Volume 64, Number 1, September 2008

• 
  Nabil I. Al-Najjar: Large games and the law of large numbers. 1-34
• 
  Stefan Ambec, Lars Ehlers: Sharing a river among satiable agents. 35-50
• 
  Jean-Pierre Benoît, Efe A. Ok: Nash implementation without no-veto power. 51-67
• 
  Ioana Chioveanu: Advertising, brand loyalty and pricing. 68-80
• 
  Dean Corbae, John Duffy: Experiments with network formation. 81-120
• 
  Daniel Friedman, Daniel N. Ostrov: Conspicuous consumption dynamics. 121-145
• 
  Roberto Galbiati, Pietro Vertova: Obligations and cooperative behaviour in public good games. 146-170
• 
  Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel, Timothy C. Salmon: Revenue equivalence revisited. 171-192
• 
  Hideo Konishi, Margarita Sapozhnikov: Decentralized matching markets with endogenous salaries. 193-218
• 
  Dorothea Kübler, Wieland Müller, Hans-Theo Normann: Job-market signaling and screening: An experimental comparison. 219-236
• 
  Raúl López-Pérez: Aversion to norm-breaking: A model. 237-267
• 
  Antonio Nicolò, Yan Yu: Strategic divide and choose. 268-289
• 
  Marina Núñez, Carles Rafels: On the dimension of the core of the assignment game. 290-302
• 
  Joana Pais, Ágnes Pintér: School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms. 303-328

• 
  Giacomo Calzolari, Alessandro Pavan: On the use of menus in sequential common agency. 329-334
• 
  Bertrand Tchantcho, Lawrence Diffo Lambo, Roland Pongou, Bertrand Mbama Engoulou: Voters' power in voting games with abstention: Influence relation and ordinal equivalence of power theories. 335-350

Volume 64, Number 2, November 2008

• 
  Yael Maschler: In memory of my father. 352-354
• 
  Robert J. Aumann: Working with Mike. 355-360
• 
  Salvador Barberà: Michael Maschler in Barcelona. 361-362
• 
  Louis J. Billera: The mentor. 363
• 
  Daniel Granot: My referee and collaborator. 364
• 
  Ein-Ya Gura: A mathematics teacher. 365-366
• 
  Sergiu Hart: Michael's questions. 367
• 
  Hervé Moulin: An advocate of cooperative theory. 368
• 
  Guillermo Owen: Helping young game theorists. 369
• 
  Bezalel Peleg: My joint work with Michael Maschler. 370-371
• 
  Jos A. M. Potters, Stef Tijs: Michael Maschler in The Netherlands. 372
• 
  Hana Shemesh: Michael Maschler at the Center for the Study of Rationality. 373
• 
  Martin Shubik: In memory of Michael Maschler. 374
• 
  Eilon Solan: Learning from Michael Maschler and working with him. 375
• 
  Marilda Sotomayor: Michael Maschler, a special friend. 376-377
• 
  Oded Stark: Michael Maschler: My lost migration compass. 378-379
• 
  Federico Valenciano: Michael Maschler in Bilbao. 380
• 
  Myrna Holtz Wooders: In memory of Michael Maschler. 381
• 
  H. Peyton Young: Michael Maschler, game theory, and the Talmud. 382
• 
  Shmuel Zamir: Teacher, colleague and coauthor. 383-384
• 
  Shmuel Zamir: Biographical information: Michael B. Maschler. 385-387
• 
  Steven Callander: Majority rule when voters like to win. 393-420
• 
  Marco E. Castillo, Philip J. Cross: Of mice and men: Within gender variation in strategic behavior. 421-432
• 
  Michela Cella: Informed principal with correlation. 433-456
• 
  José R. Correa, Andreas S. Schulz, Nicolás E. Stier Moses: A geometric approach to the price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games. 457-469
• 
  Enrico G. De Giorgi, Stefan Reimann: The α-beauty contest: Choosing numbers, thinking intervals. 470-486
• 
  Raymond Deneckere, Sergei Severinov: Mechanism design with partial state verifiability. 487-513
• 
  Alex Dickson, Roger Hartley: The strategic Marshallian cross. 514-532
• 
  Lars Ehlers, Ton Storcken: Arrow's Possibility Theorem for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences. 533-547
• 
  Kjell Hausken: Whether to attack a terrorist's resource stock today or tomorrow. 548-564
• 
  Ratul Lahkar, William H. Sandholm: The projection dynamic and the geometry of population games. 565-590
• 
  Jordi Massó, Antonio Nicolò: Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences. 591-611
• 
  Ahuva Mu'alem, Noam Nisan: Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions. 612-631
• 
  Joana Pais: Incentives in decentralized random matching markets. 632-649
• 
  Maxwell Pak: Stochastic stability and time-dependent mutations. 650-665
• 
  William H. Sandholm, Emin Dokumaci, Ratul Lahkar: The projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic. 666-683

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