Volume 45, Number 1, October 2003

• 
  Ehud Kalai: Introduction to the Games 2000 Special Issue. 1
• 
  Robert J. Aumann: Presidential address. 2-14
• 
  Kenneth J. Arrow: Introductory remarks on the history of game theory. 15-18
• 
  Reinhard Selten, Klaus Abbink, Joachim Buchta, Abdolkarim Sadrieh: How to play (3×3)-games.: A strategy method experiment. 19-37
• 
  Pierpaolo Battigalli, Marciano M. Siniscalchi: Rationalizable bidding in first-price auctions. 38-72
• 
  Dean P. Foster, H. Peyton Young: Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium. 73-96
• 
  Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt, Thomas R. Palfrey: Risk averse behavior in generalized matching pennies games. 97-113
• 
  Joseph Y. Halpern: A computer scientist looks at game theory. 114-131
• 
  Xingwei Hu, Lloyd S. Shapley: On authority distributions in organizations: equilibrium. 132-152
• 
  Xingwei Hu, Lloyd S. Shapley: On authority distributions in organizations: controls. 153-170
• 
  Yakar Kannai: Costly Nash paths. 171-180
• 
  Daphne Koller, Brian Milch: Multi-agent influence diagrams for representing and solving games. 181-221
• 
  Richard P. McLean, Andrew Postlewaite: Informational size, incentive compatibility, and the core of a game with incomplete information. 222-241
• 
  Hervé Moulin, Richard Stong: Filling a multicolor urn: an axiomatic analysis. 242-269

Volume 45, Number 2, November 2003

• 
  Andrew Postlewaite, Robert Wilson: Introduction to the special issue in memory of Robert W. Rosenthal. 271-277
• 
  Balázs Szentes, Robert W. Rosenthal: Beyond chopsticks: Symmetric equilibria in majority auction games. 278-295
• 
  Ken Binmore, Larry Samuelson, Peyton Young: Equilibrium selection in bargaining models. 296-328
• 
  Douglas Gale, Shachar Kariv: Bayesian learning in social networks. 329-346
• 
  Uri Gneezy, Ernan Haruvy, Alvin E. Roth: Bargaining under a deadline: evidence from the reverse ultimatum game. 347-368
• 
  Srihari Govindan, Philip J. Reny, Arthur J. Robson: A short proof of Harsanyi's purification theorem. 369-374
• 
  Sergiu Hart, Andreu Mas-Colell: Regret-based continuous-time dynamics. 375-394
• 
  Eric Maskin, John Riley: Uniqueness of equilibrium in sealed high-bid auctions. 395-409
• 
  Richard P. McLean, Andrew Postlewaite: Informational size and incentive compatibility with aggregate uncertainty. 410-433
• 
  Martin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein: Sampling equilibrium, with an application to strategic voting. 434-441
• 
  Roy Radner, Thomas J. Richardson: Monopolists and viscous demand. 442-464
• 
  Muhamet Yildiz: Walrasian bargaining. 465-487
• 
  Robert J. Weber: Auction Theory: By Vijay Krishna. Academic Press, 2002. 488-497

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