization games. 205-219
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  Carlos Hervés-Beloso, Emma Moreno-García: Walrasian analysis via two-player games. 220-233
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  Leonidas C. Koutsougeras: Convergence of strategic behavior to price taking. 234-241
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  Annick Laruelle, Federico Valenciano: Cooperative bargaining foundations of the Shapley-Shubik index. 242-255
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  Paulo Klinger Monteiro: First-price auction symmetric equilibria with a general distribution. 256-269
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  Mário R. Páscoa, Abdelkrim Seghir: Harsh default penalties lead to Ponzi schemes. 270-286

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  Sergiu Hart: Proposals to host the Fourth World Congress of the Game Theory Society. 287
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  Shmuel Zamir, Salvador Barberà: A special issue of the IJGT in honor of Michael Maschler. 288

Volume 65, Number 2, March 2009

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  Nir Andelman, Michal Feldman, Yishay Mansour: Strong price of anarchy. 289-317
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  Jonas Björnerstedt, Andreas Westermark: Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities. 318-338
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  Dino Gerardi, Richard P. McLean, Andrew Postlewaite: Aggregation of expert opinions. 339-371
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  Ángel Hernando-Veciana: Information acquisition in auctions: Sealed bids vs. open bids. 372-405
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  Josef Hofbauer, Jörg Oechssler, Frank Riedel: Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics: The continuous strategy case. 406-429
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  Nathan Larson: Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions. 430-460
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  Theo Offerman, Andrew Schotter: Imitation and luck: An experimental study on social sampling. 461-502
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  Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters: Nash consistent representation of effectivity functions through lottery models. 503-515
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  Vlasta Pokladniková, Muhamet Yildiz: Moderation of an ideological party. 516-537
• 
  Amnon Rapoport, Tamar Kugler, Subhasish Dugar, Eyran J. Gisches: Choice of routes in congested traffic networks: Experimental tests of the Braess Paradox. 538-571
• 
  Pedro Rey-Biel: Equilibrium play and best response to (stated) beliefs in normal form games. 572-585
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  Dezsö Szalay: Contracts with endogenous information. 586-625
• 
  H. Peyton Young: Learning by trial and error. 626-643

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  Theo S. H. Driessen, Cheng-Cheng Hu: A note on equivalence of consistency and bilateral consistency through converse consistency. 644-648

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  Sergiu Hart: Proposals to host the Fourth World Congress of the Game Theory Society. 649

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